

TOWARDS THE WEST:
SYSTEMIC TRANSFORMATIONS AND
TÜRKİYE'S STRATEGIC ORIENTATION

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Contents

FOREWORD.....	v
1. THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL SYSTEM CONCEPTS	8
1.1. The Concept of the System and Systems Theory.....	8
1.2. The Concept of the International System	12
1.2.1. Liberalism and Neoliberalism: The Concept of the System.....	15
1.2.2. Realism and Neorealism: The Concept of the System	19
1.2.3. Behaviouralism and the Concept of the System	25
2. HISTORICAL PROCESSES, THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM, AND TÜRKİYE	32
2.1. The Westphalian Phase of the International Order.....	32
2.2. Establishment, Development, and Outcomes of the Vienna System.....	39
2.3. The System Established by the 1856 Treaty of Paris following the Crimean War	47
2.4. The International System Established following the First World War ...	52
3. TÜRKİYE DURING THE SECOND WORLD WAR AND THE EARLY COLD WAR PERIOD	61
3.1. Turkish Foreign Policy Until the Second World War.....	61
3.1.1. Turkish Foreign Policy during the Atatürk Period.....	63
3.1.2. Turkish Foreign Policy During the İnönü Period.....	68
3.2. The Second World War: Blocs and Conflicts.....	70
3.3. Conferences that Shaped the System.....	73
3.4. The Establishment of the UN System.....	77
3.5. The Start of the Cold War: Actors and Processes.....	80
3.6. Turning Towards the West: Türkiye's Foreign Policy Orientation during and after the War.....	83
CONCLUSION	99
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	106

FOREWORD

Understanding international politics necessitates resolving the complex web of relations operating at different levels. The reasons behind any state's choice to either engage in cooperation or conflict must be sought in the nature of the system that determines the relations between various states. No state, no matter how powerful it is, can operate outside the boundaries and dynamics of the international system. This system shapes states' preferences, limits their options, and sometimes creates unexpected opportunities.

This study examines the transformation of the international system within a broad framework that spans three and a half centuries from the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 to the 1990s. However, it does not merely discuss the history of the system in an abstract manner; it also analyzes -within a historical context- Türkiye's search for a position within this system, its efforts to maintain this position, and the process through which the said country has determined its strategic orientation. The modern state system's foundations were laid in Westphalia, after which it acquired an institutional character at the Congress of Vienna. The said system entered a new phase with the establishment of the League of Nations after the First World War, and then it was radically reshaped during the Second World War and the Cold War. Amidst these major transformations, Türkiye emerged as an actor striving to determine its own direction within the constraints imposed by both its geographical location and its historical legacy.

Established after the dissolution of the Ottoman State (Empire), the Republic of Türkiye strived to rebuild its internal structure while simultaneously finding its place in a rapidly changing international environment. Having pursued a balanced foreign policy during the period between the two world wars and having developed pragmatic relations with the Soviet Union, Türkiye turned its attention to the West after the Second World War. This transformation was neither coincidental nor solely the result of external pressures. Although the Soviet Union's claims over the Turkish Straits and its claims over Eastern Anatolia brought Türkiye closer to the West, the country's foreign policy was driven by economic interests, security concerns, and a conscious strategic orientation aligned with the Republic's ideal of modernization. This orientation solidified with Türkiye's NATO membership in 1952 and formed the fundamental axis of Türkiye's foreign policy during the Cold War.

The first part of this study examines the concept of the international system within a theoretical framework and considers how approaches such as realism, liberalism, and behavioralism define the system, the questions these approaches address, and the types of explanatory models the said

approaches have developed. Following these theoretical foundations, the thesis examines the historical development of the modern international system along a line extending from Westphalia to Vienna, from the Crimean War to the First World War. Each turning point redefined the rules of the system, changed the balance of power, and gave rise to new institutions. The second part examines the impact of these transformations on Türkiye, comprehensively analyzing the cautious approach toward the West during Atatürk's era, the politics of balance during the İnönü era, and the critical foreign policy decisions made in the post-war period. The third part evaluates Türkiye's position within the Western Bloc during the Cold War in the context of its evolving asymmetrical relations with the United States, its NATO membership, its search for regional alliances, and its economic integration process.

This study is meant to appeal to readers of various levels of expertise. It aims to be a useful reference source for scholars with its theoretical depth and diverse literature, for students with its systematic structure and clear narrative, and for the general reader with its analytical approach that illuminates history's broader context. It is based on a comprehensive literature review; scientific articles, books, conference proceedings, archival documents, and official sources have been meticulously examined, and different approaches have been compared and discussed. At the same time, this work is not merely a literature compilation, as it is also an effort to give a more concrete character to systemic thinking through the example of Türkiye.

In terms of timeframe, this study covers a broad period starting from Westphalia to the end of the Cold War and examines Türkiye's orientation toward the West in three fundamental phases: the policy of balance pursued during the interwar period, the change of direction after the Second World War, and the foreign policy direction institutionalized within the Western alliance during the Cold War. This periodization is congruent with historical reality and is based on an analytical choice. Indeed, it is not possible to understand Türkiye's current foreign policy position and future orientations without grasping these historical and systemic transformations. History is not a series of isolated events, rather, it is a series of continuities formed by cause-and-effect relationships. This study aims to explain this continuity through the utilization of a systemic perspective.

The international system is currently undergoing a transformation. China's economic and military rise, Russia's renewed claim of being a global power, the debate concerning the hegemonic position of the US, and challenges such as climate change and migration are testing the system's stability. Türkiye once again finds itself at a historical threshold in terms of strategic choices. A proper understanding of the past is essential for forming

rational policies for the future. This work aims to contribute to attaining an understanding of the past and to making more accurate predictions of the future by connecting Türkiye's historical experience with the general dynamics of the international system.

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1. THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL SYSTEM CONCEPTS

1.1. The Concept of the System and Systems Theory

The concept of "*system*," which has been defined in various ways throughout history and has been addressed by many philosophers from Aristotle to Hegel in the context of comprehensive metaphysical structures explaining the world as a whole, emerged in early Ancient Greek philosophy as a conceptual framework denoting the totality of existence. This concept underwent certain transformations and evolved in meaning through different intellectual stages until the 20th century.¹ This has led to serious conceptual confusion in the field of international relations, since even in the English language alone the said concept encompasses many different meanings within its conceptual structure.

The concept of the system is defined in the Merriam-Webster Dictionary as a group of elements that form a unified whole, interact regularly, or are interdependent.² The Cambridge Dictionary defines it as a way or method of doing something,³ while the Oxford Dictionary defines it as an organized series of ideas or a specific way of doing something.⁴ Meanwhile, the Turkish Language Association Dictionary (*Türk Dil Kurumu Sözlüğü*) conceptualizes it as the sum of methods used to achieve a specific result.⁵ Given that the concept of system is explained with such varied definitions even in regular dictionaries, it is first necessary to establish a precise definition before examining this scientific phenomenon as a whole.

The general definition of a system is; "*a whole formed by elements*

¹ Emrah Utku Gökçe, "Sistem Kavramı ve Uluslararası İlişkiler Disiplinindeki Tanımları," *Avrasya Terim Dergisi*, Cilt:9, Sayı:2, 2021, (ss.1-11), p.1.

² "System Notion", <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/system>, (Accessed: 01.06.2024).

³ "Meaning of System", <https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/learner-english/system>, (Accessed: 01.06.2024)

⁴ "System Notion", <https://www.oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com/definition/english/system#:~:text=%2F%CB%88s%C9%AAst%C9%99m%2F-%2F%CB%88s%C9%AAst%C9%99m%2F,particular%20way%20of%20doing%20something>, (Accessed: 01.06.2024).

⁵ "Sistem", <https://sozluk.gov.tr/>, (Accessed:20.06.2024).

that interact with each other for a common purpose." In this context, the parts that make up the system are interdependent, and the system also contains many subsystems. Each subsystem is in constant interaction with other subsystems and the supersystem. Thus, a supersystem emerges from the entirety of subsystems interacting toward a common goal.⁶

When defining the concept of the system, John W. Burton draws attention to the relationships between the units that constitute it. According to Burton, the units of a system are elements of the same set. That is, they share common characteristics that form specific relationships between the units. These relationships encompass communication processes, mutual interactions, and forms of dependency.⁷ In short, Burton defines a system as *"the totality of relationships between objects and their qualities"* and considers the state as a unit of interaction within this system. Two basic approaches stand out within this framework, and they seek to explain the characteristics of the system, and particularly the role of the state within this system. The first of these is called the attributive approach. According to this approach, the power of the state is an inherent characteristic and is based on measurable physical capacities. The other approach is based on a behavioral perspective and defines power as a phenomenon related to the actions of states in the international system. In this second approach, power is understood as an interactive process that connects various states. As can be understood from this, both approaches have different assumptions about and theoretical bases for explaining the phenomenon of *"national power."*⁸

After defining the concept of system in general terms, it is necessary to address its specific meaning in the field of international relations. In this context, the political system emerges as an analytical method used to explain the relationship between the political structure and political processes. At the center of this approach are all the elements of political structure and the mechanisms of its functioning. The political system is also defined as the entirety of organizational arrangements developed to designate and realize societal objectives. Therefore, to properly understand the political system, it is necessary to understand the fundamentals of general systems theory that forms the theoretical

⁶ J. Burton, "A Systems Approach to International Relations", *International Social Science Journal*, Vol:26, No:1, 1974, (pp.22-33), p.22.

⁷ Burton, p.22.

⁸ U. Khasanov, "System as a Paradigm of International Relations", *Issues of Theory, Methodology and Practice of International Studies*, Vol:4, No:86, 2018. (pp.81-97), p.86.

framework of the political system.⁹

When discussing General Systems Theory, it is necessary to first mention the approach of biologist Ludwig von Bertalanffy. Bertalanffy observed that systems in nature constantly exchange energy and matter with their environment, and he developed a mathematical model based on these observations.¹⁰ This model, called "*General Systems Theory*," initially opened new areas of research in the field of biology and eventually transformed into an interdisciplinary paradigm. Thus, the concept of "*system*" ceased to be a solely philosophical or scientific category and acquired the quality of a worldview that integrates different scientific disciplines.¹¹ According to Bertalanffy, the fundamental objectives of General Systems Theory can be summarized as follows:¹²

- There is a general tendency toward natural and social integration in different scientific branches.
- This tendency toward integration finds a central focus in general systems theory.
- This theory can be an important tool for achieving definitive theoretical explanations in non-physical areas of science.
- It can contribute to the goal of unity in science by providing vertical integration among individual scientific disciplines.
- In this context, it lays the groundwork for the interdisciplinary integration of scientific education.

The concept of system gained importance in the discipline of Political Science with David Easton's work.¹³ The system model developed by Easton is considered to be one of the most comprehensive models in this field.¹⁴ Easton, who focused on national-level political systems, examined the stability exhibited by various political systems despite the significant changes that have occurred around the world. Focusing on national-level

⁹ Hande Bilgin, "Sistem Teorisi ve Yeni Sistemin Politika Kurulları", *Erzincan Binalı Yıldırım Üniversitesi İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi Dergisi*, Cilt:4, Sayı:2, 2022, (ss.53-70), p.55.

¹⁰ Mustafa Yalçınkaya, "Açık Sistem Teorisi ve Okula Uygulamaları," *Gazi Eğitim Fakültesi Dergisi*, Cilt: 22, Sayı: 2, 2002, (ss.103-116), p.104.

¹¹ Yunus Yoldaş, "*İşlevsel-Yapısal Sistem Kuramı*", Alfa Aktüel, İstanbul, 2007, pp.7-14.

¹² Ludwig von Bertalanffy, *General System Theory*, New York, 1969, p.38.

¹³ See: David Easton, *The Political System*, Alfred Knopf, New York, 1971.

¹⁴ Kemali Saybaşılı, *Siyaset Biliminde Temel Yaklaşımlar*, Ankara Birey Toplum Yayınları, 1985, pp.23-24.

political systems, Easton examined how political systems have maintained their stability despite major transformations that have occurred worldwide. Easton's system theory has been evaluated from different perspectives over time by numerous studies that are either supportive or critical of Easton's original work. Şirin Tekeli has classified the criticisms under three headings:

1. Studies that directly analyze the system theory itself.
2. Methodological critiques of Easton by practitioners.
3. Studies comparing Easton's system model with other theories.¹⁵

Easton drew inspiration from the ideas of Max Weber and Talcott Parsons when developing his system approach. This approach, which aims to explain political processes in society within a "system" framework, attempts to analyze complex interaction networks using an "input-output" model. In this context, Easton's political system model defines the demands and support received from the system's environment as the "input," and the decisions and policies produced in response to these inputs as the "output." Consequently, the political system concept developed by Easton approaches political life as a dynamic interaction process consisting of inputs and outputs.¹⁶ This model aims not only to understand the conditions of political stability but also to explain the limits and forms of political change within the system.

As stated above, Easton classified the demands and supports that determine the functioning of the political system under the concept of "inputs." In contrast, the system's responses to these inputs, namely the decisions made and actions taken, are grouped under the heading of "outputs." In this context, social demands must be clearly expressed and they must exert a certain pressure or tension on the system. This is because social support for the political system may decline and the system's legitimacy may thus be undermined if the said system fails to respond adequately to demands from its environment.¹⁷ In this context, the concept

¹⁵ See: Şirin Tekeli, David Easton'un Siyaset Teorisine Katkısı Üzerine Bir İnceleme" İstanbul Üniversitesi İktisat Fakültesi Yayınları İstanbul, 1976; Hasan Topbaş, David Easton'un Siyasal Sistem Teorisi Bağlamında Türkiye'de Siyasal İletişim ve Siyasal Katılma (Erzurum Seçmeni Üzerine Bir Araştırma), (Gazi Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Halkla İlişkiler ve Tanıtım Anabilim Dalı, Doktora Tezi), Ankara, 2009, p.58.

¹⁶ Selçuk Akıncı, "Siyasal Katılım Düzeyleri Üzerine Bir İnceleme", *Karadeniz Teknik Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi*, Sayı:7, 2014, (ss.33-45), p.35.

¹⁷ Abdullah Dinçkol, "Siyasal Sistem Kuramı Çerçevesinde Kamu Yönetimi Alt Sistemi", *İstanbul Ticaret Üniversitesi Dergisi*, Cilt: 3, Sayı: 6, 2004, (ss.61-93), p.67.

of "support" refers to any contribution or resource that ensures the continuity of the political system in meeting demands. Support manifests itself in the form of individuals' or groups' positive attitudes, obedience, and loyalty towards the political system. Support that is concretely demonstrated in the form of action is called *overt support*, while support that manifests itself in the form of attitudes, beliefs, or feelings is called *covert support*.

After defining the political system, Easton argues that other systems inside and outside the political system form its environment. The political system is one of many systems that constitute a society, and it is often interdependent with other various systems representing religious, economic, and cultural authorities in a society in terms of the exchange (transactions) that occur between them. Easton divides the environment of the political system into two parts: the internal (intra-societal) environment, which is formed by the ecological, biological, and personality systems that connect societies, and the external (extra-societal) environment, which is formed by international political systems, international ecological systems, and international social systems and is situated outside the social environment in which the political system is located.¹⁸

As can be understood from what was discussed above, one of the most important consequences of the concept of the system and the approaches to it is the realization that international relations should not be examined solely by focusing on the internal structure of the state. This is because there is a broader structure beyond the internal system of the state that consists of the interactions between states. This structure manifests itself as the international system that determines the general dynamics of international relations.

1.2. The Concept of the International System

The system is one of the most important concepts in the discipline of International Relations. Without this concept, it is extremely difficult to legitimize the system of international relations as a separate category. This is because it allows the discipline to be distinguished from law, economics, and history. The interaction of units within the international order and the description of the order are provided by the concept of the system. In addition, the concept of the international system characterizes the nature and essence of the international order and reveals how it affects the actors and behaviors within the order. The international system is therefore a

¹⁸ David Easton, *A Framework for Political Analysis*, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, Prentice-Hall 1965, pp.59-62. Naklen: Hasan Topbaş, p.61.

critical variable affecting international relations.¹⁹ Furthermore, the system can be characterized in various ways; as an explanation (for the nature and character of the international order), a goal (towards a final state or equilibrium point), a structure that operates independently of actors and maintains order, a process (as in, a series of interconnected and coherent events), etc.²⁰

In international political studies, the concept of the system is categorized as the world system and the international system. While the world system is primarily used to analyze or define global political-economic situations, the international system is to analyze the implications of international politics or relations. Additionally, the international system encompasses a series of diplomatic or military actions. Another point to emphasize regarding the international system is that it was accepted as an academic term in the late 1950s.²¹ However, even though this concept has been subject to scientific studies since the 20th century, this does not mean that it has no historical background.

The origins of the modern international system lie in the rules and norms agreed upon by the sovereign states that began to emerge in Europe in the 15th century in order to regulate their relations with one another.²² The development of the notion of sovereign states was fundamentally driven by the Holy Roman Empire's loss of authority over European states beginning in the 13th century, resulting in the Empire's diminished ability to influence global developments, the formation of European political unions through the joining of princes, nobles, and guilds, the nationalist sentiments that developed as a result of the political ties established between the monarchies of Spain, Portugal, France, and England and their peoples, and the significant role of technological development.²³ However, the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia is generally accepted as the beginning of the modern international system. This is because the global system began to evolve after the order that emerged with the Treaty of Westphalia, allowing the international system, which had previously been based solely on the balance of power among the great powers, to manifest itself in different

¹⁹ Emrah Utku Gökçe, p.6.

²⁰ Emrah Utku Gökçe, pp.5-6.

²¹ Ryūhei Hatsuse, "International System", *Government and Politics*, Vol:2, (pp.1-14), p.1.

²² A. Nuri Yurdusev, "Uluslararası İlişkiler Öncesi Devlet, Sistem ve Kimlik", *Devlet, Sistem ve Kimlik*, Atilla Eralp (der.) içinde, İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul, 2019, p.15.

²³ A. Nuri Yurdusev, pp.15-16.

ways.²⁴

Although this system initially manifested itself only in the European geography, it eventually spread throughout the world, primarily through colonialism and other factors.²⁵ The Treaty of Westphalia, signed in 1648, ended the Thirty Years' War that began in 1618 between Protestants and Catholics in Germany and eventually involved a number of European states. Although the war began as a religious conflict, it gradually took on political significance and resulted in the fragmentation of Germany.²⁶ Ultimately, this treaty gave rise to a system of states with regular relations between each other based on certain rules, which became what is known today as the international system.²⁷ With this, the concept of the state, rather than dynasty or religion, became central to the European state structure. In this vein, the "right to sovereignty within one's own borders" established by Westphalia eventually led to the spread of this system throughout the world. Furthermore, the states that accepted the terms of the treaty formed a defensive front against external intervention.²⁸

This system exhibited different characteristics during different periods until the end of the First World War. These periods cover the years 1648-1789, 1790-1814, 1815-1870, and 1871-1918.²⁹ Britain assumed the role of a system balancer in each of these periods.³⁰ However, the concept of the international system, which has been subject to constant change, has been the focus of serious debate in academic circles since the 20th century. In this context, different theories of international relations have brought different approaches to the subject of the international system.³¹ The

²⁴ Gökhan Binzat, "Hegemon Devlet, Uluslararası Sistem ve Yükselen Güçler", (Çukurova Üniversitesi, Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, Uluslararası İlişkiler Ana Bilim Dalı, Yayınlanmamış Yüksek Lisans Tezi), Adana, 2020, p.91

²⁵ Faruk Sönmezoğlu, *Uluslararası İlişkilere Giriş*, DER Yayınları, İstanbul, 2017, p.15.

²⁶ Yalçın Alganer, Müzeyyen Özlem Çetin, "Avrupa'da Birlik ve Bütünleşme Hareketleri (1)," *Marmara Üniversitesi İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Dergisi*, Sayı:2, 2007, (ss. 285-309), p.292.

²⁷ Oral Sander, *Siyasi Tarih. İlk Çağlardan 1918'e*, İmge Kitabevi Yayınları, İstanbul, 2023, pp.100-101.

²⁸ Henry Kissinger, *Dünya Düzeni*, çev: Sinem Sultan Gül, Bayner Yayınları, İstanbul, 2016, p.38.

²⁹ Faruk Sönmezoğlu, p.15.

³⁰ Henry Kissinger, p.44.

³¹ İskender Serdar, "Neorealizm, Neoliberalizm, Konstrüktivizm ve İngiliz Okulu Modellerinde Uluslararası Sistemsel Değişikliklere Bakış", *The Journal of Europe – Middle East Social Science Studies*, Sayı:1, 2015, (ss.14-38), p.14.

various approaches to the concept of the international system are detailed below within the context of some fundamental international relations theories.

1.2.1. Liberalism and Neoliberalism: The Concept of the System

The emergence of the discipline of International Relations as an academic field also brought debates about the concept of the system to the agenda. The theoretical foundations of this discipline are largely based on liberalism. Following the great destruction caused by the First World War, a group of academics and statesmen developed various proposals and analyses to prevent similarly destructive wars from happening again. These proposals eventually formed the basis of the school of thought known as Liberalism or Idealism.³² The Idealist approach was based on the idea that international peace could be achieved, and wars could be prevented through cooperation between states. This idea spread rapidly, especially through universities in the post-war period, and became the dominant paradigm in the early stages of discipline. In subsequent times, the term "Idealism" was used by realist thinkers to criticize this approach.³³

The intellectual origins of the theory of liberalism that emerged immediately after the war are based on the Enlightenment³⁴ period's idea of rational progress,³⁵ since the Enlightenment period's ideas had a significant impact on the policies and analyses developed by the theory.³⁶ Scientific and political developments in 17th-century Europe led to the birth of the Enlightenment idea. Although these developments paved the way for modern changes, the international system that emerged after the

³² Ramazan Gözen, *İdealizm, Uluslararası İlişkiler Teorileri*, der: Ramazan Gözen, İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul, 2021, p.73.

³³ Beril Dedeoğlu, *Uluslararası Güvenlik ve Strateji*, Der Yayınları, İstanbul, 2001, p.39.

³⁴ The period beginning with the English Revolution of 1688 and ending with the French Revolution of 1789 is considered the Age of Enlightenment in Europe. Enlightenment thought recognizes the individual as a rational being and argues that human activity can lead to a more progressive and advanced order. See: Mehmet Ali Ağaoğulları, *Political Thought in the West from Socrates to the Jacobins*, İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul, 2016, p.518.

³⁵ Atilla Eralp, "Uluslararası İlişkiler Disiplinin Oluşumu: İdealizm-Realizm Tartışması", *Devlet, Sistem ve Kimlik*, der: Atilla Eralp, içinde, İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul, 2019, Atilla Eralp, "Uluslararası İlişkiler Disiplinin Oluşumu: İdealizm-Realizm Tartışması", *Devlet, Sistem ve Kimlik*. Atilla Eralp (der.) içinde, İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul 2004, (ss.57-88), p.62.

³⁶ Ramazan Gözen, p.97.

collapse of the Holy Roman Empire had an anarchic structure. In such an environment, various states' efforts to arm themselves for protection in the system and survive in a competitive environment triggered a state of war. In other words, the concept of modernity advocated by the Enlightenment also led to negative consequences. This process necessitated the development of new ideas to resolve the current situation at that time, and thinkers of the Enlightenment era, such as J. Locke, J.J. Rousseau, I. Kant, J. Bentham, and R. Cobden, made proposals for the establishment of a peaceful international system. While Smith and Cobden subjected idealism in the field of international relations to economic evaluation, Kant and Bentham focused more on the political dimension of idealist ideas.³⁷

In addition to all this, the ideas of US President Woodrow Wilson played a decisive role in the development of the liberalism/idealism theory. The League of Nations was established in line with Wilson's ideas of open diplomacy, the right to self-determination, and forming international organizations. According to Wilson, with the creation of the League of Nations, the concept of collective security would prevail in the international system and the traditional balance of power system would give way to an order based on peace. Furthermore, the new international system to be institutionalized under the leadership of the League of Nations would aim to prevent wars and establish lasting peace through a progressive approach.³⁸ The Fourteen Points developed by Wilson subsequently became the fundamental principles of idealism, and this theory took shape around three main concepts of *peace, freedom, and democracy*.³⁹ Among these three concepts, the phenomenon of peace came to the fore, as peace was seen as an essential condition for the continuation of the international order and it became the fundamental element that united theorists who embraced liberal thought in different periods. Kant even argued that humans are naturally inclined to cooperate and that this tendency, guided by reason, could lead to lasting peace through the establishment of an international legal order and various institutions.⁴⁰

In this context, Jeremy Bentham, who approached idealism from a different perspective, drew attention to the principle of utilitarianism. According to Bentham, the correctness of an action or order can be

³⁷ Lerna K. Yanık, "Liberalizm: Bir Yazın Değerlendirmesi", *Uluslararası İlişkiler Akademik Dergi*, Cilt:12, Sayı:46, 2022, (ss.35-55), p.36.

³⁸ Atilla Eralp, p.63.

³⁹ Eric Hobsbawn, *Kısa 20. Yüzyıl 1914-1991 Aşırılıklar Çağı*, Çev: Yavuz Alogan, Sarmal Yayınevi, İstanbul, 1996, pp.133-134.

⁴⁰ Immanuel Kant, *Ahlak Metafiziğinin Temellendirilmesi*, Çev: İoanna Kuçuradi, Türkiye Felsefe Kurumu Yayınları, Ankara, 2013, p.46.

evaluated based on whether it provides the greatest happiness for humanity. Within this framework, institutions such as international law and international courts should be seen as mechanisms that will provide the greatest benefit and minimize errors. According to Bentham, such a legal order will contribute to the sustainability of international peace by reducing the possibility of war to the lowest level.⁴¹

Based on the above, it can be said that the theory of idealism essentially attributes the causes of human negative tendencies to environmental conditions. In this regard, two fundamental solutions emerge for eliminating existing negative tendencies. The first is that the negative environmental conditions in which individuals find themselves must be improved through reforms. If similar tendencies persist despite this, it is considered possible to transform human behavior through education and resolve problems peacefully within the framework of international law. Second, neither the state nor the international system is entirely homogeneous in structure. The international system is not solely comprised of states but is as a holistic structure involving the interaction of social groups, individuals, and international organizations. Nevertheless, idealism, within the context of international law, particularly emphasizes that the relationships between units within the system are regulated by common norms and values.⁴²

After discussing liberalism theory, which is based on the idea that the international system should serve the individual's life and freedom and emphasizes that the system consists not only of states but also of non-state actors, and which treats these actors as units of analysis, another theory that deserves attention and which was frequently discussed in the 1970s is neoliberalism. Neoliberalism is, according various perspectives, a school of thought that supports right-wing ideology, a reflection of the process of Americanization, or a school of thought with a much broader meaning that is not limited to either the free market economy or to capital mobility.⁴³ This theory emerged at a time when the international system was facing a deep crisis. However, this does not mean that the historical origins of neoliberalism can be limited to the 1970s. Indeed, following the Great Depression of 1929, it became apparent that the values advocated by classical liberalism were insufficient to meet the needs of the time, leading liberal thinkers to seek alternatives. It was through these explorations that

⁴¹ Andrew Heywood, *Political Theory: An Introduction*, Palgrave MacMillan, Basingstoke, Hampshire, New York, 2004, pp.358-359.

⁴² Ramazan Gözen, pp.99-102.

⁴³ Zafer Çelik, "Neoliberalizmin Kısa Tarihi", *İdealkent*, Sayı:7, 2012 (ss. 187-193), pp.189-190.

neoliberal values began to take shape, and studies reached a general consensus that neoliberalism serves four fundamental objectives.⁴⁴

The first of neoliberalism's four fundamental objectives refers to a transformation process based on economic reforms. Within this framework, liberalization in trade and industry was encouraged and the privatization of public enterprises became a priority. The second objective is the creation of a rule-based development model. Whereas political and economic interests were at the forefront in previous development approaches, the new model envisaged the reorganization of the relationship between the state and the market within a specific set of rules. Thirdly, the neoliberal approach aims to integrate ethical values into economic activities within a new ideological framework. Thus, the aim is to give the functioning of the market not only an economic but also a moral and normative dimension. Finally, the fourth objective is to balance the relationship between the free market and individual values with an effective management approach. In this regard, neoliberalism envisions building a management model that will ensure both the protection of individual freedoms and the efficient functioning of market mechanisms.

As can be understood from this, liberalism and neoliberalism attempt to interpret the international system within the framework of their own value systems. As mentioned above, liberalism centers on an individual-based understanding of freedom in the international system and views the state as a tool for protecting individual freedom. While liberals do not completely reject the importance of military power, they emphasize the decisive role of economic values in the international system.⁴⁵ This is because, according to them, the concept of security is not limited to protecting territorial integrity or the survival of the state. Security should be approached as a multidimensional concept, encompassing military, economic, political, and social dimensions.⁴⁶ Therefore, the international system must be shaped based on this multidimensional understanding of security. In contrast, neoliberals redefine the role of the state in the international system, placing it in a more prominent position. According to the neoliberal understanding, the fundamental purpose of the state is to maximize profits and increase its ability to act independently in the international competitive environment. In this respect, neoliberalism

⁴⁴ T. Ganti, "Neoliberalism", *Annual Review of Anthropology*, No:43, 2014, (pp.89-104), p.91.

⁴⁵ Agil Mammadov, p.20.

⁴⁶ Nasih Sarp Ergüven, "Uluslararası Hukuk Açısından Güvenlik Kavramının Teorik Temelleri", *Ankara Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Dergisi*, Cilt:65, Sayı: 3, 2016 (ss.771-835), p.771.

preserves the individual-centered emphasis on freedom of classical liberalism, but places greater weight on the economic and structural capacity of the state.

1.2.2. Realism and Neorealism: The Concept of the System

When discussing theories of international relations, the theory of realism must inevitably be discussed as well. This theory emerged as a reaction to the views put forward by idealism in the international environment that took shape after the Second World War.⁴⁷ Developing various assumptions about the international system, realism essentially argues that human nature determines politics, that humans are inherently self-interested and aggressive, that international politics consists solely of a struggle for power and authority, and that the loss of power is equivalent to the loss of statehood.⁴⁸

When evaluated within the historical process, it can be seen that the emergence of the theory of realism coincided with the early 1930s. During this period, the international system entered a serious crisis. The great economic depression that began in the United States at the end of 1929 and which spread throughout the world led to the collapse of the international economic order. In addition, rising nationalist movements in Germany and Japan (which emerged defeated from the First World War), the rise of fascist regimes, the efforts to reshape the international system, the failure of idealism's ideas for a peaceful world order to prevent war, and the ineffectiveness of the League of Nations were decisive factors in the birth of realism. Therefore, the rise of realism to prominence should be seen as a result of this turbulent international environment characterized by economic crises, political instability, and the failure of idealistic approaches.⁴⁹

Realism theory is broadly divided into two main categories: classical realism and structural realism (neorealism). Over time, the proponents of these two approaches reached consensus on some fundamental assumptions. Accordingly, a common understanding has been developed on the following points: a) nature itself has a competitive structure, b) the international system is inherently anarchic, c) the fundamental actors of the system are states, d) the primary goal of states is to maintain their existence in the international system, and e) the fundamental tool of this struggle is power. In this context, the values defended by classical realism should be addressed first. The intellectual

⁴⁷ Mustafa Aydın, "Uluslararası İlişkilerin Gerçekçi Teorisi: Kökeni, Kapsamı, Kritiği", *Uluslararası İlişkiler*, Cilt:1, Sayı: 1, 2004, (ss.33-60), p.34.

⁴⁸ Agil Mammadov, p.19.

⁴⁹ Atilla Eralp, pp.68-69.

foundation of classical realism is formed by the ideas of thinkers such as Thucydides, Niccolò Machiavelli, and Thomas Hobbes.⁵⁰ These thinkers emphasized the self-interested and conflictual nature of human beings, arguing that the pursuit of power is inevitable at both the individual and state levels.

Thucydides' works highlight a methodological realism approach, systematically analyzing events that unfold within a specific logical framework governing the functioning of political relations. In his work *The Peloponnesian War*, the thinker explains the fundamental cause of the war as the fear and anxiety that Athens' growing power created in Sparta (the Lacedaemonians). This situation led the Spartans to violate the existing peace treaty and ultimately caused war to break out between the parties.⁵¹ Thucydides, while examining human nature, concluded that it has an unchanging quality. He emphasized that individuals are driven by feelings of interest, power, and pride. He also noted that the sphere of influence of money expanded during the Athenian–Spartan War and considered money to be an even more powerful force than weapons in certain cases. In this work, considered a turning point in the development of the theory of realism, Thucydides also expressed the concept of balancing. According to him, the disruption of the balance of power between states inevitably paves the way for new conflicts.⁵²

Niccolò Machiavelli must undoubtedly be mentioned when discussing classical realist thought. Machiavelli argued that the state should have a central position in the formation of the international political order and gave realism a transformative meaning. He set out these views in detail in his 1513 work *The Prince*.⁵³ According to Machiavelli, politicians (or in other words, statesmen), play a decisive role within the system. In this context, rulers must first protect their own power and then the survival of the state. If politicians realize they cannot compete within the framework of legal rules, they must know how to eliminate their rivals through power and trickery. This is because, according to Machiavelli, there is no moral or legal framework that limits the state's use of power. This approach, which

⁵⁰ Seda Gözde Tokatlı, "Klasik Realizm ve Neorealizm Kuramının İncelenmesi: Devlet Kavramına Yönelik Analiz", *Ufuk Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi*, Cilt:11, Sayı:21, 2022 (ss.122-141), p.124.

⁵¹ Steven Forde, "Varieties of Realism: Thucydides and Machiavelli", *Journal of Politics*, Vol:54, No:2, 1992, (pp.372-393), p.374.

⁵² Dursun Murat Düzgün, "Realizm Teorisinin Ortaya Çıkışı ve Gelişme Evreleri", *Karadeniz Uluslararası Bilimsel Dergisi*, Sayı:47, 2020, (ss. 256-276), p.259.

⁵³ Nicolo Machiavelli, *Hükümdar*, çev. Necdet Adabağ, İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, İstanbul, 2019, p.1.

interprets politics as an activity independent of morality and based on power and interests, has had a profound impact on the formation of realist theory.⁵⁴

Hans J. Morgenthau played a decisive role in the development of realism after the Second World War. Influenced by Thomas Hobbes' understanding of the state of nature, Morgenthau argued that for humans to escape war, they must transfer their self-governing authority to a higher authority, namely the state. According to Morgenthau, power struggles become an inevitable phenomenon in the context of international politics. In this vein, Morgenthau transformed realism into a systematic theory and clearly set out its basic principles.⁵⁵

Furthermore, Morgenthau rejected idealism's optimistic and conciliatory approach to human nature, arguing that humans are inherently selfish and self-interested. In his thinking, the concept of "national interest" (*raison d'état*) occupies a central position. According to Morgenthau, states, just like individuals, compete to protect and strengthen their own interests. In this context, realists have considered the efforts to establish international institutions and create a global society, as advocated by idealists, to be a utopian approach. Morgenthau established a direct relationship between national interest and power, arguing that national interest determines continuity and stability in state behavior.⁵⁶ In this framework, the "*six fundamental principles of political realism*" he developed are worth remembering. According to Morgenthau's political realism:⁵⁷

- Society and politics are governed by objective laws derived from human nature.
- The foundation of political realism is built upon the concept of interest.
- Power is seen as the fundamental mechanism that directs and controls human behavior in political realism.
- There is always a tension between political activities and moral principles.
- The moral law accepted by realism does not encompass a universal truth that applies to everyone.
- Political realism argues that the political sphere has its own unique

⁵⁴ Nicolo Machiavelli, p.10.

⁵⁵ Dursun Murat Düzgün, p.262.

⁵⁶ Atilla Eralp, pp.72-74.

⁵⁷ Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1978, pp.4-11.

autonomy.

Based on these principles, it can be concluded that Morgenthau assessed the world as an order dominated by conflicting national interests and defined this perspective as "*realism*."

When discussing realist theorists, it is also worth mentioning the important role E.H. Carr played in shaping the theory of realism through his criticisms of idealism. In his 1939 work, *The Twenty Years' Crisis: 1919–1939*, Carr characterized idealists as utopians and emphasized that they ignored the decisive role played by power in the international system. According to him, idealists constructed a world design detached from reality, relying solely on the assumption that reason would guide states, without taking military and material elements into account.⁵⁸

Based on the arguments put forward by realist theorists who lived in different periods and adopted their own research methods, we can conclude that the international system has an anarchic structure. In this anarchic order, the absence of hierarchical supreme authority over states often leads to conflicts of interest being resolved through war. Within this framework, the primary goal of states is to protect and sustain their own existence.⁵⁹ Therefore, the theory of realism, based on the understanding that "*there are no permanent friends or enemies; only permanent interests*," is built on four fundamental assumptions. The first is the absence of sovereign authority to control the use of power; the second is that states are the dominant and rational actors in the international system; the third is that states are in constant competition and strive to maximize their power; and the fourth is that national interests are of vital importance in determining state policies.⁶⁰

Thus far, we have discussed the arguments defended by classical realist theorists according to their way of thinking. However, as mentioned above, realism is not limited to the representatives of the classical school. At this point, it is necessary to consider the approach of neorealism, also known as structural realism. In the 1970s, a general trend emerged in the discipline of international relations toward developing new theoretical approaches, but no consensus was reached among the theories put forward during this process. The main reason for this was the widespread disagreement regarding the nature of the international system at the time. In such an environment of disagreement, realist thinkers realized that it was

⁵⁸ Edward Hallet Carr, *Yirminci Yüzyıl Krizi 1919-1939*, çev. Can Cemgil, İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, İstanbul, 2020, p.14.

⁵⁹ Gökhan Binzet, p.28.

⁶⁰ Jonathan Monten, "Thucydides and Modern Realism", *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol:50, Issue:1, 2006, (pp.-25), p.8.

inevitable to consider the international structure as a decisive factor. As a result of this awareness, realism underwent a process of transformation within itself, and neorealism began to take shape in response to the criticisms directed at classical realism. In this context, neorealists sought to analyze the international system as a whole, taking into account the economic and structural dynamics that classical realism had overlooked.⁶¹

Kenneth N. Waltz deserves special mention when discussing the theory of neorealism. The systems theory developed by Waltz is fundamentally based on the equation "*unit + structure + distribution of power*."⁶² According to Waltz, who is considered to be one of the founding figures of neorealism, the international system is a whole consisting of a political structure and the units (states) interacting within this structure.⁶³ This system, which exhibits continuity from a structural perspective, has a decentralized (or anarchic) character.⁶⁴ The primary goal of states, which are the basic units of the system, is to ensure their survival. Waltz emphasizes the anarchic nature of the system, stating that this situation stems from states perceiving each other as potential threats.⁶⁵ In this context, neorealists differ from classical realists in the following respect: According to neorealists, power is "*not an ultimate goal to be achieved, but rather a tool to be used when necessary*."⁶⁶ Therefore, Waltz seeks the source of the power struggle not in human nature, as classical realists would argue, but in the structure of the international system. With this approach, Waltz shifts realism from an individual-centered perspective to a system-centered analytical framework.⁶⁷

Waltz also argues that a bipolar international system is more stable than a multipolar system.⁶⁸ According to him, in a bipolar system, major

⁶¹ Mustafa Aydın, "Uluslararası İlişkilerde Yaklaşım, Teori ve Analiz", *Ankara Üniversitesi SBF Dergisi*, Cilt:51, Sayı: 1, 1996, (ss.71-114), p.99.

⁶² Süleyman Elik, "Uluslararası Politikada Sistem Düşüncesi", *Selçuk Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi*, 50, 2023, (ss.89-105), p.94.

⁶³ В.Н. Коньшев, "Неоклассический реализм в теории международных отношений", *Полис. Политические исследования*, № 4, 2020 (ss.84-106), p.95.

⁶⁴ R.B.J. Walker, "Realism, Change, and International Political Theory", *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol:31, No:1, 1987, (pp.65-86), p.77.

⁶⁵ Dursun Murat Düzgün, p.263.

⁶⁶ Yücel Bozdağoğlu; Çınar Özen, "Liberalizmden Neoliberalizme Güç Olgusu ve Sistemik Bağlamlılık", *Uluslararası İlişkiler Dergisi*, Cilt:1, Sayı:4, 2004, (ss.59-79), p.62.

⁶⁷ İskender Serdar, p.16.

⁶⁸ Kenneth Waltz, "Structural Realism after the Cold War", *International Security*, Cilt:25, Sayı:1, 2000, (pp.5-41), p.907.

powers conduct their foreign policies in a more controlled manner. The main reason for this is that, due to the clear delineation of spheres of influence and the deterrent power of nuclear weapons, the likelihood of a direct hot war between the leading powers is quite low.⁶⁹ Competition in a bipolar system is more manageable and relies on less costly negotiations due to the limited number of actors. In contrast, in multipolar systems, as the diversity of actors increases, so does the number of sources of threats, making it unclear which actor poses a threat in the international system.⁷⁰ This complex structure becomes even more unstable due to fluctuating military alliance relationships and variations arising from differences in state capacities. Based on all these assessments, Waltz argues that a bipolar system is structurally more balanced and predictable and therefore offers a more stable international order than a multipolar system.

In addition to these analyses, Waltz argues that the balance of power in the international system is a persistent phenomenon. Even if the balance within the system is disrupted from time to time, it can be reestablished in different forms. Therefore, the balance of power mechanism remains functional in both bipolar and multipolar systems.⁷¹ Waltz also emphasized that the anarchic nature of the international system forces states to balance each other. In this context, weak states engage in efforts to balance powerful states to survive, which creates a constant search for balance within the system.⁷²

Waltz also notes that national and international systems have different natures. According to him, while national political systems are built on a hierarchical command-obedience relationship, there is no such supreme authority in the international system, and therefore an anarchic structure prevails.⁷³ While individuals in national systems have the opportunity to focus on different areas thanks to the division of labor, states with different characteristics perform similar functions in the international system.⁷⁴

⁶⁹ Kenneth Waltz, "The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory", *Journal of Interdisciplinary History*, Cilt:18, Sayı: 4, 1988, (pp.615-628), p.623.

⁷⁰ Seda Gözde Tokatlı, "Klasik Realizm ve Neorealizm Kuramının İncelenmesi: Devlet Kavramına Yönelik Analiz", *Ufuk Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi*, Cilt:11, Sayı:21, 2022, (ss.122-141), p.130.

⁷¹ Tayyar Arı, "Morton A. Kaplan ve Uluslararası Politikada Sistem Yaklaşımı", *Uludağ Üniversitesi İktisadi İdari Bilimler Fakültesi Dergisi*, Cilt: 11, Sayı: 1-2, 1990, (ss.103-118), p.188.

⁷² İskender Serdar, p.17-18.

⁷³ Süleyman Elik, p.94.

⁷⁴ Tayyar Arı, p.188.

Consequently, both classical realists and neorealists have attempted to explain the concept of the system within their own theoretical perspectives. However, while classical realists interpret the international system based on inter-state interactions and in a result-oriented manner, neorealists, led by Waltz, have linked these interactions to structural factors and have also included unit-level causes originating from states in their analysis.⁷⁵ In this sense, neorealist theory, unlike classical realism, has systematically evaluated cause-effect relationships and the means-ends distinction.⁷⁶

1.2.3. Behaviouralism and the Concept of the System

Another important system debate in the discipline of International Relations has been conducted within the framework of the *Behavioral* school. The behaviorist approach was first developed by B.F. Skinner in the field of psychology. According to this approach, the science of psychology cannot produce scientific explanations by directly studying consciousness and mental processes. Therefore, to ensure scientific validity, individuals' observable behaviors and the relationship between these behaviors and environmental conditions must be studied. Only in this way can a causal and measurable relationship between human actions and the environment be established.

Behaviouralism has also been influential in other social science fields such as sociology and political science in later periods,⁷⁷ but it was influential in the discipline of international relations only by the 1950s, which was later than in the other fields. Representatives of this school argued that methods valid in natural sciences could also be applied to international relations studies based on a positive way of thinking. In this context, behaviorists generally aim to make the social sciences, and the discipline of international relations in particular, more scientific, measurable, and objective. The behavioral school thus pioneered a methodological transformation in international relations based on observation, data, modeling, and quantitative analysis.⁷⁸

According to behaviorists, by examining the behaviors and tendencies of actors in the international system based on data analysis, it is possible to predict the steps these actors may take in the future. In this

⁷⁵ Kenneth Waltz, "Uluslararası Politikanın Değişen Yapısı", *Uluslararası İlişkiler*, Cilt:5, Sayı:17, 2008 (ss. 3-44), p.5.

⁷⁶ Tayyar Arı, p.189

⁷⁷ Oktay F. Tanrısever, "Yöntem Sorunu: Gelenekselcilik-Davranışsalcılık Tartışması", *Devlet, Sistem ve Kimlik*. Atilla Eralp (der.) içinde, İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul, 2019, p.94.

⁷⁸ Mustafa Aydın, p.77.

context, adapting the methods and rules of natural sciences to international relations studies ensures more objective and realistic results. Behavioralists have characterized the approaches found in the literature that preceded them as "*traditional*." According to them, traditional approaches have been inadequate in explaining the crises and systemic problems that have arisen in the discipline of international relations. This is because these approaches, while defining general problems, have not developed systematic, data-driven, and scientific analyses.⁷⁹

Furthermore, behavioralists have pointed out that the structure of the international system during the period when traditional approaches emerged was different from the structure that was present when behavioralism rose to prominence. In this context, traditional approaches developed their system definitions and proposed solutions based on a European-centered classical balance of power understanding. However, by the time behavioralist thinking began to gain traction, the international system had transformed into a different structure with new characteristics. The division of the world into two separate blocs led by the United States and the Soviet Union following the end of the Second World War was a decisive factor in this transformation.⁸⁰ In connection to this, the United Kingdom and France, which had long held hegemonic positions within the European system, began to lose much of their former power and influence.

Subsequently, it became necessary to establish a pragmatic field of study within the discipline of international relations, and with this development, behavioralists played an important role in developing the concept of the international system. One of the leading figures of this approach is Morton Kaplan.⁸¹ Kaplan's system theory, developed in the field of international politics, is accepted as one of the tools of social theory.⁸² Kaplan defined the concept of the international system as "*the result of relationships and repeatable patterns of behavior among states, blocs, and international organizations*."⁸³ Kaplan developed six international system models, taking into account predictable situations.⁸⁴ The most important of these models is the "*balance of power system*." Kaplan

⁷⁹ Oktay F. Tanrısever, p.95.

⁸⁰ Erdem Özlük, pp. 377-378.

⁸¹ See: Morton Kaplan, *System and Process in International Politics*, ECPR Press, 2005.

⁸² Süleyman Elik, p.91.

⁸³ Tanrısever, p.98.

⁸⁴ Morton A. Kaplan, "Balance of Power, Bipolarity and Other Models of International Systems", *The American Political Science Review*, Cilt: 51, Sayı: 3, 1957, (pp.684-695), p.685.

developed this system model based on the international order that prevailed in Europe during the 18th and 19th centuries.⁸⁵ Kaplan's approach is explained as follows.

"This model, which is related to historical sociology, attempts to explain how inter-state relations were formed in the balance system consisting of six or eight states that existed among European states in the 18th and 19th centuries. Rather than simply stopping wars, the most binding rule of this system was the necessity of suppressing nationalist actors or limiting actors who adhered to the fundamental principles of supranational organizations. However, the extent to which this principle was accepted is a matter of debate... The period in which the system was historically applied was the 18th and 19th centuries. The large number of states outside the alliances was another source of instability. In this context, the state that best followed the balance of power policy was Britain. Kaplan explained that the main reason for this was that Britain was an island nation that was far from the conflict zones. In the balance of power approach, the element of balance prevails over ideology. Wars were fought for limited purposes. In the race for supremacy, powers balanced each other out and prevented each other from achieving permanent dominance. In this case, international law could play an effective role in inter-state relations.⁸⁶

Kaplan particularly emphasizes that there must be at least five states within the system. According to him, if the number of actors in the system falls from five to three, the possibility of two powerful actors eliminating the other increases. In this context, Kaplan lists the basic characteristics of the balance of power system as follows:⁸⁷

- Although the states in the system act to increase their own power capacity, they tend to resolve the possibility of war through diplomatic means.
- A state that fails to increase its capacity may resort to war in order to protect its interests.
- A common tendency to stop a war emerges when one of the states in the system is faced with the threat of elimination.
- Other actors adopt a balancing stance against a state or coalition that claims leadership within the system.

⁸⁵ Morton A. Kaplan, "How to Theorize about International Politics", *International Journal on World Peace*, Volume:13, Issue:1, 1996, (pp.3-20), p.4.

⁸⁶ Süleyman Elik, "Uluslararası Politikada Sistem Düşüncesi", *Selçuk Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi*, Sayı:50, 2023, (ss.89-105), p.92.

⁸⁷ Morton A. Kaplan, *Balance of Power*, p.686.

Another system model developed by Kaplan is the *"loose bipolar system."* This system differs significantly from the classical balance of power system due to its various characteristics. In the loose bipolar system, the actors, i.e., states, are organized around two major blocks. However, there are also states within the system that pursue independent foreign policies without belonging to any bloc. As is the case in the balance of power system, the search for equilibrium remains important in this model as well, but the distinguishing feature of the loose bipolar system is the prominence of mediation activities. Such mediation initiatives are usually carried out by independent states that are not affiliated with any block. Furthermore, according to Kaplan, the existence and effectiveness of international organizations are also considered a noteworthy element in this system.⁸⁸ For example, *"In structures such as the Warsaw Pact and NATO, if one bloc has a hierarchical structure and the other has a loose structure, states in the loose structure can develop relations with non-aligned states. However, the existence of states with a hierarchical structure affects the other bloc and limits its non-bloc activities. If there is a strict hierarchical situation at both poles, then memberships are applied very rigidly."*⁸⁹

Kaplan emphasizes the importance of hierarchical structure within the blocks in the system. According to him, blocs seek to neutralize each other but avoid major wars and instead resort to diplomatic negotiations and small-scale conflicts to resolve crises. In this context, the deterrent role of nuclear powers also becomes apparent.

Non-aligned states, on the other hand, pursue conciliatory policies in an attempt to prevent a possible war between the two blocs.⁹⁰ Furthermore, the loose bipolar system is characterized by longer-lasting alliances compared to the balance of power systems. In addition, ideological foundations play a decisive role in the organization of the blocks within this system.

Another model developed by Kaplan is the *"tight bipolar system."* Neutral states disappear in this system, and the system is effectively reduced to two major power blocs.⁹¹ In such a system, crises are not allowed

⁸⁸ K. E. Boulding, "Theoretical Systems and Political Realities: A Review of Morton A. Kaplan, *System and Process in International Politics*", *Conflict Resolution*, Vol:2, No:4, 1958, (pp.329-334), p.330.

⁸⁹ Süleyman Elik, p.92.

⁹⁰ Nazlı Maç, *"İki Kutuplu Sistem Sonrası ABD-Rusya Federasyonu İlişkileri Bağlamında Uluslararası Sistem Analizi"*, (Dokuz Eylül Üniversitesi, Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, Kamu Yönetimi Ana Bilim Dalı, Yayınlanmamış Yüksek Lisans Tezi), İzmir, 2004, p.9.

⁹¹ K.E. Boulding, p.330.

to arise, and the system is shaped solely by the two major power poles. Due to the small number of actors, these actors either join a bloc directly or support that bloc. Therefore, states do not assume a mediating role in this system, and there is a sharp polarization between the blocs.⁹²

One of the system models proposed by Kaplan is the "*universal system*." In this model, international actors (such as international organizations) play an important role.⁹³ The universal system is based on a confederal structure, and system members tend to resolve crises that may arise through peaceful means. However, according to Kaplan, the formation of such a system requires a long period of time, meaning that it is quite difficult to achieve something like this in the short term.

Another model developed by Kaplan is the "*hierarchical system*" model. The hierarchical system model is known for its two types of structures. An authoritarian model emerges if a power manages to become dominant in the system. Additionally, *"in this system, functional organizations are stronger than geographical organizations. Since the hierarchical system is integrated, it is considered a stable system. Although it is possible to leave the system, actors cannot afford the high cost of doing so."*⁹⁴

The final system model is the "*unit-veto system*," shaped in the context of the development of nuclear weapons. This system does not carry an ideological nature. Alliances are rarely found within the system, but states tend to agree on certain pacts to prevent nuclear attacks. However, the conciliatory power of universal actors is quite limited in this system.⁹⁵

After discussing the system models proposed by Kaplan, it is worth emphasizing that the first two of the models mentioned above, namely the "*balance of power*" and "*loose bipolar system*" models, have managed to find application within the discipline of international relations. In contrast, the other models have remained more hypothetical in nature. In any case, these models developed by Kaplan on a theoretical level provide significant insights into understanding the international system with their unique hypotheses and arguments. In this context, Kaplan highlights a series of variables that determine the characteristics of each system⁹⁶ and states that

⁹² Süleyman Elik, p.93.

⁹³ Morton A. Kaplan, *System and Process*, pp.54-55.

⁹⁴ Süleyman Elik, p.93.

⁹⁵ Tayyar Arı, pp.104-111.

⁹⁶ The most significant criticism against Kaplan came from the traditionalists, specifically from Hedley Bull. Bull considered the values Kaplan defended to be inadequate in terms of the language he used and argued that Kaplan's paradigm was not terminologically sound. He pointed out that behavioralists failed to

these variables can be listed as follows:⁹⁷

- Basic rules are the main forms of behavior that maintain balance within the system.
- In addition, the rules of change for new inputs emerging in the system should not be overlooked.
- Different actors within the system can be grouped according to their structural characteristics through classifying variables.
- Capacity variables enable the classification of system actors according to their power elements.
- Finally, information variables reveal the level of communication and information flow between system actors.

Furthermore, David Easton, who conducted extensive studies on systems theory, should be particularly highlighted when discussing the behavioral school. This is because behaviouralism in the discipline of international relations has not been limited to the study of individual-based political behavior; it has also evolved into a series of orientations, methods, and analysis procedures. In this context, according to Easton, the intellectual foundations of behaviouralism are built on eight fundamental principles:⁹⁸

- Regularities
- Verification
- Techniques
- Quantification
- Values
- Systematization
- Pure Science
- Integration

In sum, according to behavioralists, the discipline of international

adequately explain the fundamental issues of international relations and that they did not have definitive opinions on the problems in this field. See: Erdem Özlük, “Gelenekselcilik-Davranışsalcılık Tartışmasını Bağlamında Anlamak”, *Ankara Üniversitesi SBF Dergisi*, Cilt:64, Sayı:3, 2009, (ss.198-220), p.211.

⁹⁷ Nazlı Maç, p.6.

⁹⁸ “Behaviouralism as an Approach to Contemporary Political Analysis: An Appraisal”, <https://www.ijern.com/Behaviouralism.php>, (Accessed: 10.06.2024).

relations should be approached in tandem with other scientific disciplines, taking into account that political phenomena are shaped by various factors in society. In other words, behavioralists emphasize the holistic structure of the international system and argue that this structure is shaped by various system models.

2. HISTORICAL PROCESSES, THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM, AND TÜRKİYE

2.1. The Westphalian Phase of the International Order

The history of international relations has gone through numerous stages that paved the way for the formation of today's international order. In this process, geographical, economic, and military factors played a decisive role in the rise of some states and the decline and collapse of others. This situation made disputes and wars between states inevitable. States seeking to avoid the destructive effects of wars gradually began to explore different diplomatic methods. This process reached a new turning point with the Peace of Westphalia that was signed in 1648. However, before discussing this treaty, it is worth outlining the general historical process that necessitated this peace.

In the early 17th century, a large part of Europe, including the Habsburg territories in Central Europe, had a "dualist" system of government.⁹⁹ This was because political power was shared between the prince (or ruler) and the nobility, with the property held by the nobility being called an "estate." Over time, the balance between these two centers of power was disrupted, leading to political and religious disputes. While the Habsburg dynasty supported Catholicism, a significant portion of the nobility belonged to the Protestant faith.¹⁰⁰ The dynasty's attempts to restrict religious freedoms provoked a reaction, particularly from the Bohemian and Hungarian nobility, and these groups sought to take advantage of the dynasty's internal strife to strengthen their constitutional position. As a result, the *Thirty Years' War* broke out, which devastated Europe between 1618 and 1648.¹⁰¹

The first phase of this war, which began on religious grounds between Catholics and Protestants in German territories, is known as the Bohemian Phase (1618–1625). The defeat of the Bohemians during this period led to the dissolution of the Protestant Union.¹⁰² Consequently, the

⁹⁹ Andreas Osiander, "Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Westphalian Myth", *International Organization*, Vol:55, No:2, 2001, (pp.251-287), p.253

¹⁰⁰ Andreas Osiander, p.253

¹⁰¹ Yalçın Alganer, Müzeyyen Özlem Çetin, p.292.

¹⁰² Mohamad Zreik, "The Westphalia Peace and Its Impact on the Modern European State", *Quantum Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities*, Vol:2, No:1, 2021, (pp.1-16), p.5

Elector Palatine and the King of Bohemia Frederick V, also known as *the "Winter King"*, sought alliances with Denmark, Holland, and Sweden. Although he made an alliance agreement with Transylvanian Prince Bethlen Gábor and some European powers in April 1621, the Protestant forces suffered successive defeats in a short time. The Battle of Stadtlohn on 6 August 1623, resulted in the destruction of most (about four-fifths) of the Protestant army, and this defeat led Frederick to abandon his claims to the Palatinate and Bohemia. Thus, the first phase of the war ended, and a period of temporary calm began in the Holy Roman Empire. However, this peace did not last long. In 1625, King Christian IV of Denmark intervened in the war to support the Lutheran principalities in northern Germany, marking the beginning of the "Danish Phase" of the war. The aim of the Danish army was to preserve the Protestant balance in Northern Europe against the Catholic Habsburg influence.¹⁰³

These developments prompted the Holy Roman Empire to take steps to end the ongoing war with Denmark and limit Denmark's military activities on European soil. To this end, Emperor Ferdinand II requested military support from Albrecht von Wallenstein, an experienced Bohemian nobleman.¹⁰⁴ Known for his extraordinary leadership skills and strategic genius, Wallenstein accepted the offer of assistance on the condition that he be granted a portion of the conquered lands. In 1626, the imperial army under Wallenstein's command clashed with the Protestant forces led by Ernst von Mansfeld at the Battle of Dessau Bridge¹⁰⁵, and the Protestant army suffered a heavy defeat. Later in the war, the Danish army was also defeated, which marked the end of the Danish Phase. Finally, with the signing of the Treaty of Lübeck in 1629, King Christian IV of Denmark obtained the right to reclaim his own territories in exchange for ceasing his support for the Protestant principalities in German lands.¹⁰⁶ Denmark thus withdrew from the Thirty Years' War and subsequently its influence in Northern Europe greatly diminished.

From 1630 onwards, the Thirty Years' War spread to a wider area, and King Gustav II Adolf of Sweden decided to take an active role in the war.¹⁰⁷ The Swedish king ostensibly launched a campaign against the Emperor to protect Germany in general from Habsburg oppression and,

¹⁰³ M. Zreik, p.5.

¹⁰⁴ Andreas Osiander, p.256.

¹⁰⁵ Alexander Baran, George Gajecy, *The Cossachs in the Thirty Years War*, Rome, PP. Basiliani, 1983, p.14.

¹⁰⁶ M. Zreik, p.5

¹⁰⁷ Peter H. Wilson, "The Causes of the Thirty Years War 1618-48", *The English Historical Review*, Vol:123, No:502, 2008, (pp.554-586), p.558.

more specifically, from the negative consequences of the 1629 Edict of Restitution.¹⁰⁸ King Gustav II Adolf thus landed on the Pomeranian coast in July 1630 and assumed leadership of the Protestants.¹⁰⁹ Although the stated aim of the campaign was to protect the Protestants in Germany from Habsburg oppression, its real purpose was to bring the Hanseatic League under control and turn the Baltic Sea into a "Swedish lake." In line with this strategic goal, Sweden aimed to increase both its economic and military influence in Northern Europe. As the war progressed, Spain, as an ally of the Holy Roman Empire, played an active role in the clashes between 1635 and 1645.

One of the most critical events of this period was the Battle of Nördlingen on 5-6 September 1634. In this battle, the Catholic-Imperial armies inflicted a heavy defeat on the Protestant forces, thus largely disbanding the Protestant League. This development marked an important turning point in the European balance of power, and France, under the direction of Cardinal Richelieu, joined the war on the side of the Protestants. French armies crossed the Rhine River in 1635 and entered Imperial territory, thus transforming the war from a religious conflict into a struggle for hegemony in Europe.¹¹⁰ In the final phase of the war, the French and Swedish armies acted jointly and won a decisive victory against the Imperial forces at the Battle of Jankau in Bohemia on 5 March 1645. This victory hastened the Habsburgs' decision to engage in peace negotiations. In the same year, the Treaty of Brömsebro (13 August 1645), signed between Denmark and Sweden, ended the conflict between the two countries.¹¹¹ With the Treaty of Brömsebro, peace negotiations gained momentum in Europe, a process that finally culminated in the Peace of Westphalia in 1648.¹¹²

Ultimately, the Thirty Years' War can be defined not as a single

¹⁰⁸ The Restitution Edict was issued by Holy Roman Emperor Ferdinand II on 6 March 1629 during the Thirty Years' War. Its main purpose was to restore territorial control to the level specified in the 1555 Peace of Augsburg, which prohibited the further secularization of Catholic church lands and prevented such lands from being transferred to Protestant control.

¹⁰⁹ Andreas Osiander, p.257.

¹¹⁰ Myron P. Gutmann, "The Origins of the Thirty Years' War", *The Journal of Interdisciplinary History*, Vol:8, No:4, 1988, (pp.749-770), p.767

¹¹¹ Andrzej Kamieński, "Congress of Westphalia. Participants in the Negotiations, Main Provisions and Consequences of Decisions Taken", *Przegląd Zachodniopomorski Rocznik*, No: 4, 2019 (pp.61-82), p.65.

¹¹² Stephen D. Krasner, "Compromising Westphalia", *International Security*, Vol: 20, No:3, 1995-1996, (pp.115-151), p.115.

war, but as a series of three major conflicts involving more than six main parties. First, a German civil war broke out over religious reasons and imperial authority, and this phase ended with the signing of the Peace of Prague in 1635. This was followed by the Western War, fought by Spain against the Netherlands and France, which was a legacy of the 16th century. Finally, the Baltic (or Northern) War emerged, which took place mainly on German soil and involved Denmark and Sweden on one side and the Holy Roman Emperor and his allies on the other.¹¹³

Following the end of these wars, as previously emphasized, a long and complex diplomatic negotiation process was initiated with the aim of reaching the Peace of Westphalia. During this process, hundreds of diplomats representing over 145 delegates and fifty-five separate political-judicial units conducted intensive negotiations in the cities of Münster and Osnabrück for three years.¹¹⁴

The representatives of all nations and states participating in the conference had specific goals. Delegates generally received instructions from their rulers not to "*reach an early settlement.*" Indeed, no side wanted to appear weak or take responsibility for the destructive war that had lasted more than thirty years. Nevertheless, by 1645, establishing peace in this war that had (according to some estimates) wiped out one-third of the German population had become an inevitable necessity.

The main objectives of the parties at the peace conference can be summarized as follows:

- France sought to gain control of strategic strongholds such as Metz, Toul, Verdun, Breisach, and Alsace, as well as four cities known as the "forest cities" (*villes de la Forêt*) on the Rhine River.
- The Holy Roman Empire aimed to reestablish an imperial structure united under the emperor's leadership.
- The princes of the empire were demanding the right to political sovereignty in their own regions.
- The Dutch Republic sought recognition of its full independence from Spain.
- Sweden sought approval for the territorial gains it had made

¹¹³ Myron P. Gutmann, p.753.

¹¹⁴ Arthur Eyffinger, *Europe in The Balance: An Appraisal of The Westphalian System*, NILR, 1998, p.174.

during the war.¹¹⁵

The fundamental points of agreement between the parties represented at the congress were set out in writing in two treaties signed in Münster and Osnabrück and comprehensively summarized by historian David Maland.

Ultimately, the Peace of Westphalia (1648) not only ended the Thirty Years' War but also marked a turning point that laid the foundations for the modern system of international relations.¹¹⁶ Although the treaty addressed many issues of great importance to the European powers at the time, three key points had a lasting impact on modern diplomacy and international law. The first important point was the reaffirmation of religious freedom. The Peace of Westphalia reaffirmed the principle of the 1555 Peace of Augsburg, "*cuius regio, eius religio*" ("whose realm, his religion"; meaning that the religion of the ruler dictates the religion of the ruler's subjects). It also ensured the restoration of rights taken away from Lutherans by Emperor Ferdinand II's 1629 "Edict of Restitution." Thus, the era of religious wars shaped by Catholic-Protestant rivalry effectively came to an end, and the principle of religious tolerance gained institutional status in the European political system. The second fundamental issue concerns the nature and legitimacy of war. Before 1648, war was accepted as a legitimate means of resolving disputes between states. However, after Westphalia, the idea of limiting war and delegitimizing wars that led to the physical destruction of states began to gain importance. This development laid the foundations for the concepts of "*self defense*" and "*limited war*" in international law in the following centuries. The third and perhaps most enduring result was the explicit recognition of the principle of state sovereignty.¹¹⁷ With the Peace of Westphalia, the principle of sovereignty became one of the fundamental norms of international relations and has been a concept constantly referred to in the functioning of the international system over the following centuries. With this treaty, the concept of sovereign states gained legal and political legitimacy, thus laying the foundations of the modern state system.¹¹⁸ Furthermore, the Westphalian order combined the idea of territorial sovereignty with the concept of

¹¹⁵ Steven Patton, "The Peace of Westphalia and Its Effects on International Relations, Diplomacy and Foreign Policy", *The Histories*, Volume:10, Issue:1, 2019, (pp.91-99), p.93.

¹¹⁶ Merve Suna Özel Özcan, "Westphalian Devletler Sistemi ve Modernleşmenin Geleneksel Dünyanın Büyük Güçleri Olan İmparatorluklara Etkisi", *JEBPIR*, Cilt:5, Sayı:1, 2019, (ss.49-62), p.50.

¹¹⁷ Steven Patton, p.94-95.

¹¹⁸ Merve Suna Özel Özcan, p.54.

legitimate political authority, ensuring that each state was recognized as an independent actor with full authority within its specific borders. Thus, the state's absolute authority over its defined territory became the fundamental basis for both the prohibition of interference in internal affairs and the principle of equality among states.

In this context, it is appropriate to examine the principle of sovereignty as it is one of the most fundamental principles of the Peace of Westphalia. According to the principle of sovereignty, which means that a government has absolute authority and discretionary power over its own territory, states are considered equal in status. Sovereignty also encompasses the principle that states should not interfere in each other's internal affairs and decision-making processes.¹¹⁹ At this point, the following should be emphasized: The Westphalian order was structured on a legal basis through the principles of state equality, sovereign immunity, and non-intervention, which form the fundamental norms of international law.¹²⁰ With this order, the medieval concept of Christian unity was replaced by the principle of state independence and equality. Thus, both the Pope's and the Holy Roman Emperor's claims to universal authority were rejected.¹²¹ Instead, anti-hegemonic concepts such as territorial sovereignty and sovereign equality came to the fore. Furthermore, the Westphalian system legitimized the principle of territorial sovereignty. According to this principle, the sole and ultimate authority over a specific piece of land belongs to the legitimate government of that region. Thus, a multi-centered structure consisting of states with equal status was established in the international order.¹²²

Based on the above, it can be said that the Peace of Westphalia that ended the Thirty Years' War had a profound impact on the practice of international relations at three fundamental levels:¹²³

¹¹⁹ M.L.A. Salawu; E.O. Oju, "An Overview of the Principles of the 1648 Westphalian Peace Treaty: Sovereignty, Collective Security, and Balance of Power", *Noun International Journal of Peace Studies and Conflict Resolution (NIJPCR)*, Vol:1, No:1, 2021, (pp.242-257), p.247

¹²⁰ Richard Falk, "Revisiting Westphalia, Discovering Post-Westphalia", *The Journal of Ethics*, Vol:6, No:4, 2002, (pp.311-352), p.313.

¹²¹ Susan Strange, "The Westfailure System", *Review of International Studies*, Vol:25, No:3, 1999, (pp.345-354), p.347.

¹²² Daud Hassan, "The Rise of the Territorial State and The Treaty of Westphalia", *Yearbook of New Zealand Jurisprudence*, Vol:9, 2006, (pp.62-709), pp.65-67.

¹²³ "The Historical Context", <https://bgc.ac.in/pdf/study-material/SEM-4/Political-Science-GE-Study-Material-for-Module1-Topic-2.pdf>, (Accessed: 12.06.2024).

- The principle of sovereignty was adopted, confirming that the ruler had exclusive rights over a specific piece of land. Thus, states were granted the authority to determine their own internal policies and forms of government within their own geographical borders.
- A significant transformation took place in the formation of permanent national armies. This development led to the feudal military structure being replaced by permanent armies under the control of the central authority. State power was thus institutionally and militarily strengthened, and rulers gained absolute control over the armed forces.
- The great powers that would form the core of the European balance of power system took shape during this period. From the late 17th century onwards, Austria, France, the United Kingdom, Russia, and the Dutch Republic became decisive actors in the political structure of the continent. These powers formed the cornerstones of the international order that prevailed in Europe until the early 19th century.

The Treaty of Westphalia, greatly important in terms of international relations, has been analyzed from time to time by researchers examining the understanding of the international system. Henry Kissinger, who has evaluated this issue, expressed the ideals created by this system in his book *World Order* as follows: *"The Peace of Westphalia became a turning point in the history of nations because the elements it set in place were as uncomplicated as they were sweeping. The state, not the empire, dynasty, or religious confession, was affirmed as the building block of European order. The concept of state sovereignty was established."*¹²⁴ An article written by Richard Falk also mentions a very interesting point about Westphalia, noting that it simultaneously represents an event, an idea, a process, and a set of normative values. As an event, Westphalia refers to the peace treaty negotiated at the end of the Thirty Years' War, which formed the structural framework of the world order that has continued to this day with occasional changes.¹²⁵ At the level of ideas, Westphalia refers to the state-centered character of the world political order. Within this framework, the Westphalian system designated the state as the basic unit of international politics and made the principle of sovereignty an essential element of this structure. In terms of process, Westphalia highlights the evolution of the state's role and form of government in light of the historical transformations that have taken place ever since the treaties were signed in

¹²⁴ Henry Kissinger, *World Order*, Penguin Press, New York, 2014, pp.26-27.

¹²⁵ Richard Falk, p.312.

1648: colonialism and its termination,¹²⁶ the emergence of weapons of mass destruction, the establishment of international organizations, the rise of global market forces, and the development of global civil society. In this context, the Westphalian system demonstrates that the modern international system is a dynamic process and that the concept of sovereignty has been redefined in different ways throughout history. From a normative perspective, the principles of Westphalia, on the one hand, turned state sovereignty into a shield against external intervention for repressive regimes, while on the other hand, left weak and economically disadvantaged states open to intervention, dependencies, and serious forms of material deprivation. In this respect, the Westphalian model points to both the protective and restrictive nature of the sovereignty-based international order.¹²⁷

In conclusion, the points highlighted above regarding the Treaty of Westphalia can be summarized as follows: First and foremost, although more than three centuries have passed since the 1648 Treaty, it has continued to influence the shaping of the international relations system to the present day, undergoing only certain changes and adaptations. The fundamental reason for this is that the Peace of Westphalia is considered the first in a tradition of comprehensive peace treaties that shaped modern European history. It consists of three interconnected bilateral treaties resulting from the participation of many international actors, even though it is not formally a multilateral text. Finally, although the treaty did not resolve all issues, it nevertheless comprehensively regulated secular and spiritual matters. Thanks to these characteristics, Westphalia became a turning point that laid the legal, political, and normative foundations of the modern international system and thus went beyond being merely a peace arrangement of its time.

2.2. Establishment, Development, and Outcomes of the Vienna System

The balance of power among European states fundamentally changed after the collapse of the French Empire, and the process of division over the ruins of this empire ended with the reconstruction of the international system in Europe. The new system created by the victorious states came to be known in history as the "Vienna system." The states that formed this system sought to redraw international borders in Europe, establish a new balance of power, and legitimize the changes that had taken place over a period of approximately twenty-five years. Negotiations were

¹²⁶ Marc Ferro, *Sömürgecilik Tarihi Fetihlerden Bağımsızlık Hareketlerine 13. Yüzyıl-20. Yüzyıl*, Çev: Muna Cedden, İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul, 2002, p.47.

¹²⁷ Richard Falk, p.312.

initiated to achieve these goals, and the final system was established through important conferences held at different times. Therefore, before discussing the Vienna System and the order it created, it is necessary to examine the French Revolution and the subsequent events that led to this process.

The French Revolution, defined as "*the revolution of the human mind*," marked a turning point in the reconstruction of Europe.¹²⁸ This is so because the said revolution began as a local political uprising, but it went on to dismantle the system of government and then had a dramatic impact on the social, economic, and cultural roots of all existing values. During this period, the influence of the revolution, which used the slogan "*Liberty, Equality, Fraternity*," spread not only throughout Europe but also around the world, and Napoleon, who ripped Europe apart with his armies until 1815, played a major role in this transformation.¹²⁹

There are several reasons why this revolution began in France. The first reason relates to the administrative system in France, as King Louis XVI was an absolute monarch and all power was concentrated in his hands. The French people therefore longed for a change towards better state of affairs. Another reason stemmed from the judicial system, as it should be noted that individual freedom was not guaranteed. The third reason was related to taxation, as it was very difficult for the lower classes and farmers to pay taxes. Despite earning a meager living, these people were forced pay an reasonable amount of taxes. The fourth reason was connected to the ideas of the Enlightenment thinkers.¹³⁰

France was going through difficult times in terms of economy, society, military, etc. when the French Revolution took place. In this context, it is necessary to mention the striking consequences of the revolution for both France and European states. First, the Bourbon Dynasty was overthrown in France, and the constitutional regime replaced the *ancien régime* (old rule/order). Second, the ideas of liberty, nationalism, and fraternity spread, and as a result of nationalist attitudes, multinational states also experienced the same problems alongside France. Third, in the timeline of European history, this event is considered the end of the Early

¹²⁸ Robert R. Palmer, *The World Revolution of the West: 1763-1801*, Heath and Company, Lexington, 1963, p.3.

¹²⁹ Deniz Ülke Arıboğan, "Global Security and Cooperation in the Postpandemic Period: From the 19th Century Concert of Europe to the 21st Century Concert of Globe", *Reflections on the Pandemic. in the Future of the Word*, 2020, (pp.326-349), p.330.

¹³⁰ Samuel Hugh Mcgrady, *A Notebook of European History 1400-1920*, Thomas Y. Crowell Company Publishers, New York, 1928, pp.104-110.

Modern Age and the beginning of the Modern Age.

As mentioned above, the French Revolution was not limited to France, as the geography of the revolution expanded rapidly. During the revolution, the Ottoman State and Great Britain (to be known later as the United Kingdom) did not remain silent or neutral, but became involved in the wars that broke out. It can be said that these wars arose in the context of the balance of power. In this context, Russia, which defeated the Ottoman State in 1768-1774 and 1787-1792, gained control of the Black Sea, moved towards the Mediterranean, reestablished its control over Poland, played a leading role in the division of this region, and was able to take advantage of the rivalry between Austria and Prussia in Germany and the new tensions between revolutionary France and its neighbors. The pattern of Anglo-Russian hegemony that emerged was clearly demonstrated in the Anglo-Russian Ochakov crisis of 1791.¹³¹

The said conflict arose because both sides had expanded their spheres of influence. However, the crisis stemmed not from genuine competition, but from British Prime Minister William Pitt's attempt to define the terms of potential partnerships in governing Europe. Like most British, Pitt viewed Russia as Great Britain's natural ally. However, he realized that Russia was out of control and needed to be forced into a partnership.¹³² Although Pitt initiated the conflict between the parties, it was Russia that emerged victorious.

In terms of hegemony, Britain and Russia were not alone in seeking balance. Almost all other states behaved similarly. In this context, Austria's idea of balance in Germany meant that the state in question would control the Reich and establish supremacy over Prussia. Prussia's idea of balance in Germany, on the other hand, meant an Austrian-Prussian stalemate in the Reich, Prussian supremacy in Northern Germany, and, in general, Prussia's equality with Austria.¹³³

As can be understood from this, the pattern of balance of power

¹³¹ Paul W. Schroeder, "Did the Vienna Settlement Rest on a Balance of Power?", *The American Historical Review*, Volume:97, Issue:3, 1992, (pp. 683-706), p.690. Also see: А. Р. Сабитова, "Начало англо-русского дипломатического противостояния в рамках 'Восточного вопроса' ('Очаковский кризис' 1791 г.)", *Изв. Сарат. ун-та. Нов. сер. Сер. История. Международные отношения*, 2014. Т. 14, вып. 4 (с.77-81).

¹³² Yahya Bağçeçi, "İngiltere Başbakanı Genç William Pitt ve Özi Krizi", *Uluslararası Tarih ve Sosyal Araştırmalar Dergisi*, Sayı:12, 2014, (ss.359-379), p.367.

¹³³ Paul W Schroeder, p.691

slogans and rules serving hegemonic aims manifested itself during most of the French Revolution and Napoleonic wars. However, one particular issue must be emphasized at this point. If France had been willing and able to consolidate its control over Western Europe before or during Napoleon's reign, a true balance of power system could have emerged in Europe, and French power could have balanced the obvious geographical advantages of Britain and Russia. Instead, Napoleon's boundless ambition forced the allies against France to wage war until France was defeated and its power diminished.¹³⁴

The Congress of Vienna was an international gathering of major and minor powers held in the capital of the Austrian Empire to secure a peace treaty following the end of the Napoleonic Wars. When considered alongside the first (May 1814) and second (November 1815) Paris Treaties, which officially ended the war between France and the other Great Powers, the Vienna Treaty became an agreement that determined Europe's post-war territorial borders and the fate of many other major and minor international issues. The Congress officially convened between October 1814 and September 1815, bringing together the leading figures of the era and the most important foreign policy leaders of the four victorious powers and France. It also included statesmen representing Europe's smaller states and the "*legitimate*" rulers who had been deprived of their territories during the revolutionary period.¹³⁵

The Congress of Vienna was seen as a "compensation" for the losses and efforts of the three victorious continental powers (Russia, Austria, and Prussia) in the Napoleonic Wars, and this congress led to these three states acquiring new territories in Central and Eastern Europe. However, it should also be emphasized that the congress in question was only concluded after three important meetings took place between the parties at different times, as previously mentioned. This is because serious disagreements arose between the parties even during the drafting of the peace treaty, and the Polish-Saxon issue even caused serious debate during the Congress of Vienna. Alexander I, who wanted to unite the Duchy of Warsaw with Russia, succeeded in having Saxony given to Prussia. Following this, the disagreement deepened to such an extent that on 3 January 1815, Britain, Austria, and France signed a secret alliance agreement against Russia and Prussia, upon Talleyrand's suggestion.¹³⁶

¹³⁴ Paul W Schroeder, p.692.

¹³⁵ Nathan N. Orgill, "Congress of Vienna (1815", *The Encyclopedia of Diplomacy*, 2018, (pp.1-15), p.1.

¹³⁶ Christophe Dupont, "History and Coalitions: The Vienna Congress (1814–1815)", *International Negotiation*, Vol:8 (1), 2003, (pp.169-178), p.171.

The three parties to the agreement decided to thwart the plans of Russia, Prussia, and Austria. This further exacerbated the conflict between the parties, and as a result, after an intense struggle, part of Saxony was given to Prussia, while a large part of the Duchy of Warsaw, with a population of 3.2 million, was given to Russia. However, after Napoleon entered Paris on 20 March 1815, King Louis XVIII of the Bourbon dynasty hastily fled Paris.¹³⁷ As a result, the French copy of the agreement dated 3 January 1815 was left behind, leading to Napoleon becoming aware of the secret coalition agreement. Despite all these disagreements and the intense negotiation process, it was possible to reach the Vienna Peace Treaty, which laid the foundation for the Vienna System. The following treaties should be particularly emphasized in this process.

One of the main issues negotiated at the time of the First Treaty of Paris was the determination of France's future government. After a long struggle, the issue of the future government was resolved in Paris, and the allied leadership set about resolving the issues that would end the war with France and determine its post-war borders and responsibilities to the victorious powers. Thus, the First Treaty of Paris, signed on 30 May 1814, contained several provisions that appeared quite generous when compared to other similar events in European international history, particularly Napoleon's treatment of his defeated enemies.¹³⁸

First, the advocates of a punitive peace failed to secure a treaty imposing reparations on France.¹³⁹ However, perhaps the most striking feature concerns the arrangements made by the allied statesmen regarding France's borders. Instead of dividing France, taking large swathes of land from it, or even returning it to its so-called ancient borders, i.e., those prior to 1789, the peace envoys in Paris agreed to redefine the borders of January 1792. This decision meant that France actually gained territory along its borders, namely various points along the northern border from the former Austrian Netherlands to the Rhine River, as well as in Savoy. Under the terms of the treaty, which included these minor territorial adjustments in France's favor, France would also formally recognize the independence of the Netherlands, Switzerland, the newly formed German Confederation, and various smaller sovereign states in Italy. In return, Britain would return most of the territories it had seized from France and the United Provinces during the recent wars, except for isolated areas considered strategically

¹³⁷ Kamuran Şimşek, "Tarih-i Cevdet'e Göre Napolyon", *Pamukkale Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi*, Sayı:17, 2014, (ss.85-93), p.91.

¹³⁸ Joachim von Elbe, "Peacemaking in 1815", *The American Journal of International Law*, Vol:36, Issue:3, 1942, (pp.470-474), p.471.

¹³⁹ Nathan N. Orgill, p.7.

vital for the security of trade within the empire.¹⁴⁰

When the “*Act of the Congress of Vienna*” was signed on 8 June 1815, the events that unfolded once again called the work that had been done into question. As a result, the parties attempted to continue their peace efforts around the Second Treaty of Paris. For this reason, the treaty in question is known as an agreement that solidified the work of the peace envoys. Shortly after being exiled to Elba, Napoleon received information that the people were dissatisfied with Louis XVIII’s policies favoring the noble émigrés returning to France.¹⁴¹ In addition, there was secret intelligence conveying the details of the Polish-Saxon crisis, which nearly shattered the Quadruple Alliance. This also seemed to turn the situation in his favor once again.¹⁴²

The arrangements formalized in the treaty signed on 20 November 1815 included depriving France of more territory. According to the treaty, France would essentially withdraw its borders to those of 1790, but in terms of territory, the borders would cover a larger area than those of 1789. The resulting Second Peace of Paris, while preserving most of the promises initially made to France, also included some punitive measures intended to respond as much as possible to the criticisms made by Prussia. Additionally, France was required to cede control of strategic fortresses along these new borders, return artworks looted from Napoleon’s enemies, and pay 700 million francs in compensation to cover the total cost of the war.¹⁴³

The final congress that completed the Vienna system was Aix-La-Chapelle. This congress is known as an important international meeting,¹⁴⁴ because the Aix-La-Chapelle Congress not only ended a war, but also laid the foundation for a new order by securing peace in Europe. France’s participation in the allied powers at the Congress of Aix-La-Chapelle created objections and contradictions among the other delegates. Russia and Prussia, in particular, did not accept France’s participation. This revealed the differences of opinion among the allied powers at the congress.¹⁴⁵ However, despite all this, with the Congress of Aix-La-Chapelle, the states agreed not to make decisions on their own, pledged to

¹⁴⁰ Nathan N. Orgill, p.7.

¹⁴¹ Cristophe Dupont, p.171.

¹⁴² Charles Esdaile, *Napoleon’s Wars: An International History, 1803–1815*, Viking Publishing, New York, 2007, p.548.

¹⁴³ Charles Esdaile, p.548.

¹⁴⁴ Barış Özdal, Murat Jane, ““La Der Des Ders”in Uluslararası Sistemin Yapısına Etkileri”, *Gazi Akademik Bakış*, Cilt:7, Sayı:14, 2014 (ss.215-245), p.229.

¹⁴⁵ Rifat Uçarol, *Siyasi Tarih (1789-2012)*, Der Yayınları, İstanbul, 2013, p.133.

maintain peace in Europe, and committed to sending this agreement to other European states. After the Congress of Aix-La-Chapelle, the "Concert of Europe" (or the Vienna System) was established.

This new order was based on four fundamental principles. The first fundamental principle of the Concert of Europe involved granting privileged status to the most powerful actors in the system at the initial stage. In this context, in the First Treaty of Paris reached during the Vienna process, Britain, Austria, Russia, and Prussia defined themselves as great powers and assumed the task of establishing and maintaining peace across the entire continent. Although more than 200 delegates participated in the negotiations, which were attended by almost every government in Europe, decisions were taken by the quartet, and for the first time, this established the "small and great powers" of Europe.¹⁴⁶

The Second Treaty of Paris was shaped in parallel with the Quadruple Alliance Treaty, again aiming to establish consultation and support mechanisms to enable the great powers to maintain ongoing stability. The "*Holy Alliance Treaty*," prepared on Russia's initiative and later joined by Prussia and Austria before Vienna, brought together Protestant and Catholic monarchs under the banner of Christianity to preserve the status quo. The second principle of this system was that "the great powers would only establish, defend, and, when necessary, redefine the political and regional status quo on the continent together." The third principle proposed a "*loose mechanism for consultation and dispute resolution through the great power of the period*."¹⁴⁷ This approach was inspired by Immanuel Kant's idea of "*perpetual peace*." Here, it was anticipated that the *foedus pacificum* (league of peace) model could provide sustainable peace by establishing mediation mechanisms and cooperation between free states based on international law. The fourth principle involved the recognition of sovereignty across Europe, with the great powers declaring that they would henceforth only look favorably upon those with non-revolutionary local political institutions.¹⁴⁸

In addition, this arrangement brought new regulations regarding international treaties into force. Whereas the basic rule prior to 1815 was that all international treaties would be terminated upon the death of an emperor/ruler and would only continue if their validity was renewed by the

¹⁴⁶ B. Reinalda, *Routledge History of International Organizations; From 1815 to Present Day*, Taylor & Francis, New York, 2009, p.18.

¹⁴⁷ Kyle Lascurettes, *The Concert of Europe and Great Power Governance Today*, RAND Cooperation Perspective Expert Insights on a Timely Policy, Issue, 2017, p.6.

¹⁴⁸ Kyle Lascurettes, p.7.

new king, this was abolished after the Vienna treaties. The treaties were now considered to be signed between states rather than between individual monarchies, so a treaty's validity would only end if any of the parties wished to withdraw from the treaty.

As can be understood from the above, the new order created by the Vienna System has been a very suitable model for explaining the 19th-century European balance of power system and the diplomatic and international political stability within the course of an anarchist order. Even from a realist perspective, it has been noted that this system included the capacity of nation-states to act in alliance within the framework of the international distribution of power and perceptions of national interests.¹⁴⁹ However, Schulz, who evaluated the Vienna System, brought a different perspective to the issue and pointed out that this system, based on a series of alliance treaties and declarations, essentially aimed to protect the interests of the great powers of Europe, but also ignored powers outside of Europe. He therefore emphasized that this system had failed to bring about either peace or justice in the world.¹⁵⁰

Consequently, in the period following the much-discussed Vienna System, the three major continental powers that had formed an alliance against France continued to maintain their presence on the political stage, and France was never able to secure reliable allies against this potential hegemonic threat. For decades, Central and Eastern Europe were ruled by the so-called Holy Alliance of the Eastern Powers, which occasionally caused administrative problems throughout Europe. Furthermore, some states (such as Germany) were not satisfied with the decisions of the Treaty of Vienna. During this period, the fragmentation of Germany continued, causing discontent among the German people. This was because the people yearned for a federal state that included all Germans. In other words, Germany was either covertly or overtly continuing its struggle against absolute monarchy (despotism). Taking all this into account, Dupont came to the following conclusion when evaluating the Vienna System:¹⁵¹

- For the system to be stable, it had to be ready to adapt to changes in external conditions. However, this was not the case. The system was based on principles and values, and these values did not correspond to powerful social and political forces.

¹⁴⁹ Deniz Ülke Arıboğan, p.333.

¹⁵⁰ Matthias Schulz, "Cultures of Peace and Security from the Vienna Congress to the Twenty-first Century: Characteristics and Dilemmas", *Securing Europe After Napoleon; 1815 and the New European Security Culture*, (Ed.: Beatrice de Graaf, Ido de Haan, Brian Vick), Cambridge University Press, 2019, (pp. 21-39), p.27.

¹⁵¹ Cristophe Dupont, p.176.

- Another factor contributing to instability was the growing disagreement among members on fundamental issues where their positions and interests differed. These included the Ottoman Question, the colonial issue, isolationism, etc.

These upheavals brought about the end of the Vienna System, and the system in question, along with its legal basis, the Holy Alliance, withdrew from the political stage after the end of the Crimean War (1853-1856).

2.3. The System Established by the 1856 Treaty of Paris following the Crimean War

Compared to the Napoleonic Wars or the great wars of the 20th century, the Crimean War was short; however, by 19th-century standards, it was a long and complex war. The conflict between the parties lasted approximately 31 months, from July 1853, when Russia invaded Ottoman territories, to January 1856, when the armistice was signed.¹⁵² Although not generally considered a "*great war*", the Crimean War actually possessed many characteristics of a great war and was a conflict that closely concerned the national interests of Europe's five great powers as well as smaller states. In this context, three of the great powers (Britain, France, and Russia) were direct participants in the war, while the other two (Austria and Prussia) had a significant impact on the course and outcome of the war despite having stayed out of the hostilities.¹⁵³

The Crimean War arose as a result of the failure to resolve the "*Question of the Holy Places*" through diplomatic means. With the new political order that took shape with the French Revolution of 1789, secularism had come to the fore, and France had distanced itself from religious issues for a time. However, during the Second Empire (especially during Napoleon III's reign), with the increase in demands from Catholic circles on this issue, France once again brought the Holy Places issue to the agenda.¹⁵⁴

France's renewed assertion of its rights over the Holy Places prompted Russia to take action, leading Russia to adopt a stance in favor of maintaining the status quo in the region. In response, the Ottoman State

¹⁵² Erdoğan Keleş, "Kırım Savaşı'nda (1853-1856) Müttefik Orduların Sevk ve İdare Merkezi: Varna", Cilt:9, Sayı:43, 2016 (ss.773-800), pp.774-775.

¹⁵³ James B. Agnew, "The Great War that almost was: The Crimea 1853-1856", *Parameters*, Cilt:3, Sayı:1, 1973, (pp.46-57), p.47.

¹⁵⁴ Bekir Sıtkı Baykal, "Makamat-ı Mübareke Meselesi ve Babiali", *Belleten*, Cilt:23, Sayı:89, 1959, (pp.241-266), pp.244-245.

attempted to strike a balance between the two sides, but this effort placed it in a difficult position. To prevent the situation from spiraling out of control, the Ottoman administration established a commission to resolve the issue through diplomatic channels, striving to maintain relations with both sides. However, before the commission had completed its work, France made a proposal regarding the use of certain holy sites belonging to the Orthodox Church, and Russia declared that it was absolutely opposed to any change in the existing status quo, further increasing the tension between the parties.¹⁵⁵

Faced with these developments, Russia deliberately escalated tensions, believing that Austria and Prussia would not oppose any territorial changes Russia might initiate. However, the stance of European states, particularly Britain, was noteworthy during this process. This was because, in such a conflicted environment, Russia was attempting to reach agreements with Britain. Taking advantage of the complex diplomatic environment, Russia sought to find common ground with Britain,¹⁵⁶ and made some proposals aimed at shaping the future of the Ottoman Question (with negative implications for the Ottoman State's territories). Indeed, in early 1853, Tsar Nicholas I told Sir George Hamilton Seymour, the British ambassador to St. Petersburg, that the Ottoman State was the "Sick Man of Europe" and requested the recognition of Russia's influence in the Balkans in exchange for Egypt and Crete being left to Britain. However, Britain rejected this proposal and even signaled that it would side with the Ottoman State in the event of a possible Russian military intervention against it.¹⁵⁷

In this situation, three main factors can be highlighted. First, Britain did not view the Ottoman State to be weak as Russia did. Second, Britain did not want Russia to capture Istanbul, as it was aware of Russia's goal of reaching the Mediterranean and therefore saw the Ottoman State's existence as an indispensable balancing factor for its own interests. In this context, the Ottoman State's continued presence in the region constituted a significant obstacle to Russia's access to the Mediterranean. Thirdly, Britain did not ignore the influence of France and Austria in the balance of power in Europe. Therefore, while the British government made diplomatic recommendations to Austria and Russia to reduce their pressure on the Ottoman State, it also began to establish a basis for an

¹⁵⁵ Bekir Sıtkı Baykal, p.247.

¹⁵⁶ Charles H. Stockton, "The Declaration of Paris", *The American Journal of International Law*, Vol:14, Issue:3, 1920, (pp.356-368), p.356.

¹⁵⁷ Togay Seçkin Birbudak, "1853-1856 Kırım Harbi'nde Osmanlı-Avusturya İlişkileri", *Belleten*, Sayı:293, 2018, (ss. 241-264), p.244.

alliance with France despite their differences of opinion. Meanwhile, Russia attempted to turn the issue to its advantage by exploiting the competition between the European powers and continued put pressure on the Ottomans by sending a delegation with broad powers (headed by A.S. Menshikov) to Istanbul.¹⁵⁸ After arriving in Istanbul, Menshikov clearly put forth Russia's demands in his meetings with Ottoman officials. These demands included the official transfer of the protection of the Orthodox subjects in Ottoman territories to Russia and the regulation of rights over the Holy Places in Russia's favor. Menchikov stated that Russia would pursue a friendly policy toward the Ottoman State if these conditions were accepted. However, the Ottoman administration rejected these demands, considering them to be a violation of its sovereignty rights. As a result, Tsar Nicholas I's demands escalated, and in March 1853, two consecutive diplomatic notes were sent to the Ottoman State.¹⁵⁹

Not wanting Russia to increase its influence over the Ottoman State, Britain advised the Ottoman Sultan not to accept the terms proposed by Menshikov. Aware of this rapprochement between Britain and the Ottoman State, Russia occupied Wallachia and Moldavia on 2 July 1853 without declaring war. In response, France and Britain sent their fleets to the eastern shores of the Mediterranean Sea towards the Dardanelles in order to prevent any possible Russian advance. Prussia announced that it would not support Britain and France in this matter, while Austria preferred to wait for Prussia's stance. On the other hand, in response to Russia's increasing threats to Ottoman territories, France and Britain signed a defense alliance agreement with the Ottoman State in Istanbul in March 1854. The parties committed to acting together to expel Russian troops from Ottoman territories, while Sultan Abdülmecid also promised not to make a separate agreement with Russia. However, when Russian troops under the command of General M. Gorchakov refused to withdraw from the Danube principalities, the Ottoman State, with the support of Britain and France, declared war on Russia on 4 October 1853. Following this, on 30 November 1853, the Russian navy destroyed the Ottoman fleet in the Gulf of Sinop. After the Sinop Raid, France and Britain decided to intervene directly in the course of the war and sent their fleets to the Black Sea on 3 January 1854.¹⁶⁰

During this period, the two states signed an agreement formalizing

¹⁵⁸ S. Adolphus Slade, *Türkiye ve Kırım Harbi*, çev: Ali Rıza Seyfi, İstanbul Askeri Matbaa, İstanbul, 1943, p.51.

¹⁵⁹ Stanley Lee Poole, *Lord Stratford Canning'in Türkiye Anıları*, çev. Can Yücel, 2. Baskı, Yurt Yayınları, Ankara, 1988, p.118.

¹⁶⁰ James B. Agnew, p. 49.

their reasons for joining the war. Known as an important document in terms of military assistance, the Treaty of Istanbul was signed between the parties on 12 March 1854 and outlined the extent to which the states in question (as well as the Ottoman State) would contribute to the war.¹⁶¹ Subsequently, on 27 and 28 March 1854, Britain and France officially declared war on Russia, and the two states combined their diplomatic efforts to carry out a successful military operation. During this process, both states succeeded in inciting Austria against Russia, and on 10 April 1854, Britain and France signed an alliance treaty against Russia.¹⁶² In December of the same year, Austria also joined this alliance, while Prussia remained neutral.

The Crimean War lasted from 1853 to 1856, during which the Ottoman State, Britain, France, and the Kingdom of Sardinia acted together against Russia. Looking at the course of the war, Britain sought to establish a broader alliance against Russia with the aim involving Austria, Denmark, Sweden, and Prussia in the war. In the early years of the war, Britain and France acted in a joint and harmonious manner; however, it became clear in later periods that France did not want Britain to gain power in the East. Therefore, as the war dragged on, France became increasingly reluctant to cooperate with Britain; and in response, Russia also tried to neutralize Austria, which had adopted a similar stance to the two aforementioned states during the war.¹⁶³

Ultimately, the death of Tsar Nicholas I of Russia in February 1855 marked the end of a period lasting approximately 30 years, and he was succeeded by Alexander II.¹⁶⁴ Alexander II, who was able to assess current developments more realistically, insisted on ending the war. In this vein, some diplomatic rapprochement took place between him and Napoleon III in the autumn of 1855. During this period, Russia's consul in Vienna conveyed Russia's desire to end the war to the Austrian representative. In return, in December 1855, Austria communicated the basic terms of peace negotiations to Russia on behalf of the warring states. The negotiations addressed the status of the Danubian principalities, freedom of navigation on the Danube River, the neutrality of the Black Sea, the situation of the Christians, and several other issues. Following the end of hostilities in the

¹⁶¹ J. C. Hurewitz, *Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East. A Documentary Record: 1535- 1914*, Vol 1. Princeton, New Jersey, 1956, pp.144-145.

¹⁶² Alan Palmer, *1853-1856 Kırım Savaşı ve Modern Avrupa'nın Doğuşu*, çev. Meral Gaspıralı, Sabah Kitapları, İstanbul, 1999, p.54.

¹⁶³ Töğay Seçkin Birbudak, p.244.

¹⁶⁴ F. Armaoğlu, *Siyasi Tarih 1789-1960*, 2. baskı, Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi yayını, Ankara, 1973, pp.143-144.

Crimean War, the Congress of Paris convened on 28 February 1856 to agree on a general peace treaty, which was signed on 30 March 1856. After the signing of the peace treaty, the parties met again on 16 April and accepted the Paris Declaration in its current form and invited all other states to join the treaty.¹⁶⁵ The signatories of the Declaration and the protocol of the conference meeting at which it was accepted were Austria, France, Great Britain, Prussia, Russia, Sardinia, and the Ottoman State.

Under the terms of the treaty, Russia returned the city of Kars to the Ottoman State, while France, Britain, and the Kingdom of Sardinia were forced to return Sevastopol, Balaklava, Kerch, Kinburn, and other regions to Russia. With this arrangement, the neutrality of the Black Sea was confirmed, and Russia's right to maintain a navy in the region was abolished. Furthermore, Russia lost its right of protection over Moldavia and Serbia. Russian military supremacy in the Black Sea thus came to an end, and the number of light warships Russia could maintain in the region was subject to a limitation to be determined by a special agreement between the parties in the future.¹⁶⁶ At the same time, while the treaty guaranteed the independence of the Ottoman State, Russia was also forced to surrender Bessarabia.

The Treaty of Paris confirmed new rules and also accepted some important principles relating to maritime law. In this context, the Paris Declaration Respecting Maritime Law (16 April 1856) clearly stated the principle that blockades must be effective in order to be binding. The Declaration also contained four fundamental principles regarding maritime trade and the law of war, such as the abolition of piracy and the protection of goods being transported under a neutral flag. While almost all states accepted the provisions of the declaration and committed to implementing them, the United States did not officially sign it. However, in 1861, with the country on the brink of a civil war, the US government announced that it would effectively respect the principles of the declaration so long as disputes between the warring parties continued.¹⁶⁷

In conclusion, although the Treaty of Paris did not permanently resolve the Eastern Question, it established a temporary environment of peace and balance in Europe and officially ended the Crimean War.

¹⁶⁵ Charles H. Stockton, "The Declaration of Paris", *The American Journal of International Law*, Vol:14, Issue:3, 1920, (pp.356-368), p.361.

¹⁶⁶ "Treaty Of Paris (1856): Neutralization Of The Black Sea", <https://hansard.parliament.uk/Lords/1871-02-14/debates/c7809341-8931-40d7-91c7-7d7c0e3109f6/TreatyOfParis>, (Accessed: 15.06.2024).

¹⁶⁷ "Declaration Respecting Maritime Law. Paris, 16 April 1856", <https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/paris-decl-1856>, (Accessed: 15.06.2024).

Although some experts did not consider it a large-scale war, approximately 250,000 soldiers belonging to the Ottoman, French, British, and Sardinian alliance lost their lives, while the Russian Empire lost approximately half a million soldiers. Most of these listed deaths were due to disease and neglect.¹⁶⁸ The Crimean War had the potential to become a general European war, as it directly affected the interests of all the major powers in Europe. However, it did not have as wide an impact as the Napoleonic Wars. The main reasons for this include the technological limitations of the time, the reluctance of the major powers Austria and Prussia to actively participate in the war, and Russia's failure to find lasting allies. Looking at the results of the war, France rose to a position of leadership in continental Europe; however, it soon ceded this position to Prussia, which was the state that gained the most from the Crimean War experience. For Britain, the war resulted in heavy human losses and significant financial ruin. Thus, the country that had won its last great victory at Waterloo was no longer in a position to increase the splendor of its armaments, the influence of its diplomacy, or the strength of its economy. For this reason, as W. Mosse also points out, the Treaty of Paris (signed on 30 March 1856) that ended the Crimean War neither completely resolved the long-standing Eastern Question nor eliminated the rivalry between Britain and Russia.¹⁶⁹

2.4. The International System Established following the First World War

At the beginning of the 20th century, Europe was divided into two armed camps as a result of conflicting interests, which manifested itself with the emergence of two major alliance systems: the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente. The general consensus at the time was that the disagreements between these two groups could be resolved through diplomatic means; however, neither side made any serious effort to develop a peaceful solution. This was because the prevailing view in Europe at the time was that pursuing war was a means to achieve peace. Moreover, the arms race that had been rapidly escalating since the beginning of the century reinforced the belief that states could force their rivals to back down by expanding their military forces.¹⁷⁰

¹⁶⁸ "This Month in History: The Crimean War and the 1856 Treaty of Paris", <https://www.thegazette.co.uk/awards-and-accreditation/content/103526>, (Accessed: 15.06.2024).

¹⁶⁹ W. E. Mosse, "Britain, Russia and the Questions of Serpents Island and Bolgrad: Two Incidents in the Execution of the Treaty of Paris, 1856", *The Slavonic and East European Review*, Vol:29, No:72, 1950, (pp.86-131), p.86.

¹⁷⁰ Erel Tellal, "20. Yüzyılın Dengelerine Neler Oluyor?", *Ankara Üniversitesi SBF Dergisi*, Cilt:62, Sayı:4, 2007, (ss.227-230), p.227.

By 1914, both Britain and Germany had greatly expanded their navies, transforming the arms race into a new source of tension and mistrust in Europe. The rise of militarism thus became a significant factor that increasingly dragged nations into war. During this period, the First Moroccan Crisis of 1905, Austria-Hungary's annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1908, and the Agadir (Second Moroccan) Crisis in 1911 emerged as the main international tensions that shook Europe at the beginning of the century. Along with this, the most serious regional crisis before the outbreak of the First World War was the Balkan Wars of 1912–1913.¹⁷¹

During the Balkan Wars, the leaders of Germany, France, Russia, Austria-Hungary, and the United Kingdom attempted to limit imperialist and nationalist tensions in the Balkans to prevent the outbreak of a general European war. In this process, the states in question succeeded in keeping the conflict within regional borders. However, the political and psychological effects of the Balkan Wars ultimately accelerated the groundwork for the July Crisis of 1914, which would lead to the First World War. Immediately after the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand, heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne, in Sarajevo on 28 June 1914, intense diplomatic efforts began among European capitals. As a result of these maneuvers, the Austro-Hungarian Empire sent a harsh ultimatum to the Kingdom of Serbia. This development marked the starting point for the crisis that quickly escalated into a war encompassing all of Europe.¹⁷² In the Austrian government's ultimatum dated 23 July 1914, the following demands were made towards the Serbian government:¹⁷³

- The official condemnation of all anti-Austrian publications and propaganda,
- The closure of anti-Austrian associations and communities,
- The banning of books and materials containing anti-Austrian content in schools,
- The removal from office of government officials who displayed anti-Austrian attitudes,
- The granting of the permission for Austrian officials to participate

¹⁷¹ Ruth Henig, *The Origin of the First World War*, Third edition, Routledge, London-New York, 2002, p.16.

¹⁷² Ruth Henig, pp.18-19.

¹⁷³“Austria's Ultimatum to Serbia”,
<https://www.chino.k12.ca.us/cms/lib/CA01902308/Centricity/Domain/3696/D%20Austrias%20Ultimatum%20to%20Serbia.pdf>, (Accessed: 18.06.2024).

in the investigation into the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand,

- The punishment of individuals found to have been involved in the assassination.

It was expected that the issue would be resolved either through diplomacy or, if the ultimatum was rejected, through a local war. This was because Austria-Hungary did not believe that these initiatives would lead to a larger war in the region. Following the publication of the ultimatum, Winston Churchill, who would later become Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, assessed the document as follows: “*Europe is on the brink of a general war. The ultimatum Austria has given to Serbia is the most ruthless document of its kind ever written*”.¹⁷⁴

Serbia, upon receiving the ultimatum, immediately appealed to Russia, and the Council of Ministers convened on 24 July 1914 to determine a plan of action. Russia believed that Germany was using the assassination crisis as a pretext to launch a preemptive war to protect its interests in the region. Defying the Austro-German bloc’s expectation that Russia would back down in the event of a possible conflict, the Russian Council of Ministers ordered partial mobilization preparations in four military districts.

Serbia accepted all terms of the ultimatum except one. For Serbia, the only unacceptable clause was Austria-Hungary’s demand for direct participation in the internal investigation; as Serbia stated that this demand would violate its constitution and criminal procedure law.¹⁷⁵ Consequently, Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia on 28 July 1914, exactly one month after the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand.¹⁷⁶ Russia, which had an alliance with Serbia, announced that it was mobilizing its army for defense. Germany considered Russia’s move a hostile act and declared war on Russia on 1 August 1914, followed by France on 3 August. Thus, the regional crisis in Europe quickly escalated into a general war.¹⁷⁷

Although the United Kingdom did not establish a formal alliance

¹⁷⁴ “Austria-Hungary Issues Ultimatum to Serbia”, <https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/austria-hungary-issues-ultimatum-to-serbia>, (Accessed: 18.06.2024).

¹⁷⁵ “Did the Serbian Government Meet the Austrian Demands?”, <https://teachdemocracy.org/images/pdf/gates/Did-Serbia-Meet-Demands.pdf>, (Accessed: 18.06.2024).

¹⁷⁶ Frank C. Zagare, “Explaining the 1914 War in Europe (an Analytic Narrative)”, *Journal of Theoretical Politics*, Vol:21, No:1, 2009, (pp.63-95), p.66.

¹⁷⁷ Frank C. Zagare, p.66.

with France under the 1904 *Entente Cordiale* (Cordial Agreement), this agreement created a strong political rapprochement between the two countries and imposed a moral obligation on the UK to support France.¹⁷⁸ In addition, under the terms of the 1839 Treaty of London, the UK was obliged to protect the independence and integrity of Belgium, which had a neutral status. Germany invaded Belgium on 4 August 1914, prompting King Albert I of Belgium to request assistance from the UK. The UK declared war on Germany on the same day to defend Belgium's neutrality and soon found itself at war with the Central Powers, including France. Japan, which had formed an alliance with the UK in 1902, sent an ultimatum to Germany on 14 August 1914, demanding the evacuation of German territories in China and its island possessions in the Pacific. Germany ignored this warning, prompting Japan to declare war on Germany on 23 August 1914, followed by Austria-Hungary on 25 August.¹⁷⁹ The conflict thus spread beyond European borders to the Asia-Pacific region.

The Ottoman State's involvement in such a major global conflict was not accidental. The Young Turks realized that their former allies, such as France and Britain, would not take any action to prevent the empire's collapse. By the end of 1912, the Young Turks had come to believe that they should side with Germany, one of the Central European powers, in the event of an outbreak of an international conflict. This was because Istanbul, which was of great strategic importance to Germany, was the political center of the railway line between Berlin and Baghdad.¹⁸⁰ The involvement of the aforementioned state in the war occurred as a result of the international environment becoming tense following the Ottoman government's announcement on 9 September 1914 that it would abolish the hated capitulations starting at the beginning of October. Germany did not officially recognize this decision until 1917. The abolition of the capitulations, in particular, was a significant factor in the Ottoman State's entry into the war. This is because the capitulations had turned the Ottomans into a semi-colony of Europe and were seen as one of the biggest obstacles to the modernization process of the Ottoman State. Following

¹⁷⁸ Sarah Tudor, *Britain and the First World War: Parliament, Empire and Commemoration*, House Lords Library Note, 2014, p.1.

¹⁷⁹ "Japan's Victory in World War I", <https://www.usni.org/magazines/naval-history-magazine/2021/june/japans-victory-world-war-i>, (Accessed: 18.06.2024).

¹⁸⁰ Paulino Toledo Mansilla, "The Young Turks, Their Revolution and Turkey's Entry into The First World War", *Center for Latin American Studies Publications Ankara University*, No:11, 2017, (pp.51-88), p.81.

these developments, German pressure on the Ottomans to enter the war increased steadily starting from 20 October 1914.¹⁸¹

The participation of the Ottoman State in the war in 1914 increased the number of fronts and expanded the geographical scope of the clashes. In this context, Italy's process of joining the war was convoluted, as it managed to avoid entering the war at the beginning despite being allied with Germany and Austria-Hungary. This situation was based on an article in the Triple Alliance Treaty. According to this article, Italy would only join Germany and Austria-Hungary if they were waging a defensive war. However, given that Austria-Hungary's actions under the current circumstances of the time were offensive in nature, Italy managed to free itself from its alliance obligations and declared its neutrality. Nevertheless, Italy began secret negotiations with the Entente Powers in 1915 and, in exchange for territorial promises under the Treaty of London, changed sides and entered the First World War by declaring war on Austria-Hungary on 24 May 1915.¹⁸²

It is particularly important to note that Italy joined the war against its former allies, Germany and Austria-Hungary. The reason for Italy's declaration of war against these two states stemmed from the secret London Agreement it signed in 1915. Under this agreement, Britain, France, and Russia promised Italy sovereignty over large territories around the Adriatic Sea, such as Trentino, South Tyrol, Istria, and Dalmatia, as well as the Twelve Islands in the Aegean Sea.¹⁸³ In exchange for these territorial gains, Italy was expected to join the war on the side of the Entente Powers. Thus, Britain and France aimed to open a new front in the south of the Western Front, thereby dividing the military strength of the Central Powers and reducing the pressure on the Western and Eastern fronts.

On 7 May 1915, German submarines sank the ocean liner RMS Lusitania, killing more than 120 Americans and causing the rise of anti-German sentiment among American citizens. This situation led the United States to abandon its policy of neutrality and ultimately intervene in the

¹⁸¹ Kemal H. Karpat, "The Entry of The Ottoman Empire into World War I", *Belleken*, Sayı:68, Sayı:253, 2004, (pp.687-734), pp.720-721.

¹⁸² Pierluigi Pironti, "Warfare to Welfare: World War I and the Development of Social Legislation in Italy", *Historical Social Research*, Vol:45, No:2, 2020, (pp.187-216), p.194.

¹⁸³"Treaty of London (1915)",

<https://www.zgodovina.eu/slovenici/koroska/dokumenti/London-Treaty-1915.pdf> (Erişim Tarihi: 18.06.2024).

international crisis by declaring war on Germany on 6 April 1917.¹⁸⁴ Because the US entered the war largely due to Germany's submarine warfare, the Wilson administration could have organized an entirely sea-based operation against German submarines.¹⁸⁵ However, very little support was given to carry out this operation. The British and French leaders, who were trying to turn the US entry into the war to their advantage and whose military forces had previously suffered heavy losses, asked Wilson to strengthen the Western Front, which stretched from Belgium to Switzerland. This was because they saw the Western Front as the only place where the US could play a decisive role in defeating Germany.¹⁸⁶

As highlighted above, this conflict, which was considered a local war when it broke out in 1914, quickly expanded in scope and turned into an international crisis. This was because almost all the powerful states of the world took sides in this war and sought to protect or expand their interests through the alliances they had previously formed. In this context, the First World War, which caused the greatest destruction in modern history up until that point, ended with the Treaty of Versailles signed in 1919 and other peace treaties signed by the Allied Powers in different places. This marked the beginning of a new era in the discipline of international relations.¹⁸⁷

The Treaty of Versailles, which marked a turning point for world history, contained the terms of peace signed with Germany. The treaty was signed on 28 June 1919, in the Hall of Mirrors at the Palace of Versailles; the same hall where, 48 years earlier, the German Empire had been proclaimed following France's defeat in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870. Essentially, the Treaty of Versailles placed the responsibility for the war on Germany, thereby obligating Germany to pay reparations and stipulating that the amount to be paid would be determined by the Inter-Allied

¹⁸⁴ Tuğçe Kaya, "ABD Birinci Dünya Savaşı Sırasında Neden Osmanlı Devleti'ne Doğrudan Savaş İlan Etmedi? Amerikan Gizli Belgeleri Üzerine Bir İnceleme", *Çağdaş Türkiye Tarihi Araştırmaları Dergisi*, Cilt: 19, Sayı: 39, 2019 (ss.533-562), p.533.

¹⁸⁵ Brian F. Neumann, *The U.S. Army Campaigns of World War I Commemorative Series*, Center of Military History, Washington, D.C., 2017, p.19.

¹⁸⁶ Brian F. Neumann, p.20.

¹⁸⁷ Merve Suna Özel Özcan, Lütfi Tutuş, "Nazi Almanyası'na Giden Süreci Yaratmak: Paris Barış Konferansı, Versailles Antlaşması ve Weimar Almanyası", *Akademik Araştırmalar ve Çalışmalar Dergisi*, Cilt:14, Sayı: 27,2022, (ss.276-2919, p.280.

Commission until 1921.¹⁸⁸

Under the terms of the treaty, the German government was forced to make significant territorial concessions. In this context, the regions of Alsace and Lorraine in the west were returned to France, and the cities of Eupen and Malmedy were transferred to Belgium. In the north, some districts of the Duchy of Schleswig were ceded to Denmark following a referendum, while in the east, the regions of Pomerania, Poznan, and East Silesia came under Polish sovereignty. In addition, Germany was forced to withdraw from all its overseas colonies, primarily in favor of Britain, France, Belgium, and Japan. Furthermore, to prevent a potential future German military attack, the Allied Powers established a demilitarized zone along the borders of Belgium and France.¹⁸⁹

Following the Treaty of Versailles, the Treaties of Saint-Germain-en-Laye and Trianon were signed on 10 September 1919 and 4 June 1920 respectively. The fundamental purpose of both treaties was to legally recognize the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and to legitimize the establishment of new national states on the territories of this empire.¹⁹⁰ The final link in the chain of treaties signed was the Treaty of Sèvres. Although the apparent aim of this treaty, signed on 10 August 1920, was to establish peace with the Ottoman State,¹⁹¹ in reality, it aimed to destroy the empire's political and territorial integrity and enact its partition on a legal basis.

According to the terms of the treaty, Turkish sovereignty would have been limited to only a small part of the national territory; Istanbul and the Bosphorus region would have been placed under the control of an international commission and effectively come under the control of British, French, and Italian representatives. Furthermore, the Treaty of Sèvres would re-establish the capitulations regime, restoring the judicial immunity and economic privileges of European states over Ottoman territories. At the same time, the treaty promised extensive lands to the Armenians in Eastern Anatolia, which provoked a strong reaction among the Turkish public. The harsh provisions of Sevres foresaw the de facto liquidation of the Ottoman State, which was a decisive factor in the start of the Turkish

¹⁸⁸ Roch Little, "The Peace of Victors, A Peace of Double Morality. The Treaties That Concluded World War I", *Center for Latin American Studies Publications Ankara University*, Sayı:11, 2017, (pp.89-97), p.90.

¹⁸⁹ Little, p.90.

¹⁹⁰ Little, p.91.

¹⁹¹ Sinan Demirağ, *İmzalanma Süreci ve Tartışmalarıyla Sevr Antlaşması*, (Sakarya Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, Tarih Ana Bilim Dalı, Yayınlanmamış Doktora Tezi), Sakarya, 2022, p.327.

national resistance movement in Anatolia.¹⁹²

As a result, the First World War, which ended with the signing of four treaties, caused countless lives and property losses worldwide. Approximately 10 million soldiers and 5 million civilians lost their lives as a result of the war.¹⁹³ While the total cost of the destruction is impossible to definitively calculate, the greatest material damage was suffered in Belgium and France. Another major impact of the war was the devastation it wrought on the economies of European countries. The destruction was so great that after the war, European countries went from being creditors to debtors. Consequently, European countries imposed heavy taxes on their populations to compensate for war expenditures, while the US was perhaps the least economically affected country after this war.¹⁹⁴

Looking at the political consequences of the war, the four great imperial powers -the German, Russian, Austro-Hungarian, and Ottoman Empires- were defeated both politically and militarily by the end of the war. Consequently, the war resulted in the collapse of empires and the rise of nations. The collapse of these empires and the rise of nations led to the redrawing of the map of Europe. Furthermore, with this war, a new system began to form in the arena of international relations, which went down in history as a new diplomatic era. During this period, international relations and diplomatic practice were no longer limited to European countries, and the center of power began to shift from Europe to the Atlantic.¹⁹⁵ This has been accepted by historians as the end of the European state system and the beginning of the global state system of the 20th and 21st centuries.

The First World War essentially became the matrix of "New

¹⁹² Temuçin Faik Ertan, "The First World War and The Ottoman Armenians", *Center for Latin American Studies Publications Ankara University*, Vol:11, 2017, (pp.163-172), p.168.

¹⁹³ "Historical Context: The Global Effect of World War I", https://www.gilderlehrman.org/history-resources/teaching-resource/historical-context-global-effect-world-war-i?gad_source=1&gclid=Cj0KCCQjw4MSzBhC8ARIsAPFOuyVLGgJoUuOlgZ4SQCIceMySwLsCOSNkSpZSSkvNS-TXvbQIciNMXRaaAmNeEALw_wcB, (Accessed: 18.06.2024).

¹⁹⁴ Fraser Cameron, "The Impact of the First World War and Its Implications for Europe Today", <https://www.boell.de/en/2014/07/08/impact-first-world-war-and-its-implications-europe-today>, (Accessed: 18.06.2024).

¹⁹⁵ Sertif Demir, "20. ve 21. Yüzyılların Başlangıç Dönemlerinin Karşılaştırılması: Örtüşen ve Ayrışan Olguların Bir Analizi", *Akademik Bakış*, Cilt:5, Sayı:10, 2012, (ss. 207-228), p.216.

Diplomacy," and the "New" approach mentioned by US President Wilson was used to describe the new situation that emerged immediately after the war and the establishment of the League of Nations. As a system, new diplomacy promoted arbitration and collective security as the surest way to avoid future armed conflicts.¹⁹⁶ People began to emphasize that it was important to develop open cooperation among nations to solve global, political, economic, social, humanitarian, and technical problems.

The most innovative result of the peace treaties in terms of the international system was the establishment of the League of Nations.¹⁹⁷ Whereas European relations had previously been governed by concepts such as balance of power, harmonious diplomacy, and treaty alliances, the new diplomacy was now based on the League of Nations treaty. At the same time, instead of Old Diplomacy based on secret negotiations and alliances, a "New Diplomacy" characterized by openness and based on the League of Nations was being established as the foundation for ensuring collective security not only in Europe but also worldwide. In addition, the peaceful resolution of issues between states and the matter of disarmament were being developed to encompass all countries.¹⁹⁸ In a sense, this meant that the idea of European harmony would be extended to harmony across much of the world, providing regular opportunities for representatives of all member states to come together and discuss not only common problems but also any issues that could threaten world peace.

¹⁹⁶ Emre Ozan, "Birinci Dünya Savaşı ve Uluslararası İlişkiler Disiplininin Doğuşu Üzerine Bir Değerlendirme", *Akademik Bakış*, Cilt:7, Sayı:14, 2014, (ss.197-214), p.201.

¹⁹⁷ Thomas J. Knock, *To End All Wars: Woodrow Wilson and the Quest for a New World Order*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1992, pp.36-37.

¹⁹⁸ Doğan Şafak Polat, "Kuruluşundan Çöküşüne Milletler Cemiyeti Sistemi", *Electronic Journal of Social Sciences*, Cilt:19, Sayı:76, 2020, (ss.1950-1967), p.1958.

3. TÜRKİYE DURING THE SECOND WORLD WAR AND THE EARLY COLD WAR PERIOD

3.1. Turkish Foreign Policy Until the Second World War

Before discussing the foreign policy pursued by the newly established Republic of Türkiye that was founded after a difficult struggle following the Ottoman period, it will be appropriate to briefly mention the Ottoman State. The Ottoman State, which experienced its most prosperous periods between the 15th and 17th centuries, emerged on the historical stage in the late 13th century-early 14th century. This empire emerged as a new power center in Anatolia by filling the political vacuum created by the weakening of the Anatolian Seljuk Empire, which had become subject to the Ilkhanids after the Battle of Köse Dağ in 1243.¹⁹⁹

The main goal of this empire, based on Sunni Islam, was to expand its territory through conquests. For this reason, the bureaucracy of the Ottoman State was structured around the achievement of this goal. The sociological structure of the Ottoman State was divided into two main groups. One was the common people, whose occupations were industry, trade, and agriculture,²⁰⁰ the other were the rulers. The common people, known as *reaya*, were obliged to pay taxes through their production, while²⁰¹ the rulers were divided into four groups: *Seyfiye* (which included members of the army), *İlmiye* (religious servants and scholars), *Mülkiye* (court servants), and *Kalemiye* (bureaucrats and diplomats).²⁰²

In addition to these two social groups, the Ottoman State had a society made up of different ethnic structures and religions, making it impossible for the people to become a cohesive political community. This was because the state did not implement assimilationist policies. The main reason for the absence of assimilation policies can be attributed to the limited nature of technical and economic resources available at that time.²⁰³

¹⁹⁹ İlber Ortaylı, *Türkiye Teşkilat ve İdare Tarihi*, Cedit Neşriyat, Ankara, 2017, p.113.

²⁰⁰ Sevgi Gül Akyılmaz, *Reis-ül Küttab ve Osmanlı Hariciye Nezaretinin Doğuşu*, (Selçuk Üniversitesi, Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Yayınlanmamış Doktora Tezi), Konya 1990, p.28.

²⁰¹ İlber Ortaylı, p.133.

²⁰² Sevgi Gül Akyılmaz, pp.28-29.

²⁰³ Wilham Hale, *1774'ten Günümüze Türk Dış Politikası*, çev. Masuh Uslu, Serbest Akademi, Ankara, 2021, p.25.

However, despite its complex social structure, the Ottoman State managed to establish its rule across three continents. This brought with it administrative problems, and by the 18th century, the state had entered a period of decline. Unable to achieve the desired results from the wars it had entered throughout the 18th century, the Ottoman State suffered territorial losses. With the beginning of the 19th century, the process of the state's disintegration accelerated as the nations living in this multi-ethnic state began to gain their independence.²⁰⁴

There were two main reasons for the Ottoman State entering a period of decline and disintegration. First, the Ottoman State remained isolated from the Renaissance, Reformation, and Enlightenment processes that took place in Europe. Furthermore, unlike Europe, the Industrial Revolution did not occur in the Ottoman State, which had elevated Europe to a position of hegemonic power in many areas, particularly in the military sphere.²⁰⁵ The technological production that emerged as a result of the Revolution in Europe increased economic prosperity and led to significant changes in military technologies.²⁰⁶ The ideas of *nationalism*, *liberty*, and *equality* that emerged with the French Revolution influenced not only Europe but also the multi-ethnic structure of the Ottoman State from the 19th century onwards; as these ideals particularly accelerated the independence movements of the Balkan nations. However, in the subsequent period, these same ideas took on a new meaning in the founding philosophy of the Republic of Türkiye, leading to the establishment of a constitutional framework based on the principles of national sovereignty and secularism.

The new Republic of Türkiye, established in 1923, inherited the historical, institutional, and diplomatic legacy of the Ottoman State, and therefore encountered various difficulties in the process of implementing its foreign policy, particularly regarding border adjustments, minority issues, and international status. This period, especially in the analysis of Turkish foreign policy up to the Second World War, reveals the distinct influence of the realist approach.²⁰⁷ Indeed, the founding cadres of the Republic took care to pursue a rational, cautious, and balance-oriented

²⁰⁴ F. Armaoğlu, p.33.

²⁰⁵ Oral Sander, *Anka'nın Yükselişi ve Düşüşü*, İmge Kitabevi Yayınları, İstanbul, 2016, p.161.

²⁰⁶ Oral Sander, *Anka'nın Yükselişi ve Düşüşü*, p.208.

²⁰⁷ Serdar Cem Sedirolu, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin Kuruluş Yıllarında (1923-1938) Türk Dış Politikasında Karar Vericilerin Tercihlerini Etkileyen Unsurlar, içinde "*Tarih araştırmaları- IV*", ed. Arzu Baykara Taşkaya, İksad Yayınevi, 2022, pp.121-122.

diplomacy based on lessons learned from past experiences. Within this framework, the foreign policy strategies pursued during the Atatürk and İnönü periods will be discussed in detail below. This is because the period up to the Second World War largely represents a foreign policy approach synonymous with these two leaders.

3.1.1. Turkish Foreign Policy during the Atatürk Period

The fundamental principles internalized by the foreign policy pursued by the Republic of Türkiye, founded on the legacy of the Ottoman State, were adopted by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk as "*ensuring service to all Turkish people and the state*",²⁰⁸ and the main goal was to integrate Türkiye into the international system by ensuring the international acceptability of this newly formed state. The most important reason for prioritizing recognition in the international system was related to the fact that events developing within the framework of this system either directly or indirectly posed a threat to Türkiye's national security.²⁰⁹ Mustafa Kemal played a major role in Türkiye's foreign policy during this period as the country began to gain respectability. This is because Mustafa Kemal sought to emphasize the balance of power in the context of foreign policy, aiming to take advantage of the prevailing situation in favor of national interests.²¹⁰ During this period, Turkish foreign policy was based on *realism, independence, peace, trust, rationality, and Westernization*, and certain issues shaped relations with other countries. These issues can mostly be categorized in the context of the Mosul issue, Turkish-Western relations, and Turkish-Soviet relations.

Rich in oil resources, Mosul occasionally attracted the attention of the states outside the region, and these states waited for opportunities to initiate separatist activities in the region. Such an opportunity arose during the First World War, and the Allied powers, particularly Britain, which entered the region through secret agreements, began to take concrete steps. As a result, shortly after the signing of the Armistice of Mudros, Britain occupied the region on 11 November 1918.²¹¹ Subsequently, Britain attempted to turn the situation entirely in its favor with the Treaty of

²⁰⁸ Mahmut Bali Aykan, *Türk Dış Politika Anlayışı*, der. Haydar Çakmak, *Türk Dış Politikası (1918-2008)*, Platin, Ankara, 2008, pp.31-32.

²⁰⁹ Muhammet Erat, *Osmanlıdan Cumhuriyete Boğazlar Meselesi*, *Türk Dış Politikası Cumhuriyet Dönemi*, Gökkuşbu Yayınları, İstanbul, 2008, p.158

²¹⁰ Baskın Oran, "Türk Dış Politikası: Temel İlkeleri ve Soğuk Savaş Ertesindeki Durumu Üzerine Notlar", *Ankara Üniversitesi SBF Dergisi*, Cilt:1, Sayı:1, 1996, (ss.353-370), pp.353-354.

²¹¹ Sezen Kılıç, "Musul Sorunu ve Lozan", *Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi Dergisi*, Cilt:24, Sayı:71, 2008 (ss.319-340), p.320.

Sèvres, but Türkiye declared that it did not recognize that treaty. Despite successful completion of the Turkish National Struggle that began with the War of Liberation, Britain insisted on the issue of Mosul at the subsequent Lausanne Conference, and it was decided that this issue would be resolved through bilateral negotiations and agreements. However, while Turkish-British standoff continued around this issue, the League of Nations (LN) reiterated that Mosul was under British mandate, and evaluating the support given to Britain by the other Western powers, the Turkish side realized that it was being isolated on this issue. While Türkiye did not recognize LN's decision, the ongoing restructuring process and internal problems within the country prevented the young country from resorting to force to resolve the Mosul issue. Therefore, with the agreement signed in June 1926, Mosul was ceded to Iraq under the British mandate, with the condition that Türkiye would receive a 10% share of Mosul's oil for a period of 25 years.²¹² In subsequent years, Türkiye relinquished this right in exchange for a lump sum of money.

One of the most notable developments during this period was the improvement in Turkish-Soviet relations. Realizing that it was being isolated by Western powers over the Mosul issue, Türkiye recognized the need to change its perception of Russia that had been shaped during the Ottoman period. This was because, in the new international system that had emerged, where Russia could no longer be balanced by Western powers, Türkiye needed to pursue a policy of balance alongside the Soviets.²¹³ This was largely influenced by the fact that both Türkiye and Russia experienced similar fates during the First World War. In this context, Türkiye turned its face towards the East in foreign policy, which began to seriously concern the West.²¹⁴ This was because relations that could develop on the basis of friendship with Russia could facilitate the guarantee of Türkiye's security on its eastern border and in the Black Sea.²¹⁵

The first attempts at contact between Türkiye and Soviet Russia were initiated by the Russian side, and various meetings were held with Turkish officials through secret representatives. As a result of these unofficial contacts, the Russian side offered assistance and cooperation in

²¹² Tarık Saygı, "Lozan Antlaşması'nda Musul Sorunu ve Hatay Meselesi", *Yalova Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi*, Cilt:5, Sayı:10, 2016 (s.157-174), p.166.

²¹³ Yılmaz Altuğ, *Türk Devrim Tarihi Dersleri: 1919-1938*, 2. Baskı, İÜ İşletme Fakültesi İşletme İktisadı Enstitüsü, İstanbul, 1975, p.136.

²¹⁴ Salahi R. Sonyel, "Kurtuluş Savaşı Günlerinde Doğu Siyasamız", *Belleten*, Cilt: 41, Sayı:164, 1977, (ss.657-732), p.661.

²¹⁵ Yücel Güçlü, "The Basic Principles and Practices of The Turkish Foreign Policy Under Atatürk", *Belleten*, Cilt: 64, 2000, (ss.949-968), p.952.

exchange for Turkish friendship. This exchange of ideas between the parties resulted in the establishment of official diplomatic relations in 1920.²¹⁶ Subsequently, the Treaty of Moscow was signed between the two states on 16 March 1921. This treaty was essentially shaped on the basis of a common balance of power policy against Britain and Western powers in general.²¹⁷ Subsequently, the Treaty of Kars was signed between Türkiye and the Soviet Republics of South Caucasus on 13 October 1921, and the Treaty of Friendship and Brotherhood was signed with the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic on 21 January 1922, thus establishing Turkish-Soviet relations on a solid foundation.²¹⁸

However, parallel to the development of these friendly relations, certain demands made by Soviet Foreign Commissar Georgy V. Chicherin to the Turkish side unexpectedly cause a sense of unease in Ankara. Chicherin claimed that certain regions in and around Batum belonged to Russia and demanded that the status of these territories be reconsidered. Mustafa Kemal Pasha, however, continued to pursue flexible and balanced diplomacy during this process to prevent the breakdown of relations. The main reason for this was that the political support and military assistance promised by the Turkish-Soviet Treaty was of vital importance for the success of the national struggle taking place in Anatolia.²¹⁹

In this context, it can be said that a period of suspicion began in bilateral relations from this period onwards. The attitude displayed by the Russians regarding Armenia was particularly influential in this regard. By demanding that the regions of Muş, Bitlis, and Van be ceded to Armenia, the Soviets had revealed to the Turks their political ambitions in Anatolia.²²⁰ In other words, Turkish-Soviet relations during this period were shaped by Türkiye's political suspicions and the Soviets' concerns about Türkiye's potential rapprochement with the West.

In fact, the resolution of the Mosul issue and the suspicion towards the Soviets enabled Türkiye to re-evaluate its relations with the West. This also had a major impact on Türkiye's membership in the League of Nations and its adoption of an anti-war stance. Türkiye sought to normalize its

²¹⁶ Mevlüt Samet Yıldız, Çağatay Benhür, "Sovyet Basınında Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin Onuncu Yıl Kutlamaları ve Kliment Yefremoviç Vorosilov'un Türkiye Ziyareti", *Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi Dergisi*, Sayı: 109, 2024 (ss. 135-172), p.141.

²¹⁷ Yücel Güçlü, p.952.

²¹⁸ Cemil Hasanlı, *Tarafsızlıktan Soğuk Savaşa Doğu Türk-Sovyet İlişkileri. 1939-1953*; Bilgi Yayınevi, Ankara 2011, p.15.

²¹⁹ Faruk Sönmezoğlu, p.59.

²²⁰ Ali Fuat Cebesoy, *Moskova Hatıraları*, Vatan Neşriyatı, İstanbul, 1955, p.61.

relations with Britain during this period, primarily because all important Turkish statesmen believed that Britain would ultimately prevail in the event of a war. In this sense, the Turks' trust in British power was unquestioned. A turning point in bilateral relations occurred during the last few years of Atatürk's presidency. King Edward VIII visited Turkish ports, and a British engineering company was appointed as a consultant to the Turkish government for all public works. The process culminated in May 1938 with the British government granting Türkiye a loan of 16 million pounds; 6 million pounds of this loan were allocated for arms purchases from British companies, while the remainder was allocated for commercial purchases supported by the Department of Export Credit Guarantees (*İhracat Kredileri Garanti Dairesi*).²²¹ This not only ensured complete reconciliation with Britain, but also marked the establishment of close relations.

Although a neutrality and mutual assistance agreement was signed between Türkiye and Italy at this time, Italy's implementation of its expansionist strategy in the 1930s subsequently led to the reemergence of trust issues in bilateral relations. Meanwhile, relations between Türkiye and France, another European country, were shaped by the Hatay issue. As is well known, the Ankara Agreement that was signed between Türkiye and France in 1921 stipulated that Hatay would be left under French mandate, and privileges would be granted to Turks in the region. Subsequently, Syria also remained under French mandate. However, with the abolition of Syria's mandate system in 1936, the Sanjak issue came back to the forefront.²²² The main reason for this was that decisions regarding the Sanjak were to be transferred to Syria. Mustafa Kemal, proclaiming that Hatay was a personal matter for him,²²³ sought to find a solution and clearly expressed his dissatisfaction with this matter. The issue was later brought before the League of Nations, where it was decided that the Sanjak would be independent in internal affairs, while the Syrian government would have authority in relation to Sanjak in foreign affairs.²²⁴ As the new status of the Sanjak was being determined, problems arose regarding the elections, and Türkiye was forced to intervene to identify injustices.

²²¹ Yücel Güçlü, p.955.

²²² Coşkun Topal, "Sancak (Hatay) Sorunu ve İkinci Dünya Savaşı Öncesi Süreçte Arap Kamuoyundaki Etkileri", *Trakya University Journal of Social Science*, Cilt:11, Sayı:2, 2009, (ss.1-16), p.3.

²²³ Adem Kara, "Hatay'ın Anavatana Katılması Hakkında Yeni Bir Belge", *International Journal of Social Inquiry / Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi*, Cilt:10, Sayı:2, 2017 (ss.117-134), p.124.

²²⁴ Yılmaz Altuğ, p.44.

Looking at the international system at that time, it was a known fact that states were on the brink of a new war and that France wanted Türkiye by its side against other European states in such a complex environment. For this reason, France chose not to insist on the Hatay issue. With France out of the way, Hatay gained its independence in 1938 and was annexed to Türkiye a full year later, which resolved the issue.²²⁵

During this period, the increasingly intense process of bloc formation among European states forced Türkiye to pursue a policy of balance in its foreign relations. As the aftermath of First World War had yet to subside in Türkiye, it would have been extremely risky for the country to enter into an unpredictable environment of competition.

"Between 1935 and 1938, the bloc formation movement in Europe intensified. Relations between the Anti-Revisionist West (led by Britain and France), which wanted to preserve the order brought about by the First World War, and the Revisionist countries (Germany, Italy, and others), which wanted to change the status quo, were becoming increasingly tense. Although dissatisfied with the post-war order, the USSR appeared to be in dialogue with Western democracies against Nazi Germany, while also secretly engaging in contacts with the said country. Within these bloc-forming efforts in Europe, Türkiye, as a state satisfied with its borders, sought to align itself with Western democracies, while also sympathizing to a certain extent with Germany's predicament. While increasing its closeness to the West, Türkiye maintained its dialogue with Germany and tried not to let its relations with the USSR fall below a certain level. This multi-faceted policy earned Türkiye respect in every political center. There was almost a competition among these countries to win Türkiye over to their side."²²⁶

Based on the principle of "*peace at home, peace in the world*,"²²⁷ the general characteristic of Turkish foreign policy during the Atatürk period was as follows: a) Valuing peace and working diligently to preserve it, b) Strictly adhering to the law, c) Protecting national interests, d) Pursuing modernization (Westernization) and democratization, and emphasizing human values, and e) Engaging actively with the rest of the world while abstaining from engaging in adventurism.

²²⁵ Yılmaz Altuğ, p.46.

²²⁶ Mehmet Gönlübol, Ömer Kürkçüoğlu, "Atatürk Dönemi Türk Dış Politikasına Genel Bir Bakış", "Atatürk Dönemi Türk Dış Politikasına Genel Bir Bakış", *Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi Dergisi*, Cilt:1, Sayı:2, Mart 1985, (ss.451-473), p.460.

²²⁷ See: Hamza Eroğlu, "Yurtta Sulh, Cihanda Sulh", *Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi Dergisi*, Cilt:1, Sayı:2, 1985 (ss.435-450).

3.1.2. Turkish Foreign Policy During the İnönü Period

As the international system was embroiled in the Second World War with grave consequences for all involved states, the decision-making mechanism of Turkish foreign policy underwent a process of change. İsmet İnönü came to power after the passing away of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk in 1938,²²⁸ and he, similar to Atatürk, sought to implement a balance strategy throughout the war years. This was an indication that he was acting in line with the basic principles of Turkish foreign policy.²²⁹ The most notable aspect of the foreign policy pursued during this period was the neutrality strategy, which was accepted as appropriate for the demands of the time. During this period, Türkiye not only developed political and economic relations with Britain and France, but also took great care to maintain its existing relations with Germany. In this context, Turkish government officials described Germany as a friendly country at every opportunity and never made any threatening actions or statements against Germany before or during the war. An important reason for Türkiye's refrain from making threatening actions or statements against Germany stemmed from the economic and commercial cooperation developed in the context of national interests.²³⁰ Some historians and researchers have argued that Türkiye's lack of support for Britain and France during the war and its refrain from making statements against Germany seriously damaged its relations with Britain. However, Britain mostly found Türkiye's behavior justified, and, given the threat to Britain's position in the Middle East and India, Türkiye's position as a neutral ally at the crossroads to the East sometimes served Britain's interests.²³¹

During this period, Türkiye was repeatedly attempted to be drawn into war by various countries. For example, Türkiye first faced the risk of entering the war in 1940, when conflicts were taking place in the Germany, England, and France triangle. However, Türkiye managed to remain outside the war by invoking the treaty it had signed with the Soviets in

²²⁸ Kemal H. Karpat, *Türk Siyasi Tarihi (Siyasal Sistemin Evrimi)*, 6. Baskı, Timaş Yayınları, İstanbul, 2015, p.65.

²²⁹ Gülay Sarıçoban, "İkinci Dünya Savaşı döneminde (1939-1945) Türk Dış Politikası", *Atatürk Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi*, Cilt:24, Sayı:4, 2020, (ss.1755-1777), p.1757.

²³⁰ J.M. Vanderlippe, "A Cautious Balance: The Question of Turkey in World War 2", *The Historian*, Vol:64, No:1, 2001, (pp.63-80), p.64.

²³¹ Selim Deringil, "The Preservation of Turkey's Neutrality, during the Second World War: 1940", *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol:18, Issue:1, 1982, (pp.30-52), p.43.

1925.²³² The second time Türkiye faced the danger of being drawn into the war was when Italy attacked Greece. The third time was in January 1941, when Britain suggested that Türkiye declare war on Italy. However, Turkish decision-makers refused to enter the war due to Russia's stance and Türkiye's military inadequacy.²³³

As can be understood from this, Türkiye's geopolitical position made it impossible to pursue a neutral policy in the traditional sense, and in such a situation, Numan Menemencioğlu, who served as Minister of Foreign Affairs for a long time during and after the war, tried to bring the concept of "effective neutrality" to the fore.²³⁴ However, when Germany invaded France and Romania in 1940, Italy attacked Greece, and the Axis Powers achieved successes on almost all fronts, the Turkish public began to increasingly criticize the government of İsmet Pasha, and even Kazım Karabekir questioned what it would mean to lose a war in which Italy would participate, after it became clear that the Allies were losing. Despite all this, it can be said that the first half of 1941 and 1942 were the periods when Türkiye's balanced policy was most clearly implemented.

Although Türkiye did not actively engage in combat during the Second World War, it was nevertheless forced to implement a war economy throughout the war.²³⁵ The country managed to remain outside the war despite all economic difficulties and political pressures. Several factors determined Türkiye's position of remaining outside the war during this period. The first relates to the constant emphasis on Türkiye's military and economic weakness at the time. However, this strategy led to the country's isolation in international politics after the Second World War and left it in a difficult position, particularly in relation to the Soviets, until it entered under the protective umbrella of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The second factor stemmed from the close relations between Türkiye and the Soviets during the war. The provisions of the friendship and non-aggression pact signed between the two states facilitated Türkiye staying out of the war. The third most important factor relates to Mustafa Kemal's peaceful and non-interventionist strategy, which underpinned the success of the foreign policy pursued under İnönü's leadership. This made

²³² Cemil Koçak, *Türkiye'de Milli Şef Dönemi (1938-1945)*, Yurt Yayınları, Ankara, 1986, p.308.

²³³ Hakan Özden, "The Diplomatic Maneuvers of Turkey in World War II", *Karadeniz Araştırmaları*, Sayı:37, 2013 (pp.91-110), p.97.

²³⁴ Ersel Kiraz, "İkinci Dünya Savaşı'nda Türkiye: Savaş sırasında Türk Dış Politikası ve Savaşın Türkiye Üzerindeki Sosyoekonomik Etkileri Üzerine Bir Derleme", *ASA Dergisi*, Cilt:3, Sayı:1, 2025 (ss.1-37), p.19.

²³⁵ Ersel Kiraz, p.30.

it possible to preserve Türkiye's territorial integrity, highlighting the importance of pursuing a balanced policy among the great powers.

3.2. The Second World War: Blocs and Conflicts

The roots of the Second World War lie in the unsatisfactory terms of the Treaty of Versailles, which was signed by all the countries that participated in First World War in the second decade of the 20th century. For this reason, Johan Kaufman called the period from the end of the First World War to the beginning of Second World War "the long armistice period" and pointed out that the peace that existed during this period was in truth only temporary.²³⁶ This was because countries such as Austria, Hungary, Italy, and Germany were dissatisfied with the post-war situation in Europe. In particular, a major economic crisis had occurred shortly before this period, and the world economy had suddenly taken a turn for the worse, prompting many countries to adopt protectionist strategies to save their citizens from economic crises. This led to a revolution that gave rise to fascist movements in many European countries.

Looking at world history, fascism became so widespread after the First World War that some historians consider the period between 1919 and 1945 to be the era of fascism's proliferation.²³⁷ During this particular period, fascism was used as a tool to suppress socialist and communist movements. In such a complex environment, world powers reached the brink of a second major war, which eventually triggered the Second World War. Before discussing this war, it is necessary to briefly examine the two important blocs that determined the course of the war.

There were two major alliances in this world war: *the Axis Powers* and *the Allied Powers*. After the war broke out, as was the case in the First World War, the formation of alliances became a factor in the course of the Second World War. In 1936, Germany and Italy formed an alliance known as the Rome-Berlin Axis, which included an agreement to help each other in their quest for power and conquest. Later, after Japan joined the alliance in 1940, with which it became the Rome-Berlin-Tokyo Axis.²³⁸ These Axis countries saw themselves as dispossessed nations and demanded more

²³⁶ Johan Kaufman, *An Introduction to Diplomacy*, Martinus Nijhoff Publisher Ltd, London, 1988, p.162.

²³⁷ Marvin Perry, *Man's Unfinished Journey: A World History*, Houghton Milton Company, USA, 1971, p.664.

²³⁸ İbrahim Öztürk, Ahmet Korkmaz, "II. Dünya Savaşı'nda Almanya'nın Türkiye'yi İşgal Planları", *Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi*, Cilt: 13, Sayı: 3, 2023, (ss.1651-1666), p.1653.

control and authority over other countries that possessed the world's abundant natural resources. The Allied Powers were led by United Kingdom, the United States, and the Soviet Union, and were governed by British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, American President Franklin D. Roosevelt, and Soviet leader Joseph Stalin, respectively.²³⁹ The similarities between the Allied and Axis Powers, the two opposing sides of the war, are as follows:²⁴⁰

- Although the Axis partners never established friendly relations in their diplomatic or military policies, they shared the common goal of territorial expansion.
- Both the Allies and the Axis powers sought to establish imperial systems based on military conquest and the collapse of the post-First World War international order.
- Both blocs had global domination in mind and were at the forefront of this struggle.

After establishing some background on the two major blocs in the war, we must now look at the course of the war. In March 1938, German troops invaded Austria and incorporated it into the Reich²⁴¹, and in September, Hitler declared that the oppression of ethnic Germans living in Czechoslovakia was intolerable and that war was imminent. In March 1939, Hitler's military forces annexed Czechoslovakia, and the Allies, who claimed more rights over Poland, warned Hitler that war would break out if Germany continued. Not heeding this warning, on 1 September 1939, German troops attacked Poland, aiming to kill civilians to force Poland's surrender.²⁴² Although Poland fought back, it was no match for the German military. The Second World War began when the UK and France sent a letter to Hitler stating that they would be forced to declare war on Germany if he did not stop the invasion of Poland.

At this time, following a three-week struggle, Poland surrendered

²³⁹“Axis Powers In World War II”, [https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/en/article/axis-powers-in-world-war-ii#:~:text=The%20Axis%20powers%20\(Germany%2C%20Italy,Axis%20alliance%20began%20in%201943](https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/en/article/axis-powers-in-world-war-ii#:~:text=The%20Axis%20powers%20(Germany%2C%20Italy,Axis%20alliance%20began%20in%201943), (Accessed: 29.06.2024)

²⁴⁰“Difference Between Allied and Axis Powers”, https://byjusexamprep.com/liveData/f/2022/12/difference_between_allied_and_axis_powers_upsc_notes_37.pdf, (Accessed: 29.06.2024)

²⁴¹ Oğuzhan Ekinci, “Kültürün İlhakından İlhakın Kültürüne: Almanya ile Avusturya'nın Birleşmesi (Anschluss)”, *Atatürk Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi*, Cilt:22, Sayı:3, 2018, (ss.1603-1630), pp.1614-1616.

²⁴² Marvin Perry, p.685.

to German forces in September 1939, while Russia seized eastern Poland and the three Baltic states in accordance with the terms of its non-aggression pact with Germany.²⁴³ In the spring of 1940, German forces attacked Norway and Denmark in April; occupied the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg in May; and launched an attack against France at the end of the month. The Germans entered Paris on 14 June, and the French government, which was deeply divided politically, accepted defeat and requested an armistice.²⁴⁴ The success of the German *Blitzkrieg* (lightning-fast warfare) forced other states to rethink their doctrines and reorganize their militaries. Roosevelt ordered the transfer of large quantities of First World War munitions to France and the UK in the spring of 1940 and reached an agreement in September to transfer combatants over the age of 50 to the UK in exchange for bases in the Atlantic and the Caribbean. In this vein, while Hitler consolidated Germany's dominance over Europe in 1940 and 1941, Japan successfully imposed a new order on China and Southeast Asia in the Far East and even pushed the US toward war with its actions.²⁴⁵ As early as 1937, Japanese forces launched a full-scale invasion strategy against China, partly to eliminate Chinese communism, secure important strategic materials and economic resources, and partly to remove the Chinese people, Western imperialism, and economic interests from the Pacific region.

Throughout 1938, Japanese troops stationed in Manchuria experienced two major border disputes with Soviet Russia, leading to extensive clashes. Soviet troops emerged victorious in both conflicts, which increased the Japanese government's desire to transform the anti-Comintern pact they had signed with Germany in 1936 into a stronger alliance. Accordingly, in September 1940, Japan signed a tripartite pact with Germany and Italy, binding the three powers to assist each other with all political, economic, and military means if any of them were attacked by a country not involved in the existing conflicts. As another move to stabilize the Manchuria-Inner Mongolia border and neutralize the threat of a Russian attack, Japan put a non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union into effect in April 1941.²⁴⁶

²⁴³ Beldona V. Rao, *History of Modern Europe (AD 1789-2010)*, Sterling Publishers, New Delhi, 2011, p.208.

²⁴⁴ *A Brief History of the US Army in World War Second*, Center of Military History United States Army Washington, D.C., 1992, p.5.

²⁴⁵ Dzul Fazil, "Success and Defeat in the Second World War", *Pointer Journal of the Singapore Armed Forces*, Vol:40, No:3, 2014, (pp.48-60), p.53.

²⁴⁶ Ruth Henig, *The Origins of the Second World War 1933-1941*, Second edition, Routledge, New York-London, 2005, p.40.

While events unfolded in this manner in Asia during the war, on 7 December 1941, Japanese forces attacked the American naval base at Pearl Harbor in Hawaii, suddenly thrusting the United States into the conflict.²⁴⁷ Following Hitler's declaration of war on the US, President Roosevelt called on Congress to immediately and substantially expand the American armed forces. Beginning in August 1942, the Americans launched their offensive against Japan to liberate the islands in the Southwest Pacific from Japanese control²⁴⁸, which was met with fierce Japanese resistance. However, even though their fleets were being destroyed and they were being surrounded by American forces in February 1945, the Japanese still refused to surrender. On 6 August 1945, an atomic bomb was dropped by the Americans on the city of Hiroshima, which laid waste to the city. On 9 August 1945, American forces dropped another atomic bomb on Nagasaki, after which Japanese forces surrendered unconditionally to the Americans on 2 September 1945.²⁴⁹

Broadly speaking, the Second World War, which lasted more than five years and saw several battles in its final stages, was caused by several factors that included the Treaty of Versailles, economic stagnation, German and Japanese militarism, and the failures of the League of Nations and inaction against expansionist actors. Germany's collapse began as early as 1943, and with Hitler's suicide on 30 April 1945, Germany's defeat was officially confirmed on 7-8 May 1945.²⁵⁰ While the war ended in Europe, Japan's surrender took a little longer in Asia, and the war in that region ended in September 1945. In the process that determined the end of the war, serious negotiations were held and conferences were organized between the parties. The decisions made at these conferences played an effective role in determining the new world order and laid the foundation for the new international order in its true sense. In this context, the conferences that brought the Second World War to an end are detailed below.

3.3. Conferences that Shaped the System

The year 1943 is considered the turning point of the Second World War. Considering that Germany's collapse began in 1943, as emphasized above, it is known that the meetings that determined the fate

²⁴⁷ Ruth Henig, p.41.

²⁴⁸ Kent Roberts Greenfield, *The War against Japan*, Center of Military History United States Army, Washington, D.C., 2001, p.3.

²⁴⁹ E. H. Gombrich, *World History*, Oxford University Press, London, 1939, p.337.

²⁵⁰ Henrik Eberle, Matthias Uhl, *Hitler Kitabı*, Çev: Mustafa Tüzel, Alfa Yayınları, İstanbul, 2017, p.449.

of the war also began to be held from this year onwards. In this context, it is necessary to first mention the Adana Conference, held between Türkiye (which sought to maintain its neutrality during the war) and the Allies, and then to examine the other conferences that determined the fate of the war. In 1943, when the Axis Powers were on the defensive and the Allies were on the offensive, efforts to involve Türkiye in the war were intensified, and a meeting was held in Adana between Churchill and İnönü. Churchill arrived in Adana on 30 January 1943 and was greeted on the train by İnönü, who was accompanied by Turkish officials.²⁵¹ The most striking aspect of this meeting was that both states had adopted completely different views and were unwilling to compromise. Churchill's main goal at the Adana meeting was to get Türkiye to join the war on the side of the Allies. This was because Türkiye was in a buffer position between the Allied Powers and the Axis Powers. Therefore, Türkiye's entry into the war would strengthen the southern front and make it easier to defeat Germany.²⁵² However, İnönü avoided entering the war, citing both Türkiye's inadequate military equipment and the occasional suspicion towards the Soviets.²⁵³

In August 1943, American President Franklin D. Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill held a week-long conference that changed the course of the Second World War. Hosted by Canadian Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie in Quebec City, highly confidential discussions were held at the Quebec Conference (codenamed *Quadrant*) with the participation of hundreds of leaders from around the world.²⁵⁴ One of the important decisions reached at this conference was to establish the Southeast Asia Command in the China-Burma-India triangle, while the second was to plan strategic bombing operations using B-29 Superfortresses to defeat Japan. The third decision of the conference concerned the opening of a front in the Balkans, which was a matter of interest to Türkiye. In this context, it was concluded that Türkiye should remain neutral in the war and that military equipment should be provided to the country to reduce the pressure it was facing, particularly from

²⁵¹ Durmuş Yalçın, Cemal Avcı, *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Tarihi II*, Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi, Ankara, 2002, pp.456-457.

²⁵² *Türkiye Dış Politikasında 50 Yıl: İkinci Dünya Savaşı Yılları (1939-1945)*, T.C. Dışişleri Bakanlığı Yayınları, Ankara, 1973, pp.6-7.

²⁵³ Osman Yalçın, "İkinci Dünya Savaşında İsmet İnönü ve Churchill Arasında Yapılan Adana Görüşmesi", *Ankara Üniversitesi Türk İnkılâp Tarihi Enstitüsü Atatürk Yolu Dergisi*, Sayı:47, 2011, (ss.701-731), p.710.

²⁵⁴ See: *Quadrant Conference August 1943*, Office, U. S., Secretary Office of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 1943.

Germany. At the same time, Türkiye had to be cautious about the Turkish Straits and not allow German ships to use them.²⁵⁵

The Allied Powers met in Cairo immediately after the Moscow Conference and once again attempted to pressure Türkiye into joining the war. Consequently, it was impossible for the parties with diametrically opposed views to find common ground, and as previously emphasized, Turkish-British relations were pushed into the background and deteriorated.²⁵⁶ In the final days of 1943, conferences continued to be held to conduct the war and establish universal peace and justice, leading to the parties holding a meeting in Tehran in November 1943. The meeting at the Iranian capital marked the first time that the American President and the Soviet leader had come together.²⁵⁷ The main purpose of this conference was to discuss the Allied powers' landing at Yugoslavia, the Japan issue, and the post-war world order. At this conference, Churchill once again attempted to drag Türkiye into the war. However, during the conference, neither the Americans nor the Soviets shared Churchill's view on this matter related to Türkiye.²⁵⁸

The conferences that brought the Second World War to an end and which laid the groundwork for the subsequent order were held in Yalta and Potsdam. The Yalta Conference took place in Crimea between 4 and 11 February 1945 while the war continued.²⁵⁹ American President Roosevelt, British Prime Minister Churchill, and Soviet Premier Stalin, who gathered in Yalta for the conference, made important decisions that would determine the future course of the war and the post-war world. In Yalta, Roosevelt and Churchill discussed with Stalin the conditions under which the Soviets would enter the war against Japan, and the three agreed that, in exchange for increased Soviet influence in the Pacific region, the Soviets would be granted a sphere of influence in Manchuria after Japan's surrender. This included the southern part of Sakhalin, a part of Port Arthur, a share in the operation of the Manchurian railways, and the Kuril

²⁵⁵ Barış Ertem, "Türkiye Üzerindeki Sovyet Talepleri ve Türk-Sovyet İlişkileri (1939-1947)", *Uluslararası Sosyal Araştırmalar Dergisi*, Cilt:3, Sayı:11, 2010, (ss.252-273), p.259.

²⁵⁶ Baki Öz, *Bıçağın Sırtında Siyaset: 2. Dünya Savaşında Türk Dış Politikası*, Can Yayınları, İstanbul, 1996, p.142.

²⁵⁷ A.H. Hamzavi, *Iran and the Tehran Conference*, Oxford Press, 1944, p.198.

²⁵⁸ Barış Ertem, p.294.

²⁵⁹ Musa Özdemir, Sadık Çalışkan, Fatih Öztürk, "Yalta Konferansı: Soğuk Savaş Giden Yol", *Barış Araştırmaları ve Çatışma Çözümleri Dergisi*, Cilt:5, Sayı: 2, 2017 (ss.62-79), p.63.

Islands.²⁶⁰

The Allied leaders also discussed decisions regarding Germany, Eastern Europe, and the formation of the United Nations (UN). Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin agreed that post-war Germany should bear only part of the reparations, not the entire amount.²⁶¹ The Americans and British generally agreed that the future governments of Eastern European countries bordering the Soviets should be close to the Soviet regime, and the Soviets promised to allow free elections in all areas liberated from Nazi Germany. The negotiators also raised issues concerning the future of the UN, and all parties agreed on an American plan regarding the voting procedures in the UN Security Council. According to this plan, after France would join the UN, the Security Council would have five permanent members, each with veto power over decisions.²⁶² The issue concerning Türkiye at the Yalta Conference was related to the Turkish Straits. Although the Soviets emphasized the need to review the 1936 Montreux Convention Regarding the Regime of the (Turkish) Straits, no conclusion was reached on this matter. In February 1945, after the Yalta Conference, Stalin, Churchill, and Roosevelt agreed to meet to determine the post-war borders in Europe following Germany's surrender. In this context, the final conference was held in Potsdam, with the important issue being how Germany would be administered. At the conference, the Soviets demanded heavy reparations from Germany with the condition that half of these reparations would go to the Soviet Union. However, the new American President Harry Truman and Secretary of State James Byrnes were determined to ease the treatment of Germany by allowing the occupying nations to collect reparations only from their own zones of occupation. Truman and Byrnes took this stance because they wanted to prevent a repeat of the situation created by the Treaty of Versailles, which had demanded high reparations payments from Germany after the First World War.²⁶³

Furthermore, the US's ambiguous stance on the issues at this conference was a matter of concern for Türkiye. This was because a report prepared prior to the conference envisaged granting the Soviets considerable concessions on the provisions of Montreux, which was a

²⁶⁰ "The Yalta Conference-1945", <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1937-1945/yalta-conf>, (Accessed: 29.06.2024)

²⁶¹ Crimea (Yalta) Conference, 1945. *Protocol of Proceedings Signed at Yalta February 11, 1945*, (pp.1013-1019), p.1016.

²⁶² Crimea (Yalta) Conference, 1945, p.1015.

²⁶³ "The Potsdam Conference, 1945", <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1937-1945/potsdam-conf>, (Accessed: 29.06.2024)

stance that worried Türkiye.²⁶⁴ In this context, the Americans accepted that the Soviet Union was the Great Power that was primarily concerned with the Turkish Straits. When the first session was held in Potsdam on 17 July 1945, Truman tended to address the conflict between Türkiye and the Soviets in the context of the right of passage through the Straits. At the second session on 23 July, Truman announced his project regarding free passage through the world's waterways. Ultimately, it was decided that each of the Big Three would separately inform Türkiye that they supported the revision of the Montreux Convention.²⁶⁵

3.4. The Establishment of the UN System

To discuss the establishment of the United Nations system, we must go back in time by a couple of years. On 14 August 1941, Roosevelt and Churchill met on a warship near the coast of Newfoundland to discuss their perspectives on the war and its aftermath, and to declare their common goals under the Atlantic Charter. At this meeting, they discussed a new but as yet unspecified general security system that would replace the League of Nations, and both leaders agreed on the prohibition of the use of force between states and even the threat of force. However, a few months later, the US was pushed into the war, and with that, the Allied war coalition was formed. As a result, the war aims set out in the Atlantic Charter became the war aims of the Allies in the "UN Declaration" dated 1 January 1942. The declaration, signed by 22 states, formed the basis of the alliance against the Axis Powers.²⁶⁶ The Atlantic Charter signed in August 1941 and the UN Declaration proclaimed in January 1942 committed the Allies not only to fighting fascism in the short term, but also to strive for multilateralism in order to maintain international peace and security and to promote post-war economic growth and social stability. This commitment was evident not only on the battlefronts, but also in the commitment to intergovernmental organizations and the broad coordination of national policies among the 44 Allied states.²⁶⁷

The first concrete step towards establishing a worldwide international organization was taken in late summer 1944 as the

²⁶⁴ Selim Deringil, "Denge Oyunu (İkinci Dünya Savaşı'nda Türkiye'nin Dış Politikası)", 5. Baskı, Tarih Vakfı, İstanbul, 2014, p.261.

²⁶⁵ Selim Deringil, p.262.

²⁶⁶ Oliver Diggelmann, "The Creation of the United Nations: Break with the Past or Continuation of Wartime Power Politics", *Die Friedens Warte*, Cilt:93, Sayı:3-4, 2020, (pp.371-389), p.375.

²⁶⁷ Thomas G. Weiss, *The United Nations: Before, During and After 1945*, *International Affairs*, Vol:91, Issue:6, 2015, (pp.1221-1235), p.1223.

Dumbarton Oaks talks were taking place.²⁶⁸ The first phase of the talks occurred between 21 August and 28 September between representatives of the USSR, the UK, and the US, while the second phase took place between 29 September and 7 October between representatives of China, the UK, and the US. As a result of these talks, the four powers reached a series of agreements contained in the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals, according to which an international organization would be established under the name of the United Nations, and the charter of this organization would contain certain provisions.²⁶⁹ The UN to be established within this framework would maintain international peace and security. To this end, the organization would prevent or eliminate threats to peace and would ensure that international disputes that could lead to the disruption of peace would be resolved or settled by peaceful means.²⁷⁰ At the same time, the UN system would contribute to the development of friendly relations among nations and to the establishment of a central mechanism to harmonize the actions of nations in achieving these objectives.²⁷¹ As a result, after the Second World War, states clearly understood the need for an international organization to avoid another war and prevent potential conflicts. In this context, the UN Charter was signed by 50 countries, including Türkiye,²⁷² leading to the establishment of the UN on 24 October 1945.

The UN is an international organization open to all countries of the world, and member states must not threaten peace and security and must refrain from threatening practices and actions. The General Assembly (UNGA), which forms the structure of the UN, consists of representatives from 193 member states, with each country having one vote. Within this structure, decisions are taken by majority vote and are not binding on member states. The Security Council (UNSC) has five permanent

²⁶⁸ Şahin Eray Kırdım, Atahan Demirkol, “San Francisco Konferansı Görüşmeleri ve Birleşmiş Milletler Kararları Işığında Selfdeterminasyon Kavramının İncelenmesi”, *Ankara Hacı Bayram Veli Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Dergisi*, Cilt: 25, Sayı:1, 2021 (ss.389-430), p.390.

²⁶⁹ Oliver Diggelmann, p.373.

²⁷⁰ Thomass G. Weiss, pp.1227-1229.

²⁷¹ “Origin and Evolution of UN System”, *Yearbook of the UN*, 1946-1947, (pp.1-50), p.4.

²⁷² “Birleşmiş Milletler Teşkilatı ve Türkiye”, <https://www.mfa.gov.tr/birlesmis-milletler-teskilati-ve-turkiye.tr.mfa#:~:text=Te%C5%9Fkilat%C4%B1n%20Tarihi%3A&text=BM'nin%20kurucu%20antla%C5%9Fmas%C4%B1%20niteli%C4%9Findeki,devletlerin%20say%C4%B1s%C4%B1%2051'e%20y%C3%BCkselmi%C5%9Ftir>, (Accessed: 30.06.2024)

members: the United Kingdom, the United States, Russia, China, and France. The ten non-permanent members are elected by the General Assembly for a two-year term, and a country cannot be re-elected immediately after completing its two-year term. Unlike the General Assembly, decisions taken by the Security Council are binding on UN members.²⁷³ The Secretariat, established under Chapter XV of the UN Charter, is the administrative organ of the UN. The Secretariat consists of the Secretary-General, appointed by the General Assembly for a five-year term upon the recommendation of the Security Council, and the staff appointed by the Secretary-General. The Secretariat is organized along departmental lines, with each department or office having a distinct area of action and responsibility. Offices and departments work in coordination with each other to ensure consistency in the UN's work program.²⁷⁴ The main purpose of the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), whose members are elected by the General Assembly, is to ensure the improvement of the welfare of peoples throughout the world. Decisions within ECOSOC are taken by simple majority, and small and less developed countries generally constitute the majority in this council.²⁷⁵ At the same time, ECOSOC is one of the most powerful bodies of the organization, as it controls 70% of all human and financial resources of the UN. ECOSOC can therefore prepare draft treaties and organize international conferences on matters within its competence.

The Trusteeship Council was established under the authority of the General Assembly and replaced the League of Nations mandate system. The Trusteeship Council was created to encourage the gradual development of self-government or independence in mandated territories. Each member of the Council has one vote, and decisions are taken by a majority of the members who are present and voting at the meetings. The Trusteeship Council is currently considered to have completed its mission, as all the previously mandated territories have by now gained their independence.²⁷⁶

²⁷³ Australia. Parliament. Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade. *[Rapor Başlığı]*. Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, 2001. http://www.aph.gov.au/house/committee/jfadt/U_Nations/UNRptindx.htm, (Accessed: 30.06.2024)

²⁷⁴ "Secretariat", <https://www.un.org/en/about-us/secretariat>, (Accessed: 30.06.2024)

²⁷⁵ A. LeRoy Bennett, James K. Oliver, *Uluslararası Örgütler*, 2. Baskı, Serbest Akademi, 2021, pp.102-103.

²⁷⁶ "Trusteeship Council", <https://www.un.org/en/about-us/trusteeship-council>, (Accessed: 30.06.2024)

The International Court of Justice (ICJ) is the principal judicial organ of the UN, and its main function is to resolve disputes in contentious cases. Another function of the ICJ is to give advisory opinions on any legal question requested by the General Assembly, the Security Council, any other organ of the UN, or any of its specialized agencies. The ICJ consists of fifteen judges elected for nine-year terms by the General Assembly and the Security Council.²⁷⁷

3.5. The Start of the Cold War: Actors and Processes

Contrary to popular belief, the end of the Second World War did not bring about a return to normalcy, and the world once again found itself on the brink of war. This time, however, the conflict did not arise between the major European powers that had dominated the international stage in the 1930s, but between the Soviet Union and the United States (the two new global powers that had emerged after the war) and the two blocs they led. The formation of these two blocs forced other countries to choose sides. This was because the Soviets had expanded their territory during the war and gained prestige from fighting Hitler's Germany. Furthermore, they offered an ideological, economic, and social model that extended further into the rest of Europe than ever before, making Soviet influence particularly evident in Eastern Europe.²⁷⁸ Parallel to this, Truman and Churchill were also concerned that Stalin wanted to spread Soviet power and communism to Western Europe. Therefore, in early 1946, Truman abandoned his predecessor Roosevelt's plan to withdraw all American troops from Europe within two years. Furthermore, in March 1946, Churchill gave a speech in Fulton warning that Stalin was rapidly transforming Eastern European countries into communist states and drawing attention to the fact that an "*iron curtain*" had descended across Europe, dividing the continent between the democratic and capitalist West and the totalitarian and communist East.²⁷⁹ In early 1947, a Greek communist minority waged a guerrilla war against the Greek government, which the British had long helped defend. At this point however, the British informed the Americans that they could no longer provide military and economic aid to Greece and its neighbor Türkiye. Truman decided to take on the role of defending Greece and Türkiye to prevent this strategic region, close to the oil rich Middle East, from falling under possible Soviet

²⁷⁷ "International Court of Justice", <https://peacepalacelibrary.nl/research-guide/international-court-justice>, (Accessed: 30.06.2024)

²⁷⁸ V.N. Khanna, *International Relations*, 4. Edition, Vikas Publishing House PVT Ltd., New Delhi, 2004, p.270.

²⁷⁹ V.N. Khanna, p.275.

control. In this context, in his 1947 speech to the US Congress, Truman specifically called on American citizens to maintain their country's position of global leadership and the responsibilities that came with it, and argued for the necessity of adopting an aid program. Under this program, the first goal was to help Greece and Türkiye achieve economic and geopolitical security levels that would deter Soviet intrigues and aggression, and to make this effective in regions under Soviet influence. The second goal was to provide support for campaigns against Communist guerrillas in Greece.²⁸⁰

Subsequently, US Secretary of State George C. Marshall proposed a four-year economic and financial support program to the Congress for the recovery of Europe. In April 1948, the US Congress approved a comprehensive economic aid program for Europe, covering Germany and even the Eastern European countries occupied by the Soviets.²⁸¹ The Marshall Plan, named after the Secretary of State who proposed it, served two purposes. The first was to help Europe recover from the devastating war and the second was to strengthen Western European governments threatened by communists who appealed to many people with promises of a better life.²⁸²

Stalin viewed the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan as a threat. He was concerned that these policies were an attempt by the US to pull Germany and Eastern Europe, which were under Soviet occupation, toward Western Europe and away from Soviet control. In response, Stalin prohibited any Eastern European country from accepting Marshall Plan aid and, in February 1948, arranged for the overthrow of the coalition government in Czechoslovakia, leaving only the communists in power. A few months later, he blocked all land access to the American, British, and French occupation zones in Berlin, and, which Truman successfully responded by transporting food and supplies by air, overcoming the Soviet blockade within a year. In 1949, the US, Canada, and Western European countries established the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), a military defense alliance, followed by the Soviets forming the Warsaw Pact, which included Eastern European states. This led to military and political

²⁸⁰ Kyle T. Evered, "The Truman Doctrine in Greece and Turkey: America's Cold War Fusion of Development and Security", *The Arab World Geographer/Le Géographe du Monde Arabe*, Volume:13, Issue:1, 2010, (pp.50-66), pp.50-51.

²⁸¹ Jacob Magid, "The Marshall Plan", *Advances in Historical Studies*, Vol:1, No:1, 2012, (pp.1-7), pp.2-3.

²⁸² Çağrı Erhan, "Ortaya Çıkışı ve Uygulanışıyla Marshall Planı", *Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi*, Cilt:1-4, Sayı:51, 1996, (ss.275-288), pp.278-279.

tensions between the Western Bloc, consisting of the US, NATO allies, and other countries, and the Eastern Bloc, consisting of the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies, which went down in history as the Cold War.²⁸³ The emergence of two opposing military blocs, the division of Europe, and the separation of Germany into two countries at the end of 1949 intensified the Cold War.²⁸⁴

At that time, intercontinental ballistic missiles were being produced by both the Soviet Union and the United States. Each of the thousands of long, medium, and short-range nuclear ballistic missiles produced by these countries was much more powerful than the atomic bombs dropped on Japan. In 1959, Fidel Castro led a successful communist revolution in Cuba. Although the US trained anti-communist Cubans to invade Cuba and overthrow Castro, the operation resulted in failure. Believing that the attempt to invade Cuba was part of a new American strategy to overthrow existing communist governments, Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev decided to counter this by secretly placing nuclear missiles in Cuba aimed at the United States. US President Kennedy demanded the missiles be removed, but Khrushchev refused. Nuclear war became a real possibility during several tense days in October 1962 because of this standoff. However, Khrushchev backed down after Kennedy agreed to remove NATO missiles stationed in Türkiye that were targeting the Soviets.²⁸⁵

After the Cuban Missile Crisis, the fear of nuclear war and Stalin's death brought about a period of better relations and negotiations between the superpowers, which is known as the *détente*.²⁸⁶ However, this period began to end in 1979 when the Soviet leader Brezhnev sent military forces to Afghanistan to rescue the communist regime in that country. US President Carter believed that this was a new phase in the expansion of Soviet communists towards the oil-rich Persian Gulf region and responded by significantly increasing his country's military spending. After Ronald Reagan was elected president of the US in 1980, he launched an aggressive

²⁸³ The term "cold" refers to the absence of direct large-scale conflict between the two rival blocs, despite the major regional wars (known as proxy wars) that were fought with the support of both sides.

²⁸⁴ Gérard-François Dumont, "The Berlin Wall: Life, Death and the Spatial Heritage of Berlin", *History Matters*, 2009, (pp.1-10), p.3.

²⁸⁵ L. Slantchev, *National Security Strategy: The Cuban/Caribbean Missile Crisis, October 1962*, University of San Diego Report, 2014, (pp.1-17), p.10.

²⁸⁶ Csaba Békés, *Cold War, Détente and the 1956 Hungarian Revolution*, Working Paper of International Center for Advanced Studies New York University, No:7, 2002, (pp.1-32), p.3.

foreign policy against the Soviets, even proposing the Strategic Defense Initiative in 1983, dubbed the "Star Wars" program, which would provide a space-based nuclear missile shield against a Soviet attack.²⁸⁷ Subsequently, in 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev was elected as the new Soviet leader. Gorbachev realized that the Soviet economy, especially the civilian sector, had been weakening for a decade. This was largely due to the enormous cost of military spending and the subsidization of the economies of Eastern Europe, Cuba, and other communist countries. Given this situation, Gorbachev attempted to preserve communism through new economic and political reforms. Gorbachev's attempts at revitalizing communism coincided with the negotiations between the Americans and the Soviets over the issue of nuclear weapons.

In 1986, leaders gathered for a summit in Reykjavik, Iceland, where Gorbachev proposed a 50% reduction in American and Soviet nuclear ballistic missiles and the complete elimination of medium-range missiles in Europe, while Reagan countered with a proposal for the phased elimination of all nuclear missiles.²⁸⁸ The following year, Gorbachev and Reagan signed an agreement to destroy all intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Eastern and Western Europe, and the process began to move forward rapidly. Meanwhile, Gorbachev ordered the complete withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan and also withdrew Soviet support for communist revolutionaries fighting in Africa and elsewhere. On 9 November 1989, as the Soviet Union was undergoing a process disintegration, the Berlin Wall, a symbol of the division of Europe during the Cold War, was torn down by East and West Berliners.²⁸⁹ The agreement reuniting East and West Germany was signed in 1990, which would end up becoming one of the major events marking the end of the Cold War.

3.6. Turning Towards the West: Türkiye's Foreign Policy Orientation during and after the War

Although Türkiye did not participate in the First World War, the years 1939-1945 can be considered difficult and risky years for Türkiye in terms of political, economic, and security issues.²⁹⁰ It was not easy to stand

²⁸⁷ Jerome Grossman, The Politics of Star Wars, *Journal of Legislation*, Vol:15, Issue:93, 1989, (pp.93-101), p.93.

²⁸⁸ "The Reykjavik File",

<https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB203/index.htm>, (Accessed: 04.07.2024)

²⁸⁹ Gérard-François Dumont, p.6.

²⁹⁰ Serkan Değirmenci, "İkinci Dünya Savaşı'nda Türkiye Ekonomisi: Politikalar, Yaklaşımlar ve Sonuçlar", *Kırklareli Üniversitesi İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi Dergisi*, Cilt:12, Sayı: 2, 2023 (ss.181-204), p.183.

firm against the pressures exerted on Türkiye during these years, and it was unclear what difficulties a country that chose not to participate in the war would face after the war and where it would be positioned in line with the strategic interests of the victorious powers. Nevertheless, the policy of remaining neutral by not participating in the war was perceived by the government of the time as the most reasonable, sensible, and rational choice. In this context, İsmet İnönü, who kept Türkiye out of the war, commented as follows:

"Our destiny was to be on the same side as the states we accepted as allies. As a result, it would have been quite normal for us to enter the war alongside our allies. However, to enter this war, we were obliged to demand that our allies properly fulfill their obligations to us, primarily in the form of reorganizing and modernizing our military and economy, and our position on this issue was justified. It was in this manner that the protracted debate between remaining faithful to the commitments we had made and demanding that our allies fulfill their obligations to us kept us out of the war. In other words, entering the war was not possible for us, and at the same time, our allies never found any reason to consider us unjust in this matter because they failed to fulfill their obligations to us."²⁹¹

Towards the end of the Second World War, it became apparent that Türkiye's stance differed from its security culture up to that point. This was because, according to some researchers, Türkiye may have needed the Cold War more than the United States and the Soviet Union. This was not only for security reasons, but also for reasons such as justifying greater integration with the West. When examining Türkiye's policies before, during, and after the Cold War, it is possible to identify a unique ideology, conceptualization of security, and foreign policy process. This was shaped in particular by the tense relations between Türkiye and the Soviet Union.

Before discussing Türkiye's search for direction during the Cold War, it is worth emphasizing that contemporary historical research is increasingly moving away from the traditional approach. This is because Türkiye was not the only region where the Soviets focused their desire for expansion in geopolitical areas outside Eastern Europe.

"The historic victory over fascism prompted Moscow to expand towards China's Xinjiang province, Iran's Azerbaijan region, and Turkey's eastern provinces. The dramatic events that unfolded in all three regions in the spring of 1945 came as a surprise to the Allies. Considering the agreements reached between the Allies during the meetings and negotiations of the Big Three throughout the war, the Soviet claims on the three border points in the Near and

²⁹¹ Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, *İkinci Adam*, Cilt 2, 1'inci Baskı, Remzi Kitabevi, İstanbul, 1967, p.244.

Middle East (unlike its claims for Eastern Europe and the Balkans) emerged unexpectedly. The first cracks appeared in relations between the Allies against the backdrop of these dramatic events (which remained a mystery to the West), and wartime cooperation gradually gave way to conflict. The first signs of the West-East conflict, or what would later be called the Cold War, began to manifest themselves in the Soviets' plans to unilaterally take control of their southern borders. The declassification of old Soviet archives have shed light on many issues that had previously remained secret... These documents are so substantial that it can be argued that the Greece, Turkey, and Iran vector, long considered the starting point of the Cold War's spread from West to East, was incorrect. In contrast, against the backdrop of developments concerning Xinjiang, Iran, and Turkey, it can be accepted that the aforementioned vector shifted from East to West, and that the Cold War developed in this direction.²⁹²

As can be seen, Türkiye's orientation towards the Western Bloc is a complex process that must be interpreted by filtering out the subjective assessments put forward in some scientific publications. It would be extremely wrong to interpret the event by excluding the general geopolitical and geostrategic developments and transformations and solely interpret the said event through the lens of Soviet pressure. After all, the political and military power wielded by the Soviet Union after its great victory over fascism were the objective factors that accelerated its expansionist policy. Stalin, caught up in a psychology of invincibility, directed moves from different fronts towards strategic regions outside Eastern Europe and generally towards Asia, despite the interests of his former allies. This deeply shook the short-lived peace process that had kept the international system in balance.

In parallel with the pressures on Türkiye, other events unfolded such as when the Soviet administration issued decrees on East Turkestan and Iranian Azerbaijan in June-July 1945, the USSR Council of People's Commissars issued a decree on *"the organization of Soviet industrial enterprises in Northern Iran"* on 10 June 1945,²⁹³ the State Defense Committee issued a resolution on *"Geological exploration for oil in Northern Iran"* on 21 June,²⁹⁴ the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks issued a resolution on *"Measures*

²⁹² Джамиль Гасанлы, *Синьцзян в орбите Советской политики: Сталин и мусульманское движение в Восточном Туркестане (1931–1949)*, Флинта, Москва, 2015, pp.4-5.

²⁹³ Ahmet Çelik, "Soğuk Savaş'ın Başlarında Sovyet Rusya'nın Güney Politikası ve Türkiye'ye Etkileri", *International Social Sciences Studies Journal*, Vol:4, No:24, 2018 (ss. 5181-5207), p.5189.

²⁹⁴ Ahmet Çelik, p.5190.

against the organization of separatist movements in Southern Azerbaijan and the other provinces of Northern Iran" on 6 July. On 8 October 1945, considering the seriousness of the situation in Iranian Azerbaijan, the Politburo reviewed the decision it had adopted in July and made some changes. With these changes, demands for autonomy within Iran replaced separatist tendencies.²⁹⁵ Demands directed at Türkiye coincided with the date on which decisions regarding Iran were made. Furthermore, long before the decisions concerning Iran and Türkiye, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist (B) Party had made decisions concerning China's East Turkestan (Xinjiang) province under the label "*top secret*." In fact, Moscow made its first decision on this matter in the spring of 1943, during the Second World War as heavy fighting was still ongoing on the Soviet-German front.²⁹⁶ As can be seen, the Soviet pressure that brought Türkiye closer to the Western Bloc was in fact part of the eastern vector of Moscow's foreign policy.

As mentioned above, the Soviet Union's demands on Türkiye were announced almost simultaneously with the events in Iran. In this context, the Soviet Union's demands upon Türkiye were announced between June and August 1945. On June 7, the Soviet People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs V. Molotov received Turkish Ambassador S. Sarper at the Kremlin and made a series of demands:²⁹⁷

- The cession of territories in the east of Türkiye to the Soviet Union,
- Permission to build a military base in the Turkish Straits of Istanbul and Çanakkale,
- Establishing joint Soviet-Turkish control over the Straits.

The main source of tension between Türkiye and the Soviets during this period was the Soviets' insistence on the Straits issue and the diplomatic notes they had sent to Türkiye on this matter at different times. Prior to the diplomatic note dated 7 June 1945 was issued, and hours-long meeting between took place between Sarper and Molotov in an extremely tense atmosphere. During this meeting, Sarper pointed out that the 1921 Soviet-Turkish Treaty appeared fair in general, but upon detailed examination, it contained many injustices against Türkiye. Sarper thus requested that Molotov refrain from making territorial demands against

²⁹⁵ Джамиль Гасанлы, p.7.

²⁹⁶ Джамиль Гасанлы, p.7.

²⁹⁷ Mehtap Başarır, "Sovyet Rusya'nın 1925 Dostluk ve Tarafsızlık Antlaşması'nın Feshine Yönelik Türkiye'ye Verdiği Notaların Türk Basınına Yansıması", *Belgi Dergisi*, Cilt:2, Sayı:18, 2019 (ss. 1417-1448), p.1427.

Türkiye.²⁹⁸ Ten days later, on 18 June, Molotov received Turkish Ambassador Sarper again and, in response to the proposal to sign a union treaty between the Republic of Türkiye and the USSR, stated that the Soviet side would not renounce its territorial claims over Türkiye's eastern provinces and that these claims were made by two Soviet republics; the Georgian SSR and the Armenian SSR.²⁹⁹

These demands by the Soviet Union caused considerable reactions among the Turkish public and political circles. At the Turkish Grand National Assembly (Parliament) session on 20 December 1945, Speaker of Parliament Kazım Karabekir made the following assessment in response to the Soviet claims and threats:

"...Dominating the Kars plateau means laying in ambush for a chance to invade Anatolia. Dominating the Kars plateau means dominating the top of the roads that descend along the Tigris and Euphrates to the Mediterranean and the Gulf of Basra. The Kars plateau is the only barrier holding back the great flood that will descend upon those lands. The [Turkish] straits are [akin to the throat] of our nation. We will not allow anyone to attack there. But [the Russians] must also know that the Kars plateau is our national backbone. If it is broken, we will be destroyed again. The high-ranking officials who govern our relations with the Russians know the conditions under which we entered the War of Liberation. Did we even have a single ally? We embarked on the cause of independence against the victorious powers that ruled the entire world, saying that death comes only once. [Just like during the War of Liberation, we] will fight to the end. Back then, we had said that even if we were down to a single person, we would retreat to the top of the last mountain and make it our grave. However, the situation today is not so dire. As a Turkish Deputy, I sincerely hope, as someone who has prioritized Russian friendship that is bound by treaties and who served my government in this capacity, that the old enmity of the Tsarist era will not resurface. This friendship will never be broken on our part. If it is broken, the enmity will continue until the world is destroyed. The Turks will suffer greatly from this, but our Russian friends will also suffer greatly, as we have heard them say many times themselves... ..If the Russians insist on demanding land from us, there is no doubt that we will fight; but the future will be as dark for them as it will be for us. We will fight with everything we have until the world is destroyed and not a single Turk remains. We will spend every penny we have on armaments. In such a case, neither side will have any share in life, humanity, or civilization. As I conclude my remarks here, it will be appropriate to add one more sentence for our Russian neighbors, our Russian friends: Turkish friendship also gives strength to the Russians. Let them trust the

²⁹⁸ Cemil Hasanlı, S. Bölüm, 152 et al.

²⁹⁹ Mehtap Başarır, p.1429.

*Turks. But the path to Turkish friendship passes only through this Grand National Assembly, where the will of our nation can be manifested, and through the state system it has established.*³⁰⁰

It must be emphasized that the Soviet discourse that the “*the territorial claims were made the Georgian SSR and the Armenian SSR*” was nothing more than fabrication meant to legitimize Soviet territorial ambitions. Indeed, it was no secret that these and similar activities were directly organized by the Moscow administration. As part of this scheme, on 21 December 1945, Moscow newspapers published “*letters from two Georgian professors demanding the return of a territory stretching all the way to Giresun, Gümüşhane, and Bayburt -which they claimed was Georgian land- to Soviet Georgia*”. Although these demands could be considered insignificant on their own, the fact that the letters were announced on the front page of two official Moscow newspapers was quite significant in terms of the seriousness of the issue. Furthermore, it was unlikely that these letters were written/published without the knowledge of the Soviet government. The mere fact that these letters were considered quite normal and supported by the Soviet press also strengthens this possibility.³⁰¹ The Moscow administration carried out a series of activities in this context. For example, two books on Turkish history by A.F. Miller, published in 1948, and two books on the Turkish Straits by B.A. Dranov were published by the Soviet Academy of Sciences, the State Political Publishing House, the Ministry of Justice, and the Ministry of Defense in a consecutive order.³⁰² Having emerged victorious from the war against Germany, the Soviet administration planned the organization of local committees of the Communist Party and selected candidates for positions in the occupied territories, disregarding even the norms of international law. According to Soviet calculations, if these demands were met, the territory of the Armenian SSR would have expanded by 80%, while Georgian SSR would have expanded by 8%.³⁰³

As Türkiye was faced with such a situation, the Soviets yet again sent Türkiye a diplomatic note in August 1946, reiterating their demands

³⁰⁰ TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, Dönem: VII, Cilt: 20, p.259. For the records of the speech, see: Nasrullah Uzman, “II. Dünya Savaşı Sonrasında Sovyet Talepleri ve Türkiye’nin Tepkisi”, *Gazi Akademik Bakış*, Cilt: 11, Sayı: 22, Yaz, 2018, (ss. 117-142), pp.127-128.

³⁰¹ Nasrullah Uzman, p.128.

³⁰² Zeki Kuneralp, *Sadece Diplomat. Hatırat*, İstanbul Matbaası, İstanbul, 1981, p.207.

³⁰³ For detailed information, see: Cemil Hasanlı, pp.197-293.

regarding the Straits.³⁰⁴ While certain issues, such as the Straits being open to all merchant ships, were acceptable to Türkiye, some nuances implied a questioning of Türkiye's sovereignty over the Straits. According to the Soviet demand, the regime of the Straits would be under the control of only those states bordering the Black Sea, which revealed the reality that the Black Sea littoral states with the obvious exception of Türkiye would side with the Soviets. This meant a reduction in Türkiye's say in matters concerning to the management of the Straits and even the country becoming isolated on this issue.³⁰⁵ Despite all this, Türkiye, not wanting to sever its relations with the Soviets, opted for internal regulation and imposed bans on certain press outlets that were accused of straining relations with the Soviets. This was because anti-Soviet propaganda had begun to appear in the Turkish press during this period, and newspapers were criticizing the political, economic, and social life of the Soviets. The publications in question stated that the Soviets had lost their image as a state defending peace and security and their populist character, and that they had turned into an expansionist state.³⁰⁶

However, despite Türkiye's constructive stance, the Soviet Union did not compromise on its demands regarding the Turkish Straits. In fact, on 19 September 1946, it sent a new diplomatic note reiterating its demand a military base in the Straits and the issue of joint defense.³⁰⁷ In this situation, on 9 October 1946, the US and the UK emphasized that Türkiye alone was responsible for the security of the Straits. On 18 October 1946, Türkiye's diplomatic note in response to the Soviet demands revealed how imminent the threat was. The note stated:

"[The Soviet note] fails to explain how it, which considers the destruction of a neighbor's security and independence to be legitimate for the sake of ensuring [Soviet] security, can be issued based on the obligation to respect the territorial integrity and political independence of others. In this regard, the [Turkish] Republican Government is compelled to reiterate that Article 5 of the Soviet note dated 7 August 1946 is incompatible with Türkiye's sovereign rights, which cannot be relinquished, and its security, which cannot

³⁰⁴ See: İsmail Köse, "Sovyetler Birliği'nin Türk Boğazlarıyla İlgili Talepleri:1945-1946 Notaları", *Ankara Üniversitesi SBF Dergisi*, Cilt:74, Sayı:4, 2019 (ss. 1125-1148).

³⁰⁵ Nasrullah Uzman, p.131.

³⁰⁶ Cemil Hasanlı, p.257 et al. ; Also see: İlyas Topçu, "Soğuk Savaş Dönemi Türkiye-Sovyet Rusya İlişkileri ve Türk Basını (Stalin'in Ölümüne Kadar)", *International Journal of Academic Value Studies (Javstudies)*, Cilt:3, Sayı:9, 2017, (ss.94-110).

³⁰⁷ Nasrullah Uzman, p.133.

tolerate any restrictions..."³⁰⁸

The Soviet Union then brought the issue to the UN, accusing Türkiye of provoking war and collaborating with Germany during the Second World War. However, the UN did not accept the Soviet accusations, and Moscow was forced to withdraw its demands.

Looking at the course of all developments, it was not only Türkiye that suffered from the Soviet Union's threatening stance, but the Soviet Union itself. As Metin Toker emphasized, *"The Soviets did not appreciate a Türkiye that was fully independent and neutral, a country harboring only feelings of friendship towards them [the Soviets]. They wanted to turn us into a Poland, a Romania, a Bulgaria. Intoxicated by victory, they thought they had the power to do so. They, however, did not."*³⁰⁹

During this process, Türkiye abandoned its self-sufficient economic strategy in domestic politics and attempted to transition to a free market economy, with the İnönü government taking serious steps in this direction. This also coincided with the implementation of the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan announced by the US. The Truman Doctrine can be considered the US's first serious initiative against Soviet expansionism.³¹⁰ After the Second World War, the idea that the US, with its air and atomic superiority, could influence the behavior of other states as it wished began to come to the fore. As a result of this understanding, the US first implemented the Truman Doctrine and then the Marshall Plan to ensure the military, economic, and political stability of Europe.³¹¹ Both initiatives were clear indicators of the efforts by the US to shape the new world order. Within the framework of the Marshall Plan, which sought to bring economic prosperity to regions under Soviet influence, Türkiye also received its share and, as emphasized above, became one of the countries benefiting from this program implemented by the US.

³⁰⁸ Mehmet Saray, *Sovyet Tehdidi Karşısında Türkiye'nin NATO'ya Girişi: III. Cumhurbaşkanlığı Celâl Bayar'ın Hatıraları ve Belgeler*, Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi, Ankara, 2000, p.91.

³⁰⁹ Metin Toker, *Türkiye Üzerinde 1945 Kâbusu*, Akis Yayınları, Ankara, 1971, pp.110-111.

³¹⁰ Ali Arsin, "Soğuk Savaş'ın Kaynakları ve NATO'nun Kuruluşuna Yol Açan Gelişmeler", NATO Savunma ve Eğitim Yönleri Sempozyumu, Ankara, Ankara Üniversitesi Eğitim Bilimleri Fakültesi Yayınları, No:133, Ocak 1984, (ss.1-8), pp.6-7

³¹¹ Gündüz Uluksar, "İkinci Dünya Savaşı Öncesi ve Savaşın Devamında Türk-Rus İlişkileri", *Altıncı Askeri Tarih Semineri Bildirileri II*, Ankara, Genelkurmay Basımevi 1998, (ss. 389-408), p.404.

Under aid framework being implemented by the US, the first tractors arrived in Türkiye in 1948. Significant progress was made in agriculture with the arrival of such equipment, and the economy grew by 11-13% led by growth in the agricultural sector.³¹² It should also be noted within the American aid scheme, Türkiye was placed in the same category as countries such as Switzerland and Portugal, both of which were in a better economic and industrial position than Türkiye. This approach caused disappointment in Türkiye and undermined trust in the US. Ultimately, after convincing the US that the aid provided under the Truman Doctrine was insufficient, Türkiye was included in the Marshall Plan.³¹³ The new aid received from the US was met extremely positively by the Turkish public. It was argued that Türkiye could now pursue a much stronger and more effective policy in maintaining world peace, and that the American anti-Soviet strategy was an important step in ensuring Turkish security against the Soviet threat. It was also noted that securing aid from the US, which emerged as the strongest state in the world after the Second World War, had to be considered a true success of Turkish foreign policy.³¹⁴

Among the developments that led Türkiye to the Western Bloc in the face of increasing Soviet threats was its entry into the Council of Europe. The London Agreement, signed on 5 May 1949, by ten European countries (Belgium, the UK, Denmark, France, the Netherlands, Ireland, Sweden, Italy, Luxembourg, and Norway), established the Council of Europe. Türkiye was accepted into this organization in 1949.³¹⁵

While this was an important development for the improvement of Turkish-American relations, another opportunity arose in this regard as well. With the decision taken by the Democratic Party (DP), 25,000 (21.250) Turkish soldiers were sent to Korea in 1950, and between 1950 and 1953, these Turkish forces fought against North Korean forces throughout the war.³¹⁶ Sending troops to the Korean War was an opportunity for the DP government to improve Türkiye's relations with the US and become a member of NATO.³¹⁷ At the time, the domestic public was sought to be persuaded that entering the war was important, and the

³¹² Erik Jan Zürcher, *Modernleşen Türkiye'nin Tarihi*, 4. Baskı, İletişim yayınları, İstanbul, 2018, pp.325-326.

³¹³ Baskın Oran, *Türk Dış Politikası, 1919-1980*, Cilt 1, İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul, 2002, p.541.

³¹⁴ Oral Sander, *Türk-Amerikan İlişkileri 1947-1964*, p.22.

³¹⁵ Rıfat Uçarol, p.730.

³¹⁶ Erik Jan Zürcher, pp.341-342.

³¹⁷ Oral Sander, *Türk-Amerikan İlişkileri 1947-1964*, İmge Kitabevi, İstanbul, 2016, pp.110-111.

decision to enter the war was presented as a necessity in terms of national interests. On this issue, Turkish Prime Minister Adnan Menderes said the following in an interview with journalist Ahmet Emin Yalman:

*"We have to make an important decision on behalf of the Turkish nation. On behalf of the UN, America has called upon independent nations to take a common stand against communist forces in Korea. This call is an indispensable opportunity for us in terms of pursuing a common security understanding and enhancing our prestige in the international arena. It may also benefit us [by paving the way] for our acceptance into NATO. If Britain and other nations disregard [America's call] and let it slip away, this opportunity will be lost to us. That is why we want to respond positively to this call before other states [have the chance to react] and leave them with a fait accompli. When we send a Turkish unit there, Britain and other nations will have no choice but to comply with us, and they will also be forced to participate wholeheartedly in the war. However, when we try to get a parliamentary decision adopted due to the fact that [our plan] will involve sending Turkish soldiers abroad, things will get heated, and the rumors will be endless. We must take the burden upon ourselves, decide without delay, and communicate this decision to the UN and the US. It is a fact that when we make such a decision, there will be misinterpretations and wrong conclusions from all sides, and there will be an uproar. We need the press to take a sympathetic stance against these situations that will arise."*³¹⁸

Türkiye's participation in the Korean War accelerated its membership in the Western bloc. After the US convinced the UK, which was planning to establish an alliance under its leadership in the Middle East, regarding Türkiye's accession to NATO, Türkiye became a NATO member in 1952.³¹⁹ Thus, Türkiye's accession to NATO, aimed at guaranteeing its security against the Soviet threat, was achieved after great efforts.³²⁰ Perceived as a guarantee of Türkiye's national interests, NATO membership was supported by the opposition and approved by parliament. In return, Türkiye would become an important actor in US defense projects in the Middle East and served as a center of attraction between the region and the West. Furthermore, the West also needed a politically, economically, and militarily strong Türkiye to prevent Soviet expansion in

³¹⁸ Ahmet Emin Yalman, *Yakın Tarihte Gördüklerim ve Geçirdiklerim (1922-1971)*, Cilt:2, Pera Tur., İstanbul, 1997, p.1536.

³¹⁹ Murat Kasapsaraçoğlu, "Definition of Turkey's National Interests in the Early Cold War Era: Divergence and Convergence between DP and RPP in the 1950s", *Ankara Üniversitesi SBF Dergisi*, Cilt:74, Sayı:4, 2019 (ss.1321-1343), p.1329.

³²⁰ Numan Hazar, *Sovyet Tehdidinin Gölgesinde Türk Dış Politikası*, Orion, Ankara, 2022, p.146.

the Middle East and protect the Middle Eastern oil.

Türkiye's foreign policy strategy during the Cold War, which leaned toward the West, led to its participation in regional alliances led by the US. In this context, the US attempted to bring Türkiye and Egypt together through its first regional alliance initiative in the Middle East. However, this initiative was unsuccessful due to Türkiye's distant stance towards Arab states because of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Another initiative was the Baghdad Pact, established by the agreement signed between Türkiye and Iraq in 1955.³²¹ For the DP government and the opposition, the Baghdad Pact would serve national interests such as preventing Soviet expansion, preserving the status quo in the region, and establishing peaceful relations among the states in the region to protect Türkiye's territorial integrity and sovereignty. Over time, rather than helping establish peaceful relations, the Baghdad Pact caused conflicts and hostility in the region, even among Arab states such as Iraq and Egypt, which were competing for leadership in the Arab world.³²² Furthermore, after a change of government in Iraq, the Baghdad Pact was replaced by another regional organization in 1960.³²³

Another regional alliance formed by the US, which also included Türkiye, was the Balkan Pact that consisted of the Balkan countries. This alliance did not have the same impact as the Baghdad Pact. Türkiye's stance, which played an active role in the process of forming regional alliances, also came to the fore during the Cuban crisis, one of the most important crises of the Cold War. The crisis ended when the Soviet and American leaders agreed on one point: Soviet missiles would be withdrawn from Cuba and American Jupiter missiles would be withdrawn from Turkish territory.³²⁴ The crisis was resolved when an agreement was reached on lifting the US blockade of Cuba. After the crisis ended, the US expressed its appreciation to Türkiye for its determination and support during the Cuban crisis, and the dismantling of Jupiter missiles in Türkiye was completed in April 1963.

It should be noted that the Cuban crisis had significant consequences for Turkish-American relations. From this period onwards,

³²¹ Bürkan Serbest, "Bağdat Pakti'nin Kuruluş Süreci ve Gelişiminde Türkiye'nin Rolü", *MANAS Sosyal Araştırmalar Dergisi*, Cilt:5, Sayı:3, 2016 (ss.401-424), p.409.

³²² Murat Kasapsaraçoğlu, p.1334.

³²³ Erik Jan Zürcher, p.344.

³²⁴ "The Jupiter Missiles and the Endgame of the Cuban Missile Crisis: A Matter of 'Great Secrecy'", <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/jupiter-missiles-and-endgame-cuban-missile-crisis-matter-great-secrecy>, (Accessed: 04.07.2024)

the US began supplying F-100 aircraft. Furthermore, the Turkish public's distrust of the US increased, and Türkiye realized that it needed to adopt a multi-faceted strategy in its foreign policy. From this period onwards, Türkiye thus began to also establish relations with other countries. In the period that followed, the Cyprus Question and the US' stance on this issue became the focus of Turkish-American relations. In December 1963, the Greeks on the island of Cyprus took action to pressure the Turks and force them to leave the island.³²⁵ At this time, İnönü sent a letter to US President L. Johnson, but Johnson did nothing, concerned that he might lose the votes of Greeks living in the US in the upcoming 1964 presidential election. Furthermore, on 5 June 1964, Johnson sent a letter to İnönü requesting a meeting in Washington and calling on him to abstain from ordering the Turkish military to attack Cyprus. In his letter, Johnson threatened Türkiye with sanctions and also prohibited Türkiye from using American weapons on the island. This event, which came to be known in the history of international relations as the "Johnson Letter", marked a turning point in Turkish-American relations.³²⁶

Turkish foreign policy shifted towards multilateralism following Johnson's infamous letter, and Türkiye began seeking ways to improve its relations with Third World countries and the Soviets. Subsequently, Turkish-American relations deteriorated significantly during the US R. Nixon administration over the next decade,³²⁷ with the Cyprus Question again being a major factor. In 1974, a conflict broke out between Greeks and Turks in Cyprus, resulting in the Turkish military intervention on the island. The Turkish intervention divided Cyprus into two parts³²⁸, and after this event, Greek lobbies in the US began a sustained smear campaign against Türkiye.

Relations between Türkiye and the US began to warm up in the 1980s, mainly due to events in the Middle East such as the Iranian Revolution and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. From this period onwards, the US began to pursue a balanced policy on the Cyprus Question, largely influenced by the use of British bases on the island. Furthermore, the economic dimension of Turkish-American relations also

³²⁵ Ayşe Erkmen, *Soğuk Savaş Yıllarında Türk Amerikan İlişkileri (1945-1990)*, İKSAD Yayınları, Ankara, 2020, p.86.

³²⁶ A. Güney, "Anti-Americanism in Turkey: Past and Present", *Middle Eastern Studies*, Cilt.44, Sayı.3, 2008, (pp.471-487), p.474.

³²⁷ Fusun Türkmen, "Turkish-American Relations: A Challenging Transition", *Turkish Studies*, Cilt.10, Sayı:1, 2009, (pp.109-129), p.112.

³²⁸ K. Ulusoy, "The Cyprus Conflict: Turkey's Strategic Dilemma", *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies*, Volume:18, Issue:4, 2016, (pp.393-406), p.395.

gained momentum from this period onward. This was because Turkish Prime Minister Turgut Özal planned to establish good trade relations with and receive economic aid from the US. Özal also sought to diversify bilateral relations and increase exports of Turkish products to the American market. At the end of the 1980s, a fundamental shift occurred within the context of the Cold War, and as mentioned previously, the fall of the Berlin Wall marked the beginning of a new international order. Attention was drawn to what Türkiye's stance would be in this new order. This was because between 1989 and 1992, tectonic shifts in Türkiye's immediate neighborhood confronted Ankara with multiple challenges. In 1989 for example, Türkiye had to deal with an influx of more than 360,000 ethnic Turkish refugees expelled from Bulgaria by the communist regime of T. Jivkov.³²⁹

At the same time, in 1990, conflict had erupted between the Soviet Republics of Azerbaijan and Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh, and in August of the same year, Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait. As a neighboring state, Türkiye became a key actor in the international embargo imposed on Iraq. Although Türkiye initially struggled to adapt to this rapidly changing international environment, it later succeeded in becoming active in the Balkans, the Middle East, the Black Sea Region, the Caucasus, and Central Asia at the same time, pursuing a proactive foreign policy strategy.³³⁰

In this context, the Turkish government recognized the independence of the former Yugoslav republics of Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina after the US and the European Community did so in April 1992, and this led to the gradual normalization of Türkiye's relations with the Balkan countries.³³¹ Subsequently, the Turkic Republics that gained independence in Central Asia provided a new arena for Turkish foreign policy.³³² Türkiye, already active in the Middle East, (with the encouragement of the US) entered into a competition for influence in the

³²⁹ Göksu Duygu, "1989 Bulgaristan Türklerinin Göçü ve Bu Göçün Trakya Bölgesine Olan Etkileri", *Journal of International Relations and Political Science Studies*, Vol:2, 2021, (ss.60-79), p.72.

³³⁰ Cengiz Günay, "Turkey's Changing Role After the Cold War: From Ideational to Civilizational Geopolitics", *Exiting the Cold War, Entering a New World*, 2019, (pp.461-479), pp.461-462.

³³¹ Şaban Çalış, "Turkey's Balkan Policy in the Early 1990s," *Turkish Studies*, Vol:2, No:1, 2001, (pp. 135-146), p.136.

³³² Yasin Can Gönültaş, Hasan Yaylı, "Orta Asya Türk Cumhuriyetlerine Yönelik Türk Dış Politikasının Paradiplomatik Etkileri", *Balıkesir Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi*, Cilt:27 Sayı:51, 2024 (ss.89-108), p.89.

region with Russia and Iran. In this context, Ankara planned to take advantage of its common ethnic background and expand its economic, cultural, and political sphere of influence in Central Asia. Another important area for Turkish foreign policy has been the South Caucasus, largely due to the strategic partnership between Türkiye and Azerbaijan. In recent events in the South Caucasus, Türkiye has even increased its effectiveness as a regional actor³³³ and has taken a seat at the table with other regional actors, Russia and Iran, in resolving disputes in the region, particularly regarding Karabakh. Ultimately, the end of the Cold War marked a turning point in determining Türkiye's international role. Although Turkish foreign policy continues to be influenced by policy strategies and negotiations in Washington and European capitals, with the end of the bipolar world order, Ankara has gradually begun to define its own role and pursue this role effectively in other regions.

As can be seen, Türkiye's position in the Western Bloc during the Cold War should not be perceived as absolute and uniform. In addition to developments in the international system, "*deviations from traditional foreign policy*" in line with Türkiye's national interests sometimes brought certain problems. Furthermore, the Cold War process also led to serious transformations in Türkiye's political life and domestic politics. In this sense, the most important transformation was the transition to a multi-party system and the democratization process in the country. Türkiye, which had been ruled by a single-party regime for a long time, had previously attempted to transition to a multi-party system, but was unsuccessful in this regard. The social structure, the political and social conditions within the country, and the fact that the republican regime had not yet consolidated can be considered factors that prevented these attempts from succeeding. Furthermore, these attempts were an internal matter for Türkiye. However, the problems Türkiye faced after the Second World War were seen as a serious threat to its national sovereignty. In such an environment, Türkiye, which was leaning towards the Western Bloc, had to adopt Western values to a certain extent in terms of democratization. At the forefront of these values were free elections and, consequently, a multi-party-political system.

In this context, speaking at the 19 May Youth and Sports Day in 1945, President İsmet İnönü emphasized to Turkish youth that a second party would be established and stressed the importance of transitioning to a multi-party system. Following İnönü's advice, Hasan Saka, Türkiye's Minister of Foreign Affairs and head of the delegation to the San Francisco

³³³ Hakan Kantarcı, "Güney Kafkasya'daki İstikrarsızlığın ve Çatışmaların Bölgenin Güvenliğine Yansımaları", *SBAD*, Cilt:2, Sayı: 2, 2022 (ss.49-90), p.85.

Conference, gave a statement to Reuters agency, stating that the Turkish republican government, as a political institution, was developing with determination along the path of modern democracy, which meant that all the signs of democracy would be developed in Türkiye after the war. Another member of the Turkish delegation to the San Francisco Conference, Ahmet Şükrü Esmer, addressed the American public, saying that Turks had great respect for the American people and had high hopes for their good intentions.³³⁴ Thus, the pressures and influences that came with the Cold War led to significant changes not only in the international system but also in Türkiye's political life. In this sense, the transition to a multi-party system was the most important turning point in Turkish political life.

*"The decision by Türkiye, led by President İsmet İnönü, to transition to a multi-party system at the end of the Second World War was an important turning point in the country's political history. ... After the Allies won the Second World War, Türkiye could not afford to ignore the wave of democracy sweeping across the Western world that it wanted to join. At the same time, it was inevitable that the discontented masses that had formed internally, partly due to the effects of the war economy, would have to be taken into account in some way. In addition to the rising discontent among the general public, the pressure of external reactions against practices reminiscent of authoritarian/totalitarian regimes, or reactions that were rising/likely to arise, made it necessary to take serious steps towards democratization, something that had been avoided for a long time. From this point on, President İnönü had only one option; to join the liberal democratic bloc that had formed after the Second World War. In a sense, this was both a result of the Westernization process that began with the Tanzimat [Reorganization] period in the Ottoman Empire and which reached its peak during the Republican era, and a necessary outcome of the search for security based on the fear of isolation in the face of the threat posed by the Soviet Union. Ultimately, this process, influenced by internal and external dynamics, served as a catalyst for Türkiye's place in the democratic bloc."*³³⁵

In summary, external factors were more influential than internal dynamics in Türkiye's transition to a multi-party system, as the country was forced to move closer to the Western Bloc in the face of Soviet pressure. This situation was fundamentally rooted in the shifting international balance of power after the Second World War. The defeat of authoritarian

³³⁴ Adil Dağıstan, "Milli Mücadile'de Türk-Fransız İlişkileri (1918-1921)", *Türkler*, Cilt: 16, Ankara, 2002, p.273.

³³⁵ Murat Karataş, "Türkiye'de Çok Partili Hayata Geçiş Sürecinin İç ve Dış Dinamikleri Üzerine Bir Değerlendirme", *21. Yüzyılda Eğitim ve Toplum*, Cilt: 11, Sayı: 32, Yaz 2022, (ss. 303-323), p.305.

regimes and the victory of democratic countries after the war strengthened the efforts of the United States, in particular, to spread democracy as a global value. In contrast, the Soviet Union's expansionist policy and its demands for land and military bases from Türkiye forced the country to turn to the Western security system. During this process, Türkiye sought military and economic support from the US, while also demonstrating its willingness to conform to the international system by joining the UN as a founding member. Thus, the transition to a multi-party system was not only an internal political transformation but also a strategic step shaped by external pressures and orientations.³³⁶

Although Turkish political life during the Cold War period was characterized by strong military tutelage, occasional interventions in politics and coups, the transition to a multi-party system was an important turning point in Türkiye's democratization history. This development paved the way for political pluralism within the country, allowing for the representation of different thoughts and ideologies. Thus, the political system, which had been shaped under single-party rule for many years, gave way to a structure based on competition and guided by the preferences of the people. The transition to a multi-party system also paved the way for the development of political parties (both in terms of number and quality), which are one of the fundamental pillars of a democratic society. During this process, different social classes, economic interest groups, and ideological tendencies gained the opportunity to find their own political representatives, thus enabling broad segments of society to begin participating in the political process. Although military interventions occasionally disrupted the democratic process, the establishment of a multi-party system in Türkiye led to significant progress, such as the establishment of a democratic culture, the normalization of the transition of power through elections, and the gradual strengthening of civil politics. Therefore, despite the difficulties experienced during this period, multiparty life has been one of the most enduring and decisive steps in Türkiye's political modernization and democratization process.

³³⁶ See: Murat Karataş, p.309.

CONCLUSION

Factors such as security dilemma and balance of power in international relations manifested themselves in different ways during the transformation process of the concept of the system. This allowed the concept to be addressed by many philosophers, such as I. Kant, J.J. Rousseau, K. Marx, and M. Weber, as well as representatives of different schools of international relations theory, including H. Morgenthau, K. Waltz, and D. Easton. Particularly within the framework of this thesis, the concept of the system, addressed in the context of Idealism/Neoliberalism, Realism/Neorealism, and Behaviouralism, has been elaborated according to the distinct characteristics of each theory.

In this context, within the framework of theory of idealism, it can be said that the reasons for people's negative tendencies are linked to environmental conditions. At the same time, according to this theory, to eliminate negativity within the system, the negative conditions surrounding humans must first be remedied through reform. After that, if the same tendencies recur, then human tendencies can be improved through education, and existing problems can be resolved within a legal framework. Parallel to this, the neoliberals -in line with the demands of the period- defended the idea that economic factors should be added to the examination of the concept of the system. It can be gathered from this that both liberalism and neoliberalism attempt to interpret the concept of the international system within the axis of the values they defend. Liberalism emphasizes an individual-based understanding of freedom within the international system and views states as a means of ensuring individual freedom. Furthermore, while liberals do not disregard the importance of military power, they argue that economic values should also be emphasized within the international system. This is because, according to liberals, security is a multidimensional concept. This does not only include the elimination of threats to territorial integrity and the country's survival. Therefore, security must be addressed in its military, economic, political, and social dimensions. At the same time, comparatively speaking, neoliberals emphasize the state more within the international system. However, neoliberals' main goal is for the state to maximize profits.

When examining the concept of security and the parallel concept of the system within the framework of realism and neorealism, it can be said that both classical realists and neorealists have elaborated on the concept of the system with their own specific characteristics. In this vein, while classical realists accept the international relations system as the interaction between states, neorealist theorists, led by Waltz, look at the interaction between states in the international relations system and attempt to analyze

the structural and unit causes of this interaction. Furthermore, while classical realists conduct more outcome-oriented studies in the international system, neorealists emphasize cause-effect and means-end relationships.

Among current approaches, the works of structural realist K. Waltz and D. Easton, in particular, serve as a guide for understanding the international system. In this vein, Waltz described three causes of war within the system: people, states, and the international system. This essentially suffices to explain all current theoretical positions on international security. This is because war is the most important factor creating an environment of insecurity, and therefore there is broad consensus that that war must be avoided. The establishment of the concept of the system as a conceptual framework within the discipline of international relations is associated with the name of Easton. Easton, who worked on various political systems at the national level, examined the persistence of these systems despite going through changes and developed a systems theory. His system theory points to complex systems and focuses on inputs and outputs within a system. In this context, one of the most important conclusions of the concept of the system and the approach to it is that international relations should not be examined by focusing only on the system within the state. This is because the international system is not determined solely by the systems within the state. The inter-state system also has an effect in this respect. Consequently, according to behavioralists, the discipline of the international system must be examined in interaction with other scientific disciplines, and it must be acknowledged that political events are shaped by various other factors in society. In other words, behavioralists pay more attention to the holistic structure of the international system and believe that this structure is shaped by different system models.

The most important manifestation of the system, a theoretically relevant concept containing a highly important structure in the field of international relations, emerged with the Treaty of Westphalia. It is a well-known fact that this treaty shaped the system of international relations. In this context, studies related to the Treaty of Westphalia must list the reasons why this peace treaty is so highly praised. First, despite the passage of more than three centuries, this system has remained -with only a few modifications- the most important factor in shaping the international relations system to this day. Furthermore, the treaty is considered the first in a tradition of comprehensive peace treaties that shaped modern European history. Furthermore, although not officially a multilateral treaty, it consists of a chain of three interconnected bilateral treaties concluded in the presence of many international actors. In addition to all this, although

the treaty did not completely resolve the problems within the international system, it was effective in comprehensively regulating long-awaited secular and spiritual matters.

Another system that shaped this new order formed with Westphalia is the Vienna system. Much has been written about the Vienna system, which has had lasting consequences in terms of international relations. Indeed, in the period following this era, the three major continental powers that had formed an alliance against France continued to maintain their presence on the political stage, and France was never able to secure reliable allies against this potential hegemonic threat. Furthermore, for many years, the so-called Holy Alliance of Eastern powers held sway in Central and Eastern Europe, which led to administrative problems throughout Europe. Furthermore, some states were not satisfied with the decisions of the Treaty of Vienna. One such state was Germany, whose fragmentation continued during this period, causing discontent among the German people. This was because the German people yearned for a federal state that included all Germans. Considering all this, the system that emerged with the Treaty of Vienna can be characterized as follows; Within this system, stability could only be achieved by ensuring compliance with both internal and external conditions. However, this new system was based more on values and principles, and the existing values in particular lacked a social and political foundation. Furthermore, the general instability of the system was due to countries always prioritizing their national interests and refusing to compromise on fundamental issues.

In such an unstable environment, turmoil in the Vienna system was inevitable, and the system and its legal basis, the Holy Alliance, withdrew from the political scene after the end of the Crimean War in 1856. From this period onwards, states began to follow the strategic course of *realpolitik*, and the Crimean War began to change the structure of the international system with its consequences. Although not considered a large-scale war by experts, the Crimean War, in which approximately 250,000 soldiers from the Ottoman, French, British, and Sardinian alliance died, and approximately half a million soldiers from the Russian Empire lost their lives (with the deaths on both camps being primarily due to disease and neglect), closely concerned the interests of all the major powers in Europe. Therefore, it is accurate to assess it as a war that had the potential to become a general European war. However, this war did not become as famous as the Napoleonic Wars. This was largely due to the limitations of technology, the reluctance of two of the great powers to actively engage in the war, and Russia's inability to find a permanent ally. Nevertheless, the Crimean War elevated France to continental leadership and inflicted serious losses on Britain.

The period that followed marked the beginning of a time of profound change in the international relations system, and world history witnessed two major wars. In this context, the First World War, which caused countless lives and property losses worldwide, went down in history as a war whose cost in terms of the destruction it caused is incalculable. As a result of this war, Belgium and France suffered the greatest material damage, while the US emerged as the country that profited economically from the war. In addition, European economies collapsed, and the destruction was so great that after the war, European countries turned from being creditor nations into debtor nations. Looking at the political consequences of the war, the four great imperial powers, namely the Germans, Russians, Austro-Hungarians, and the Ottomans, were defeated politically and militarily at the end of the war. Therefore, while the war brought about the end of empires, it led to the rise of nations. With this, the map of Europe began to reshape itself, and a new system emerged in the arena of international relations. With this emerging system, international relations and diplomatic practice were no longer limited to European countries, as the US, Japan, and other countries around the world also became central to all diplomatic operations. This has been accepted by historians as the end of the European state system and the beginning of the global state system of the 20th and 21st centuries. This emerging system was embodied by the League of Nations. With this new system, emphasis was placed on a new diplomacy characterized by openness based on the structure of the League of Nations, replacing the old diplomacy based on secret negotiations and alliances. This new diplomacy was intended to lay the foundation for collective security not only in Europe but throughout the world. In a sense, this meant transforming the idea of "the Concert of Europe" into "the Concert of a Large Part of the World", providing regular opportunities for representatives of all member states to come together and discuss not only common problems but also any issues that could threaten world peace.

The Second World War, which had important consequences for world history and saw the first use of atomic bombs, ended in 1945 as a result of various negotiations and conferences between the parties. The decisions taken during this process played an effective role in determining the new world order and laid the foundations for a new international order in the true sense of the word. In this context, after the Second World War, states clearly understood the need for an international organization to avoid a new war and prevent possible wars, and the United Nations Charter was signed by 50 countries, including Türkiye. The UN was established as an international organization open to all countries of the world. Member states of this organization are obliged to not threaten peace and security and must refrain from threatening practices and actions.

The position of the Republic of Türkiye within this new system and the foreign policy it adopted has also attracted attention. This is because Türkiye, which had been inclined towards the West since its War of Liberation, sought to develop its relations with the European states despite having been in competition with them during the war years. Westernization thus became a foreign policy strategy, with the main goal being for Türkiye to resemble these Western states. Turkish foreign policy during this period was shaped under the leadership of Atatürk and İnönü. Established in 1923, the new Turkish Republic inherited the historical legacy of the Ottoman State and therefore encountered problems from time to time in the process of implementing its foreign policy. Developments in domestic politics also had a significant impact on this. In the early years of the Republic, a liberal economic development model was implemented to overcome economic failures and avoid the negative effects of the global economic crisis. However, Türkiye was among the countries affected by the 1929 global economic depression and, as a result, reverted to a state-led economic development model. Given this situation, Türkiye was forced to temporarily align itself with the Soviets, who were implementing the same development model. However, during this period, the Soviets pressured Türkiye over the Turkish Straits issue and gradually attempted to exert pressure on the country, which redirected Türkiye toward the West. The reason for Türkiye's choice was the internal problems it faced in military and economic terms.

During the period between the two world wars, Türkiye attempted to pursue a more balanced political strategy and persistently avoided participating in the war. Even though the Allied Powers expressed strong interest in Türkiye during this period and stated that they would stand by the country when necessary, a sense of distrust prevailed on the Turkish side. During the Second World War, Türkiye became a state of interest due to its geopolitical position and therefore attempted to pursue a neutrality strategy within its policy of balance. Although Türkiye did not take sides in the war, it was among the states economically affected by the adverse conditions of the war. It can be said that after this war, an obvious and significant shift occurred in Turkish foreign policy towards the West/US. This was because the Soviet Union underwent radical changes in its foreign policy, and the Moscow administration began to reiterate its demands regarding Turkish territories in Eastern Anatolia and the Turkish Straits. These demands did not materialize, both because of Türkiye's rapprochement with the Western Bloc and because of the changes in Soviet foreign policy following Stalin's death. However, the Soviet Union's occasional insistence on bringing up its demands regarding the Straits back to the agenda created psychological trauma for Türkiye, which intensified the Turkish side's traditional distrust towards the Russians based on the

events that transpired in Ottoman history.

At such a time, the emergence of the ideological polarization known in the history of international relations as the Cold War pushed states to choose sides. On one side were the Eastern Bloc countries led by the Soviets, where communism was being promoted, and on the other side were the Western Bloc countries led by the US, forming the two main sides of the war. This war, known more as a clash of ideological priorities, resulted in the division of Germany into two, but it was this divided Germany's reunification that brought an end to the same war.

During the Cold War, relations between Türkiye and the US and the European countries developed along the lines of asymmetric dependency. During this period, Western states, aware that Türkiye was struggling with economic and military problems in its domestic politics, sought to keep the country within the Western orbit. Within this scope, under the program initiated with the aim of encouraging foreign capital inflows, a grant agreement was signed between Türkiye and the US, while at the same time, the signing of a migrant worker agreement between Türkiye and the Federal Republic of Germany was a first in this regard. With this, Türkiye began to be officially supported by the US, the guarantor of the world economic order, and connections were established between Türkiye and states with significant industrial accumulation. As a result, Türkiye became economically dependent on the West to a considerable degree. When Türkiye attempted to break away from the Western orbit over time, the West implemented a strategy of intervening in the country's internal politics using various means, the most effective of which was encouraging the military to stage coups.

The end of the Cold War was a sudden and largely unexpected development that marked a turning point in world politics. This is because the collapse of the Soviet Union, the extensive efforts towards nuclear arms reductions, and the demise of the socialist system brought an end to the global bipolar rivalry. As a result, an American unipolarity laid the foundation for a new world system organized around the hegemony of capitalism and liberal democracy. After diplomatic struggle of the Cold War ended, Türkiye opted for a strategy of repositioning itself within the newly emerging system. While attempting to normalize relations with the Balkans on the one hand, Türkiye on the other hand sought to establish itself as a role model for the Turkic republics of Central Asia.

In this context, Türkiye began to view the Turkic World as a region that would allow Türkiye to expand its sphere of influence. However, Western countries, aware that Türkiye's military and economic capacity was insufficient at the time, did not perceive this as an attempt by Türkiye to deviate from the Western orbit and believed that it would be impossible

for Türkiye to achieve such a goal. The impediments Türkiye faced were largely shaped by the economic crises that occurred in 1994 and 2001, the political crises that emerged during the coalition governments in Türkiye, and the coup process. However, after the Justice and Development Party (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi/AK Parti*) came to power in Türkiye, concrete steps were taken to achieve the determined goal, and in this context, coalition governments faded into obscurity in Turkish politics. While this situation led to political stability in the country, it also led to increased economic and military capabilities, which meant that the balanced line achieved in domestic politics had begun to be reflected in foreign policy as well. Subsequently, Türkiye began to make its presence felt, particularly in the South Caucasus, alongside other regional actors, and it sought to consolidate its position in both Central Asia and the South Caucasus with its "Reopening" (*Yeniden Açılım*) strategy.

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