

BUREAUCRACY- POLITICS RELATIONSHIP:

— AN EXAMINATION ON TÜRKİYE —



Metin ÖZKARAL

KARABÜK
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INTRODUCTION

There are several important actors within the social sphere. Among these, bureaucracy and politics maintain a reciprocal relationship, functioning within the social sphere by occasionally clashing and at other times reaching compromises. Throughout this relational process, each possesses its own distinct advantages and disadvantages. This relationship constitutes a subject that has been extensively analyzed in the relevant literature. Bureaucracy, in its general sense and definition, denotes an organizational structure and institution that is regarded as both necessary and important. However, prevailing conditions and the weaknesses of states often portray bureaucrats as actors whose influence may negatively affect democracy and social change. It may therefore be argued that bureaucracy remains a contested concept. Bureaucracy refers to a structure in which officials working in administrative offices—or public bureaucrats—either possess power or at minimum, play a substantial role in political life. Whether bureaucracy is a political issue is often a matter of debate. The position of bureaucracy vis-à-vis politics holds considerable importance. When politics is regarded as being confined to state activities, or when politics and public administration are conceived as strictly separate spheres, bureaucracy may be defined as a neutral instrument or mechanism constituting the administrative apparatus of the state. In this framework, elected representatives responsible for operating political institutions stand on one side, while appointed experts occupying administrative positions stand on the other. Nevertheless, the notion that bureaucracy is inherently intertwined with power, that bureaucrats exercise dominance over it and that bureaucracy itself represents a form of power dates back to the very origins of the concept. Consequently, this symbiotic and, at times, dichotomous conflict between bureaucracy and politics is important for understanding social issues.

This study seeks to present the historical trajectory of Türkiye with respect to the bureaucracy-politics relationship and to analyze the general characteristics of this relationship within the broader theoretical framework.

1. CONCEPTUAL AND THEROTICAL FRAMEWORK¹

1. 1. Bureaucracy and Politics

The concept of bureaucracy is the product of a specific historical development. To grasp the term “bureaucracy” in its literal sense, it is necessary to examine it through an etymological approach. The word “bureau” originates from the Latin term denoting a dark-colored tablecloth. In the past, the desks occupied by officials responsible for carrying out public services were covered with such cloths. The second part of the word, “-cracy” (from the Greek “kratos”), is a suffix meaning rule, domination or power (Eryilmaz, 2002: 6). The same pattern is observed in other forms of government such as theocracy and democracy. The term “bureaucratie,” which first appeared in French, was transferred during the 19th century as “bureaukratie” in German, “burocrazia” in Italian and “bureaucracy” in English, eventually becoming a key concept in international administrative terminology (Eryilmaz, 2007: 237). Ultimately, the term “bureaucracy” etymologically refers to a system in which offices hold a certain degree of authority (Gökçe et al., 2004: 43).

The emergence of bureaucracy as a significant issue within the agenda of politics and society dates back to the mid-18th century. The term was first used in 1745 by the French economist Vincent de Gournay. It is believed that Gournay, a representative of liberal economic thought, used this term to criticize the regulatory group that opposed his progressive economic ideas (Kabaklı, 1976: 11; Eryilmaz, 2002: 5). During this period in France, the strengthening of central government, the development of public services and the growth of the state led to increasing attention on the expanding influence of officials over society. In this century, bureaucracy appears to have been classified as a form of governance. In subsequent periods, particularly in the 19th and 20th centuries, the concept of bureaucracy became a key concept for examining power relations in various spheres of economy and social life as well as administration and the nature of organizations (Eryilmaz, 2007: 246).

Nevertheless, many social scientists use the concept of bureaucracy in different meanings. Essentially, bureaucracy is used primarily to describe organizations that are highly complex (Öztürk, 2003: 7). However, two distinct approaches can be identified in defining bureaucracy. The first approach tends to define bureaucracy by focusing on the structural characteristics of an organization. The second approach

¹ This book is based on the Metin Özkarağ's master's thesis. The English translation of the book was proofread and edited by Ece Aksoy.

examines bureaucracy on the basis of behavioral characteristics of the organization (Eryılmaz, 2002: 6). According to Abadan (1959: 7), if a neutral definition of bureaucracy is to be made, it can be described as a concept referring to large-scale organizations and administrations in both the public and private sector. On the other hand, bureaucracy can also be referred to as an administrative problem. As the needs of the public increased and the state assumed responsibility for meeting them, the distance between the public and administration grew, acquiring an impersonal character. From this perspective, bureaucracy can be perceived as a problem related to administration (Robson, 1969: 2). Furthermore, the concept of bureaucracy has come to encompass all organizations established to perform the functions of the state and managed by governments, along with the entire personnel working in these organizations (Göküş, 2000: 36).

It is difficult to define bureaucracy precisely and to approach the concept from a single perspective. When expressing the principal meanings of bureaucracy, Mises (2000: 5) notes that for many people the term is used in a pejorative and negative sense. No one accepts being called a bureaucrat or acting with a bureaucratic mentality in their work. In this sense, bureaucracy is a derogatory and disparaging term used to describe the negative aspects of organizations and the misuse of official authority (Eryılmaz, 2007: 214). Today, the use of bureaucracy in this negative sense is widespread. Today, the use of bureaucracy in this sense is widespread. In this meaning, bureaucracy refers to an organization's forgetting the purpose it is tasked with accomplishing, increasingly striving to attain a self-serving authority, and the entrenchment of habits specific to the class to which its members belong (Gökçe et al., 2004: 46). Within this understanding, negative features such as "reluctance to delegate authority," "inefficiency," "slow processing of affairs," "rule-bound behavior," "red tape," "avoidance of responsibility," "secrecy in administration," and "excessive attachment to authority" come to the fore (Öztürk, 2003: 12).

The conceptualization of bureaucracy as a model for managing organizations emerged with Max Weber. In this sense, bureaucracy represents a rational form of organization that is technically superior to other organizational forms. Accordingly, bureaucracy can be defined as an organizational structure characterized by division of labor, hierarchical authority, written rules, the filing of correspondence and activities, impartiality, disciplined structure, and official positions (Eryılmaz, 2007: 215). This definition has been in use since the 18th century. In this meaning, bureaucracy is perceived as a form of administration akin to "democracy, aristocracy, or monarchy". It is used both to signify the rule of officials as opposed to the rule of the elected, and to describe a system of

government in which representative institutions exist, yet the sovereign authority rests with officials rather than politicians (Gökçe et al., 2004: 48).

Bureaucracy, understood as a form of administration in which authority lies in the hands of appointed officials and citizens are consequently excluded from processes of participation in governance, decision-making and implementation, contains two fundamental elements. The first is that dominant authority belongs to officials rather than politicians; the second is that these officials assume office through appointment rather than election (Eryılmaz, 2002: 15). In this sense, bureaucracy is defined as the public administration branch of the political system. Bureaucracy is the name given to organizations managed by modern governments and composed of various public institutions to carry out diverse administrative tasks and functions in state administration. The term “bureaucrat” is used for all appointed public officials working in public institutions. According to this usage, all appointed public employees—whether in managerial positions or not—can be qualified as bureaucrats. In practice, however, the term is generally applied to appointed public officials at the managerial levels, particularly those in middle and upper management (Özen, 1996: 8).

In this context bureaucracy refers to administration in the public sector rather than in the private sector (Eryılmaz, 2007: 215). Thus, as a structural concept, bureaucracy reflects the organizational appearance of the state. As a functional concept, it denotes the process of implementing rules and public policy decisions. A significant portion of scholars engaged in administrative science use the term bureaucracy in the sense of the public administration system (Gökçe et al., 2004: 48). State bureaucracy possesses distinctive features compared to bureaucracy in other organizations. First, the state’s ever-increasing actions impose an infinite responsibility upon it. Second, state bureaucracy bears the obligation to be accountable to the public (Abadan, 1959: 101–103).

In the conceptualization of bureaucracy, three Weberian ideal types can be identified: patrimonial bureaucracy, legal-rational bureaucracy, and rational-productive bureaucracy. Patrimonial bureaucracy was developed for traditional societies in which political power is based on traditional values and rules. This type of bureaucracy lacks rational institutionalization; authority, duties, division of labor and organizational relations are not regulated by detailed rules. Legal-rational bureaucracy emerges in situations where political authority acquires a constitutional or legal character. Its most important feature is that it is strictly defined by rules applied to everyone and at all times. Rational-productive bureaucracy on the other hand, refers to an organizational structure composed of experts, technocrats or highly professionalized

individuals. While legal-rational bureaucracy performs uniform functions around formal rationality, rational-productive bureaucracy operates on the basis of program-oriented rationality and undertakes functions related to production and development. The first two ideal types were developed by Weber, while the latter was developed by Ilchman drawing upon Weber's work (Heper, 1974: 35–53; Ülker, 2001: 146–149).

Following all these different definitions and explanations, the examination of the place of bureaucracy within political processes—the central concern of this study—can only be meaningfully conducted once the structure concerning bureaucracy's position and role in the social system is established. Analyzing the relationship between bureaucracy and the political system also means treating bureaucracy as an instrument of power. Bureaucracy is no longer examined merely as a rational tool striving to achieve certain objectives but as an entity possessing power. Indeed bureaucracy acquires power to the extent that it exercises control over social life or directly over the public (Şaylan, 1974: 23).

Thinkers who have focused on political issues and produced works whose importance has endured to the present day can be traced back to Ancient Greece. It can be argued that the scientific orientation in the field of political thought began with Aristotle (384–322 BC). Aristotle's book *Politics*, which emerged from his comparative examination of the constitutions and political systems of Greek city-states of his time, constitutes perhaps the oldest foundational source of political science. In this work, while making the first scientific classification, Aristotle placed politics at the top of the hierarchy of knowledge on the grounds that it is the most comprehensive of human activities (Öztekin, 2000: 5). Long after Aristotle, the figure who appeared as the second pioneer of political science was the Tunisian Islamic thinker Ibn Khaldun. Regarded by some scholars as the founder of sociology, Khaldun examined the concepts of state and power through a formal approach (Kışlalı, 1999: 22).

A third name that played a role in the emergence of political science is the Italian thinker Machiavelli. Machiavelli asserted that any means leading to the desired end is legitimate. Like Aristotle's *Politics*, Machiavelli's *The Prince* has taken its place among the fundamental sources of political science. In this work, Machiavelli states that states are governed either as republics or as principalities, and notes that the subject of *The Prince* is the examination of principalities (Göze, 2000: 103). Auguste Comte (1798–1853), considered the founder of sociology, is also among the important figures who contributed to the nature of political science. In the subsequent stage, as new disciplines emerged from sociology, the concepts of social sciences or societal sciences appeared. Political science as a branch within the social sciences, has gradually

transformed into political sciences through a process of specialization (Kışlalı, 1999: 24).

Another contributor to political science is Alexis de Tocqueville (1805–1859). His work *Democracy in America* is considered one of the first and most important studies that can be regarded as truly scientific. The book is particularly significant in demonstrating the impact of socio-economic development on the political system and continues to retain its relevance in many respects (Daver, 1968: 22–23).

Karl Marx also made profound contributions to political science. Marx revealed the roles and importance of social classes in political conflict and consequently, in the formation of political regimes. In addition, Max Weber illuminated the other side of the coin and emphasized the weight of bureaucracy within contemporary political regimes. Another significant contribution of Max Weber to political science lies in his explanation of the foundations of the legitimacy of political power. His distinction between traditional authority, legal authority and charismatic authority—made while examining the concept of authority as a key element of political power—continues to be used in political science even today (Kışlalı, 1999: 26).

This fragmented development of politics as a subject of scientific inquiry and research continued until after the Second World War. From that period onward, political science emerged as an independent scientific discipline with its own distinct subject matter, methodology, scope, and objectives. Following the emergence of contemporary political science, political phenomena began to be examined using scientific methods (Öztekin, 2000: 6–7).

The concept of politics used in this study essentially refers to “political power”. The concept of power encompasses the capacity to make decisions, implement them and determine what is appropriate. In its literal sense, power means strength or force. Social power, in its general and broad sense, is the ability and success to influence and control the behavior of others. Political power, on the other hand, is the capacity to influence and enforce sanctions that affect and encompass society as a whole (Öztekin, 2000: 10). The distinctive aspects of political power include its scope, its position at the highest level and its possession of the right to secure consent as well as to use coercion. The concept of political power is used, in its real and technical sense, to denote the power that is valid over the country and society as a whole (Kapani, 2001: 48–49).

What concerns political science is the formation, distribution, functioning, and exercise of political power; that is, the processes related to political power. Other types of power, such as “economic power,” concern political science only to the extent that they influence this framework. For

instance, power relations within the family do not fall within the scope of political science. However, when intra-family power relations affect the political behavior of individuals—such as influencing their voting tendencies—then it becomes a subject of political science (Kışlalı, 1999: 18).

The power that is valid over the entirety of a country or society and possesses the capacity for material force and coercion is called political power (Kapani, 2001: 48). At this point, it is useful to note the distinction between the concepts of political power and authority in terms of the content of this study. Some authors use the term authority in the sense of legitimate power, while others use it interchangeably with power. However since authority is a general term with a very broad meaning, it differs from the concept of political power. Political power expresses a concept whose legitimacy is definitive (Kapani, 2001: 53).

1.2. Theoretical Framework(s) of the Bureaucracy-Politics Relationship

Bureaucracy has been a phenomenon that has left its mark on a specific stage of societal development. For this reason, the structural and operational characteristics of bureaucracy have attracted the attention of numerous thinkers and have been the subject of detailed research. Bureaucracy theories can be listed as follows: Marxist theory of bureaucracy, Weber's theory of bureaucracy, elitist theory of bureaucracy and contemporary theories of bureaucracy. Studies on bureaucracy have established relationships between the level of economic development of societies, their political power structures and their forms of governance. Rather than focusing solely on the internal functioning of organizations, emphasis has been placed on analyzing both the visible and invisible links between organizations and societal structures (Gökçe et al., 2004: 43).

In his article *The Study of Administration*, Woodrow Wilson defends the science of public administration and seeks to clarify the distinction between politics and administration. Bureaucracy should be considered a field separate from politics. When this separation is achieved, administration will perform its assigned tasks impartially, remain outside political influence and focus directly on serving the public (Öztürk, 2003: 90). The debate initiated by Wilson has dominated public administration and political science literature as a set of values since the early 20th century. In his book titled *Politics and Administration: A Study in Government*, written in 1900, Frank Goodnow argued that politics and administration must be clearly separated. Politics is the expression of public will, while administration is responsible for implementing it. Goodnow believed that efficient administration and a form of government accepted by the public could emerge through the legal regulation of political parties by law and the

placement of administrative authority in the hands of public managers administrators (Öztürk, 2003: 90).

Another and perhaps the most important name that comes to mind when discussing the concepts of bureaucracy and politics is undoubtedly the social scientist Max Weber. In the section titled “Bureaucracy” in his work *Essays in Sociology*, he made significant observations regarding the concept. He formulated the ideal type of bureaucratic organization. The “Bureaucratic Model,” introduced by the famous German sociologist and scholar Max Weber in the early 20th century and constituting one pillar of classical management theory, differs from other conceptualizations of bureaucracy. In Weber’s bureaucratic model, as an organizational structure, tasks are organized in a hierarchical system. At each level of the hierarchy, authority and duties are formally defined by pre-established laws and administrative rules. Tasks are divided into specialized units and carried out by specialized personnel in a formal, impersonal manner in accordance with specific rules and standards. Procedures and communications are conducted in writing and officials comply with orders because they are based on legal authority. According to Weber, the legal order of the modern state is considered legitimate in the eyes of individuals as long as it is based on laws. This legitimacy extends beyond legal legitimacy to encompass social legitimacy as well. For a modern state to exist, it is necessary to observe administrative and legal rules, the coercive power of the administrative organization and the exercise of legitimate authority within a political community (Coşkun and Asunakutlu, 1999: 171).

Weber presented bureaucracy as an organizational model and actually sought to eliminate certain problems believed to arise from bureaucracy while increasing efficiency by establishing an ideal organizational structure. Today, the stronger this concept is in a given country, the more developed that country appears to be.. Weber stated that one cannot speak of a modern state without bureaucratic rules. According to Max Weber, a bureaucratic structure is an ideal organizational form in terms of efficiency. He argued that by following the principles he proposed, an ideal organization could be established—one that is effective, ideal, impersonal and rational (Kabaklı, 1976: 44).

Weber discusses various strategies concerning bureaucracy’s relations with parliament and offers evaluations. According to him, the concept of official secrecy is bureaucracy’s own unique invention; it strives to protect nothing else with such fanaticism. In its planned struggle with parliament, bureaucracy fights with an unwavering drive for power against every effort by parliament to obtain information through experts from its own ranks or from interest groups. One of parliament’s means of gathering

information is parliamentary inquiry. Naturally, bureaucracy prefers a parliament that is ignorant—and therefore weak—when such ignorance serves its own interests. Weber's approach to social reality is important for understanding how he grounds the relationship between politics and administration. Although Weberian methodology does not fully replicate the normative character dominant in discussions of the politics-administration relationship, it significantly incorporates it due to the near law-like quality of ideal types. The fact that Weber's organic conception of society does not remain entirely outside the Continental European approach perspective is significant for identifying common points in that tradition (Akbulut, 2005: 66–67). In the final analysis, Weber views bureaucracy as an instrument vis-à-vis politics, despite its advantage in technical expertise.

Karl Marx, on the other hand, developed his views on bureaucracy by examining and criticizing Hegel's philosophy of the state (Gökçe et al., 2004: 43). In fact, the most important common intellectual root underlying the fundamental approaches to politics and bureaucracy is Hegel. Almost all of the concepts frequently used in contemporary public administration and political science literature regarding administration—such as objectivity and impartiality—are derived from Hegel. Hegel has exerted a major influence on both Anglo-American and Continental European perspectives (Akbulut, 2005: 17–18).

According to Marx, the state—which had not existed previously—arose at a certain stage in the development of societies, as a result of the division of society into classes, and with the aim of preventing classes with conflicting economic interests from engaging in a destructive struggle that would lead to the destruction of both themselves and society (Fişek, 2005: 106). The state is the establishment of an order that alleviates conflict between classes and legalizes and reinforces this domination. From this perspective, bureaucracy constitutes a highly distinct and specific social group. Although the existence of bureaucracy is linked to the division of society into classes, it is not itself a social class. According to Marx, bureaucracy, like the state, is an instrument that enables a dominant class to establish its supremacy over other classes in society. He emphasized that bureaucracy does not occupy an organic position in the social structure because it is not directly involved in the process of production (Gökçe et al., 2004: 43).

According to Marx, bureaucracy and the state which serve as instruments of the capitalist class, will disappear with the realization of the proletarian revolution which ends capitalist relations of production. Public functions will then be performed by the entire people instead of bureaucrats. In a communist society free from social stratification and

exploitation, there will be no need for bureaucracy. The elimination of bureaucracy should be understood as its gradual dissolution and absorption into society as a whole. Thus, in a communist society there will be no oppressive structure like bureaucracy that is separated from other segments of society (Gökçe et al., 2004: 43).

According to Lenin, the tasks of the state under the dictatorship of the proletariat are extremely simple because the fundamental function of the state—repression—has been eliminated. These tasks can be performed by any literate person. However, Lenin noted that certain tasks might require “borrowing” some officials from the capitalist state. Furthermore Lenin argued that immediately upon the realization of the dictatorship of the proletariat, bureaucracy should be gradually eliminated and struggled against. According to Lenin, the following measures are necessary for the elimination of bureaucracy (Gökçe et al., 2004: 43; Fişek, 2005: 109):

- All public officials should be elected to office, and a system allowing for their dismissal at any time should be adopted. The salaries of public officials should be reduced to the level of an average worker’s wage.
- Every citizen should increasingly participate in state administration and acquire the skills of governance.

Following the Soviet Revolution, some changes were observed in Lenin’s views on bureaucracy. Bureaucracy continued to grow even after the revolution. Lenin interpreted this bureaucratic reality in terms of “the underdevelopment of socialism”. He attributed the strengthening of bureaucracy to the state of the economy, the civil war and the need to establish a defense mechanism against external threats. In addition to these factors, he argued that the need for a disciplined, strong and stable governmental organization, along with the continued existence of the petty bourgeoisie and Tsarist-era bureaucrats, were among the causes of the increase in bureaucracy (Eryılmaz, 2002: 27–28).

Bruno Rizzi was one of the writers initially influenced by socialist thought, even considering himself a Marxist, but later rejected it and aligned himself with the elitist school (Fişek, 2005: 117). He argued that bureaucracy occupied an organic place in the Soviet system. He stated that Soviet bureaucracy had become a new class that exploited and oppressed the proletariat in the same way as capitalists. He linked the cause of this to bureaucracy’s control over the means of production. According to Rizzi, in the Soviet Union the means of production were not socialized but merely nationalized. As a result, the means of production belonged not to the people but to the state and consequently, to the bureaucracy. A portion of the bureaucracy (experts and technicians), by possessing the means of production, exploits the proletariat and collectively appropriates the surplus product. The only difference from the capitalist system is that

exploitation is collective rather than individual. Rizzi described this form of exploitation as “bureaucratic collectivism”. In this type of exploitation, the state is not the instrument of the ruling class but the ruling class itself. This represents the final stage before the transition to a classless society. Rizzi maintained that a proletarian revolution against bureaucratic collectivism would lead to the establishment of a communist society (Fişek, 2005: 117).

Interpretations belonging to elitist theory have distinguished the political structure of society between elites and non-elites. The theory has viewed elites—who impose their will on politically passive masses—as the sole driving force of social development. In the field of administration and bureaucracy, this theory has found concrete expression in the concept of technocracy. Technocracy has often been used alongside the concept of bureaucracy. Elitists have argued that the authority to govern the state and the economy should be removed from politicians and transferred to technocrats and businessmen. The term technocracy is derived from the combination of the Ancient Greek words “tekhne” or “technikos” (meaning expertise and skill) and “kratos” (meaning power or authority). Technocracy is a political system in which the views and influence of technicians predominate. It refers to governing, directing and administering through technical means. In such a system of government, rational will manifests itself in decision-making. One of the indispensable elements of state administration is making use of rapidly developing scientific and technical methods. When making decisions concerning state administration, technical, statistical, economic, social, financial and legal data are collected as the basis for the decision. These technical data are produced by specialized technical staff in their respective fields. This prevents political representatives from making decisions alone. Technicians effectively make political managers adopt the decisions required by the technical data they control. Thus, political managers become dependent on technicians. Consequently, the hierarchical authority of politicians to issue commands to technocrats is weakened (Gökçe et al., 2004: 43).

One of the leading thinkers of elitist thought is Robert Michels. Michels directed his studies toward the internal structures and problems of organizations. He argued that large-scale organizations, while reflecting elite domination on the one hand, inherently put an end to intra-organizational democracy on the other. Based on his examinations of socialist parties in Germany, Michels developed his theory of the “Iron Law of Oligarchy” in 1911. He studied political parties and asserted that even parties accepted as organized according to democratic principles did not function that way. He stated that every party organization represented oligarchic power based on a democratic foundation. Generalizing from his

observations, he noted that all large-scale organizations develop a bureaucratic structure and that this structure eliminates intra-organizational democracy. Michels concluded that the fundamental reason for this oligarchy in democratic parties lies in the technical indispensability of leadership. Party organs and leaders demand the employment of full-time, salaried officials. Once these officials begin working in party organs, they specialize in certain areas. Organizational leaders also gradually specialize in their work and acquire professional leadership status. These managers eventually forget their social origins and form a kind of caste. They work to protect their existing positions and sustain their power. When they realize they cannot maintain their positions, they develop methods suited to their interests to identify successors. Thus, all organizations—even those with formally democratic structures—become subject to an “iron law” that effectively transforms their structure into oligarchy (Fişek, 2005: 116). Michels argued that no power or method can overcome the iron law of oligarchy (Eryılmaz, 2007: 239). In addition, he evaluated leaders (elites) from a socio-psychological perspective. Once a leader attains a certain level of prestige and lifestyle, it becomes difficult for him to relinquish them. He does not want to abandon this advantageous position. The leader perceives every criticism directed at the organization as a personal insult (Fişek, 2005: 116–117).

The Italian scholar Mosca explained his views on bureaucracy in his work translated into English as *The Ruling Class*. Mosca divides all governments into two groups: “feudal” and “bureaucratic”. In feudal administration, every member of the ruling class can perform economic, judicial, administrative or military functions. Each ruler can exercise direct and personal authority over every member of the ruled class. In the bureaucratic state, however, these functions are clearly separated and assigned to specific sections of the ruling class. Mosca calls this section of the ruling class “bureaucracy”. He described bureaucracy as “bureaucratic absolutism” that monopolizes wealth and military authority and stated that such a form of government constitutes “despotism”. Mosca argued that the power of bureaucracy could be limited by representative bodies (Eryılmaz, 2002: 17). The ruled class is the numerically large group that is subjected to more or less arbitrary treatment and governed by rulers through the use of force. Individuals belonging to the ruling minority are generally people of superior ability. They are individuals who have gained prestige and influence in society due to certain abilities they possess in reality or appearance. Mosca characterized the ruling class as the group that holds a monopoly of power, performs all political functions, benefits from the advantages of power as a result and is always fewer in number compared to the ruled class (Gökçe et al., 2004: 47).

According to Burnham, the world is in a transitional period from

one social order to another. He argued that this transitional period would be shorter than the transition from feudal to capitalist society. Burnham's Managerial Revolution theory can be summarized as follows: Contemporary society is dominated by the capitalist class (bourgeoisie). However social classes, institutions and beliefs are changing rapidly. As a result of this change, a very different social class will come to dominate society. In today's industrial societies, a clear distinction has emerged between ownership of the means of production and the technical management and coordination of the production process. Due to changes and increasing complexity in production technology, the bourgeoisie is losing control over all aspects and capabilities of the production process. In contrast, managers with specialized knowledge are gaining control over the production process day by day. Thus, managers will first dominate private enterprises and later the administration of the state. At this stage, private property will come to an end and be replaced by state property. Managers will rule contemporary industrial states and consequently, the entire world. Burnham defines managers as "those who perform the task of technical management and coordination of the production process". This task of technical management and coordination is a highly specialized function that requires expertise in physics and engineering sciences (Gökçe et al., 2004: 43; Fişek, 2005: 118–119).

When defining the basic structure of bureaucracy, Warren G. Bennis adopts the theory of bureaucracy developed by Weber. According to Bennis, bureaucracy is a useful social phenomenon that was perfected during the Industrial Revolution. The main structure of bureaucracy, according to Bennis, consists of the following elements:

- A division of labor based on functional specialization,
- A well-defined hierarchy of authority,
- Interpersonal relationships that do not rely on personal influence,
- A system of rules covering the rights and duties of employees.

According to Bennis, the superiority of bureaucracy stems from its ability to manage routine events. Organizations whose rules and objectives are predetermined can easily overcome events. However, this model developed by Weber cannot, according to Bennis, adapt to the conditions of the age. Bureaucracy cannot keep pace with the speed of social and technological developments. In Bennis's words, the "scientific and technological revolution" threatens the future of bureaucracy. Bennis criticized Weber for viewing the mechanical bureaucratic model as a simple mechanical tool; he pointed out that this model fails to integrate the employees with the organization's objectives. He argued that instead of an

overly simplified, purely mechanical understanding of human nature, a new understanding of humans based on greater knowledge of complex and changing needs should be developed (Eryilmaz, 2007: 239).

Another approach to the bureaucracy-politics relationship is systems analysis. The systems approach aims to seek balances among variables and to clarify the structural relationships between them. For example, the nature of the relationship between inputs and outputs of the political system can be a subject of research. This analytical framework serves as an explanation of the search for equilibrium between the system and its environment. Bureaucratization, as a process, is a phenomenon experienced by the political system together with its environment in the establishment of this balance and the political system itself. Bureaucratization is a phenomenon that encompasses not only the political system but also its environment. This process involves bringing together all necessary means to achieve designated social goals and clarifying the arrangements in this integration through pre-determined formal rules (Oktay, 1997: 18). The systems approach, which examines the bureaucracy-politics relationship from this perspective, seeks to explain events by taking into account their relationship with environmental conditions, within the multifaceted relationship between events and the environment. According to the systems approach, there is no overarching/central perspective that enables the formulation of a general reality applicable to everyone. None is superior to the other. Each system can observe different things. For example, education observes the environment in terms of success/failure, defense in terms of threat/security and politics in terms of power/opposition functional codes, and strives to fulfill its functions accordingly. The primary guiding system is the preservation and development of society's existence. In some societies and various institutions, the idea of a primary guiding system exists explicitly or implicitly (Şahin, 2007: 410).

After all these evaluations, it can readily be stated that politics and bureaucracy are like the two sides of the same coin. Drawing a clear line between them is extremely difficult. However a distinction can be made in terms of the origin of the authority they possess (Şahin, 2007: 407). Politics is seen as the domain dominated by politicians, dealing with values, policies, decisions, goals, judgments, and responsibilities; public administration, on the other hand, is viewed as the universe of officials concerned with events, instruments, methods, laws, execution, and responsibilities. Both overflow into each other and merge in many cases. Politicians perform administrative tasks while administrators assume political responsibilities. The political and administrative scope varies according to position and personal inclinations. As mentioned above, the relationship between bureaucracy and politics has long been a subject of

debate among scholars of public administration (Güven, 1976: 52).

Therefore, it is quite difficult to separate bureaucracy and politics with clear lines. The boundary between politics and administration has never been clearly defined. Politicians, as ministers, members of legislative bodies and representatives of pressure groups, establish relations with the administrative sphere. Public officials also enter the political sphere as drafters of texts, individuals who maintain close relations with ministers, and through professional civil servant unions (Chapman, 1970: 265). Although the relationship between politics and bureaucracy is a very important issue, it has not been grounded on a solid foundation because its treatment has been kept narrow in scope or its level of analysis has been oriented toward functional problems (Akbulut, 2005: 1).

When the literature on this topic is examined, three main distinctions emerge. In the first, bureaucracy and bureaucrats are officials who carry out the tasks assigned by politics. The concepts of bureaucracy and politics—and thus bureaucrats and politicians—represent two completely separate and distinct concepts. Officials are obliged to implement politicians' policies appropriately and to serve the public. Their sole duty is to perform the tasks assigned to them. In the second view, it is believed that bureaucracy has not only an administrative role but also a political role. It is argued that bureaucracy, through the power resources at its disposal, should play as active a role as politicians in law-making and policy-making. According to proponents of this view, politicians are dependent on bureaucrats. Laws made without them would be inefficient and inadequate. In the third and final approach, the concept of bureaucracy refers to higher councils that grant rights and powers to senior bureaucrats vis-à-vis politicians within the administrative system.

The claim that administration should have a relatively independent status from politics is based on the assumption that administration and politics can be distinguished from each other. This traditional view on the separation of politics and administration is the perspective that accepts politics as the end and bureaucracy as the means. Politics is concerned with the use of state power. The power of all national or local public authorities can be regarded as "state power". Bureaucracy, on the other hand is tasked with implementing the decisions taken (Öztürk, 2003: 91).

In real life, however, politics and administration are intertwined. Politicians can perform administrative tasks and administrators can undertake political duties. In the executive sphere, politicians and senior managers work together. For this reason, separating their activities becomes extremely difficult. Administrators and politicians are like the two sides of the same coin. Therefore, it is unrealistic to expect administrators

to act impartially like politicians. It is suggested that administration can only be separated from politics for certain specific purposes (such as research, training and education) due to the facilities provided (Öztürk, 2003: 93). According to this view, bureaucrats are indicated as an internal element of the law-making process. Proponents of this view argue that the relationship between bureaucrats and politicians is not hierarchical but rational, interactive, complementary and intertwined. Politicians and bureaucrats must work in cooperation; their relationship should not be hostile but should aim at developing an effective and efficient administration and governance. Managers should not be disturbed by bureaucrats taking roles in politics. This approach believes in the benefits of bureaucracy (Eryilmaz, 2002: 96).

The increase in the number of independent administrative authorities, on the other hand, grants senior bureaucrats certain autonomous powers within the administrative system vis-à-vis politicians. By accepting the limits and responsibilities of bureaucratic authority, they seek to empower senior bureaucrats as a safeguard against the abuse of power by incumbent politicians and to ensure efficiency and effectiveness in administration. According to proponents of this approach, empowering senior bureaucrats can contribute to the advancement of the general public interest; it can serve as a barrier against the potential misuse of political power and the privileges of powerful interest groups. It can also assist in developing an entrepreneurial and efficient understanding of administration and thereby increase effectiveness in public services. This approach is a model recently recommended by international organizations such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, particularly in economic governance. Through this method, an attempt is made to establish a balance between the impartiality and effectiveness of bureaucratic administration and political representation (Şahin, 2007: 408).

2. THE HISTORY OF RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BUREAUCRACY AND POLITICS IN TURKEY

2. 1. Ottoman Period: Tradition and Reform

In the ancient Turkic states, the highest level of political organization was the state, referred to as “il” or “el”. Families formed clans, clans formed tribes (budun), and tribes formed the state. At the head of the state was the “Hakan” or “Kağan”. Rulers believed that governing the state was a sacred duty and that this duty had been bestowed upon them by the “Gök Tengri” (the Sky God). This right to rule bestowed by Gök Tengri was called “Kut”. The Kağan also carried the title “ilig” and was regarded as possessing metaphysical power. State officials such as Katun (queen), Tigin (prince), Konçuy (princess), Han, Yabgu (tribal ruler) were generally selected from among the nobility. The “toy” (grand council) convened under the chairmanship of the Kağan in the first month of the year and during the spring season (Nişancı, 1999: 20–22). For administrative purposes, the country was divided into two regions: east-west and north-south. The origin of this dual organization was related to the Gök Tengri belief. According to this belief, the direction in which the sun rises was considered sacred. Therefore, the eastern side was regarded as superior to the western side in administrative terms. On the western wing of the state, the ruler’s brother held the title of Yabgu, while on the eastern side, usually the monarch’s eldest son served as administrator. Although not codified in writing, the Turks had a developed legal order. The rules regulating the relations between the people and the state, as well as among the people themselves, were called “töre” (mores) and all administrative activities were carried out in accordance with this understanding. As noted earlier, in the Turkic states established prior to the adoption of Islam, it was believed that the ruler governed the country on behalf of the Sky God (Gök Tengri). This understanding continued in the Turkic-Islamic states as well. However, after the Hun, Göktürk, and Uyghur periods, the Turks adapted to the conditions of their new environment and established their states in accordance with the requirements of the new understanding (Duyar, 2006: 5).

Following the adoption of Islam, many Turkic states were established, particularly the Karakhanids and Ghaznavids. These states were located far from China, in regions close to the Caspian Sea, Iran, the Middle East and Anatolia. Interaction with the states in these regions elevated the Turkish state tradition, together with its Asian foundations, to

a different level of power. In this context, while forming their state organization, the Great Seljuk and Anatolian Seljuk states took the Ghaznavids and Abbasids as models. This state structure was divided into twelve large administrative regions called provinces (*eyalet*). The center of the state consisted of the palace and the administrative structure built around it. Security, tax collection and intelligence activities were considered important. Importance was attached to the *akhism* (*Ahilik*) and guild organizations. Commercial activities were supported by provincial city elements such as caravanserais, ports, inns and baths. The Seljuks assigned an experienced statesman called “Atabey” to accompany the princes they sent as administrators to these provinces. State affairs were discussed and decided in the *divan* (council) convened under the chairmanship of the ruler. Most military and administrative affairs were in the hands of the Turks (Duyar, 2006: 8–9).

While establishing its own administrative structures on the territories it ruled, the Ottoman State carefully analyzed the difficulties experienced in earlier Turkish states, particularly the Great Seljuk and Anatolian Seljuk states and sought ways to create a strong and centralized state structure. In previously established Turkish states, the formation of a strong centralized state generally led to rapid fragmentation and the collapse of the state, as it was undermined by other heirs. Taking this into account, the Ottoman State established a centralized patrimonial structure. The patrimonial structure in the Ottoman State can be likened to the relationship between the male head of the patriarchal family (the Sultan) and the household (society). The sultan maintained this authority through a bureaucracy loyal to him. In patrimonial administrations, legitimacy is represented by the ruler. The ruler secures his authority not through a highly autonomous class dispersed across the country, but through a class of “patrimonial bureaucrats” whose future depends on him (Şahin, 2007: 419). Since patrimonial administration can be harmed when it tolerates any form of clustering, it directs its efforts toward maintaining or increasing control over communities (Mardin, 1994: 208–209).

In this period, the civil, military and religious bureaucracy, whose duty was to maintain order, also carried patrimonial characteristics. Merit and competence, in a sense, also required loyalty to the ruler. Because a ruler who ascended to the throne and wished to remain there for a long time sought to consolidate his position with a group loyal to him (Heper, 1974: 62–65).

In the early years of the Ottoman State, the bureaucracy, which could not be very effective against the sultan and the palace, had a rather simple character. However, with the conquest of Istanbul by Fatih Sultan Mehmed, the central organization of the Ottoman bureaucracy was

strengthened in terms of both structure and function. This situation elevated the state to the position of a centralized state based on the administration of land that functioned well according to the standards of its age. In the Ottoman State, political power came to be shared between the ruler and the bureaucracy (civil-military-religious). From this period onward, bureaucrats gradually gained dominance in the upper echelons of the state, began to act independently from the ruler and other state institutions, and engaged in efforts to extend their influence to other institutions, thereby relatively weakening them. In other words, the bureaucracy of this period emerged as the primary guiding system within the social system (Şahin, 2007: 420). During this period, bureaucracy began to gain power gradually against the ruler. In particular, the Janissaries, having lost their function as a military force, became so powerful that they could have the Grand Vizier (Sadrazam) of their choice appointed. The same situation applied to the civil wing of the kapıkulu (palace servants) (Sencer, 1984: 35).

The basic units of state administration in this period were located within the Palace and the capital. Officials mostly worked in these units (Tezel, 1986: 22). Many public services were carried out in the residences of statesmen (Acar, 2001: 33).

In the Ottoman State, society was also divided into two main social classes: the ruling class and the reaya (common people) (Aykaç, 1997: 138). The timar system, which was used for taxing the people and involved the citizen cultivating the land and paying taxes to the center, created a dual social structure in the form of the people on one side and the state collecting taxes and recruiting soldiers for war when necessary, on the other. The ruling class, that is, the bureaucracy, was divided into four groups: mülkiye (civil administration), ilmiye (religious scholars), kalemiye (scribal class) and seyfiye (military class) (Ergun and Polatoğlu, 1992: 72; Akyıldız, 1993). To explain these briefly (Özdemir, 2001: 100–101): The ilmiye class consisted of those proficient in Islamic sciences. Officials such as the Şeyhülislam (the chief religious official), Kadı (kadi, judge), and Müderris (professor at madrasas) belonged to this class. The seyfiye class included military classes and organizations outside the command structure. The kalemiye class consisted of various offices that performed the state's record-keeping and correspondence functions. Mülkiye officials were individuals selected from among the devshirme elite and trained in the palace. The devshirme official class, taken at a young age and trained for state administration, served as a source for high-level civil and military administrators such as grand viziers, viziers, beylerbeys (provincial governors) and sancakbeys (district governors).

At the beginning of the 18th century, the timar system

deteriorated. The situation of the peasants became economically much worse in the 18th century and migration from villages began. As the guilds, which formed the basis of the city, multiplied as professional organizations, problems increased. Since state offices were bought and sold, knowledge and ability lost their importance for becoming a sipahi (cavalry officer), sancakbeyi or vizier. Those who purchased offices with money burdened the people to recover their investment. The central administration lost its authority. For a strong state, a strong army appeared necessary; for a strong army, a regular financial system and honest administrators and officials became essential (Berkes, 1978: 96).

Following the gradual deterioration of this classical order, the main outlines of the modern bureaucratic administrative tradition began to develop in the Ottoman State from the 19th century onward. On the one hand, the superiority of Western civilization was acknowledged; on the other hand, the traditional concept of religious justice was reinterpreted. Justice was no longer understood in a conservative sense as maintaining the status quo; instead, it formed the basis of legislative activity with secular criteria outside the framework of Islamic traditions. A new bureaucratic elite emerged and education became the distinguishing characteristic of bureaucrats. This new elite, partly in order to establish the dominance of their secular policies in political life, attempted to secure the independence of the civil bureaucracy within the political system. To the extent that this independence was achieved, the civil bureaucracy transformed from being merely an implementer of politics into a social actor in which the feature of making politics predominated. The first manifestations of the bureaucratic administrative tradition emerged as a result of this bureaucratic attitude (Heper, 1974: 74).

Before the 19th century, some changes were implemented during the period known as the Tulip Era (Lale Devri). With the establishment of the printing press by İbrahim Müteferrika and the contributions of the Paris ambassador Yirmisekiz Mehmet Çelebi and his son Sait Efendi through their observations in Europe, Western techniques began to enter particularly the fields of military and diplomatic bureaucracy. In 1716, a French officer named Rochefort submitted a ten-page report to Sultan Ahmed III titled "On the Formation of a Foreign Military Engineers Unit in the Service of the Sublime Porte". During the reign of Mahmud I (1730–1754), Comte de Bonneval (Humbaracı Ahmed Pasha), who had fled from the King of France and taken refuge in Türkiye, established a mortar corps to reform the Ottoman army (Paşa, 1974: 5–10). During the reign of Mustafa III (1757–1773), Baron de Tott, a Hungarian noble educated in France, founded and trained the Artillery Corps. During the reign of Abdülhamid I (1774–1789), Grand Vizier Halil Hamid Pasha brought experts from France for the training and technical reform of the army and

worked with these experts on the reform of naval forces and the fortification of castles. When the Imperial Naval Engineering School (Mühendishane-i Bahri-i Hümayûn) was established in 1773, its teaching staff consisted mainly of French experts. At that time, leading Ottomans also requested the bringing of military experts from Prussia and France to establish a strong army against Austria and Russia (Paşa, 1974: 10–13).

The years from the accession of Selim III (1789) to the First Constitutional Era (1877) constitute a critical period in terms of the birth and development of the bureaucratic administrative tradition. This period witnessed serious efforts to halt the process of disintegration that had begun two centuries earlier, and these efforts gave birth to the bureaucratic administrative tradition. During the reign of Mahmud II (1808–1839), the structure of the existing bureaucracy was changed, structural-functional differentiation was introduced in the political and bureaucratic system, and the first modern bureaucratic system in the Ottoman State began to be established (Heper, 1974: 36). Thus, the military bureaucracy was subordinated to political will, the power of the ulema was reduced, and the power of the civil bureaucracy (kalemiye) and the ruler was increased. New ministries such as internal affairs, foreign affairs, trade and finance, as well as the office of the Prime Ministry, were created, and the duties and powers of the Grand Vizier were transferred to various independent boards (Şahin, 2007: 422).

The Tanzimat (1839–1876) is regarded as a comprehensive and prolonged renewal movement in economic, social, political and administrative fields aimed at ensuring the unity and solidarity of the Ottoman State in response to these problems. In this period, administrative and fiscal centralization was adopted in the restructuring of administration. In the transfer of powers from the provinces to the center, there was distrust of governors and concern that the local notables (Ayan) could hinder the desired change. During this period, officials were granted fixed salaries. With the Tanzimat, bureaucrats emerged as a dominant element on the political scene (Eryilmaz, 2002: 134). Tanzimat bureaucrats wanted the state to be represented by its own institutions. While they supported the preservation of the Sultan's superior position within the system, they believed that the initiative in policy-making should belong to the bureaucrats. For this, bureaucrats needed to have security. The issue that occupied the bureaucrats most was the establishment of the autonomy of bureaucracy (Heper, 1974: 148–149).

The strongest influence in this period came from France. While establishing the Nizam-ı Cedid military units, Selim III requested 15 military experts from France. In addition, Swedish, Prussian and British officers also began working on the modernization of the Ottoman armies.

The teaching at the Imperial Army Engineering School (Mühendishâne-i Berrî-i Hümâyûn), opened in 1795, was also largely based on French sources. Its curriculum was taken from French military schools (Lewis, 1984: 60). During the reign of Mahmud II, serious efforts began to send students to Europe. There is a sultanic decree from 1830 regarding the sending of 150 students from the Medical School and Enderun (Higher Official Academy) to Europe. The Ottoman State sent the most students to France in Europe. The first municipal regulation was inspired by the French model; in the first municipal organization established in Beyoğlu, Istanbul, the Paris model was taken and French was used as the official language. The Council of State (Şûrâ-yı Devlet), which forms the historical root of the Republican Council of State, was established in 1868 “according to the French example and under French pressure” by dividing the Meclis-i Vâlâ-yı Ahkâm-ı Adliye (Supreme Court) into two. Many concepts and categories of Turkish administrative law are of French administrative law origin. French administrative law concepts and categories have been influential in Turkish legislative activities and French jurisprudence has guided the development of our own jurisprudence (Karahanoğulları, 2004: 47). Although Turkish-French relations deteriorated somewhat with France’s occupation of Egypt at the beginning of the 19th century, French was still used as the language of instruction when the Medical School and Surgery School were established in 1826 to meet the army’s need for doctors. When the War Academy (Erkân-ı Harbiye Mektebi) was established in 1845, the model of the “French Army College” (École d’application d’État-Major) was taken. In 1851, an “Encümen-i Daniş” similar to the French Academy was established. From 1861 onward, civil reforms began to be carried out according to the French model; after 1867, the beginning of liberalization in France pushed the Ottoman State toward partial liberalization both internally and externally. Before the Mecelle (civil code) was prepared, the French Civil Code (Code Civile) was translated into Turkish. It is known that before 1867, France sent a diplomatic note requesting reforms in education and instruction, demanded the opening of schools at the lycée level, and even prepared the curricula for these schools (Kara, 1995: 146).

Following all these developments, a period began in which the reforms partially halted, the French Napoleonic concept of the modern unitary-law state was pushed into the background, and the struggle against wars and separatist movements began under the newly established regime. However, these efforts could not prevent the collapse of the state. From 1876 to 1909, Sultan Abdülhamid II managed to achieve partial stability in the country with his authoritarian rule. During this period, the previously initiated reforms were partially continued; however, the main administrative power was shaped around Yıldız Palace, where the Sultan’s

own power was centralized. In the Second Constitutional Era (II. Meşrutiyet) after 1909, the Committee of Union and Progress (İttihat ve Terakki), which came to power, adopted a centralist, nationalist nation-state tradition, especially with its policies during World War I. In the following years the Ottoman State collapsed.

All these bureaucratic and political changes were made to enable officials to move beyond kul (slave/servant) status and to serve in a structure or environment where they possessed rights and authorities within the limits defined by law, and where relations between crime and punishment were regulated within general rules—thus reaching the status of civil servant (memur). In the kul status, however, there was no security for the individual. The life and property of an official in kul status depended on a single word from the ruler throughout his life. With the reforms mentioned above, the state was gradually shifted from the Sultan's control toward institutions in which bureaucrats exercised significant influence (Kalaycıoğlu, 1986: 13).

The distinctive feature of the Tanzimat bureaucrats was that they emerged as a closed group, educated in the Western style, who regarded only themselves as competent to govern the state. They viewed themselves not as servants of the sultan, but as servants of the state. Bureaucrats were that they emerged as a closed group, educated in the Western style, who regarded only themselves as competent to govern the state. (Heper, 1974: 69–70). This paradigm was also carried over into the process of establishing the Republic.

2. 2. Republic Era

The establishment of the Republic represents a systematic transformation. This transformation manifested itself in the political regime and the conception of civilization. The modernization efforts that began with the proclamation of the Tanzimat were considered insufficient by the founders of the new state. The preference was in favor of implementing a radical Westernization program. Bureaucracy was utilized during this implementation process. In this period, the CHP was referred to as the “party of the bureaucracy” (Eryılmaz, 2007: 243). One points on which scholars with differing views studying the 20th-century Turkish revolution agree is that the group that founded the Republic consisted of military and civilian bureaucrats. The bureaucracy which carried out the revolution and came from various social classes had also developed its own unique worldview and philosophy of revolution. On one side stood the people; on the other were the intellectuals or the bureaucracy, who were to modernize society. Especially in the initial period of Republican history, the term “memur” (civil servant) which denotes bureaucracy, is described not as serving the people but rather as commanding them. This relationship

was later expressed in political struggles with slogans such as “the oppressive state” or “the gendarme state” (Şaylan, 1974: 75).

From 1923 until the transition to multi-party system, the dominant power and institution in Turkish political life was the Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi-CHP). Until 1946, with the exception of a few short-lived experiments, the CHP maintained power as the sole political party. For any political system to function effectively, the social forces within that system must be represented in proportion to their relative weight. Since bureaucracy was regarded as the most effective force in society in the early years of the Republic, the CHP inevitably assumed the character of a party that included the bureaucracy to a large extent; and indeed, this was the case. During this period, even though the bureaucracy was weak, it was allied with the property-owning classes (landlord notables and the nascent urban bourgeoisie) and had itself entered a process of embourgeoisement. Within this ideological framework, the bourgeois class began to develop and grow stronger in full cooperation with the bureaucratic power. Nationalism, which had been formulated during the Turkish War of Independence and initially carried a humanistic content directed against imperialism, gradually assumed a character that neutralized views contrary to the interests of the bourgeois class, in proportion to the development of that class. (Şaylan, 1974: 75–77).

During the single-party period, the implementation and guardianship of reforms constituted one of the most fundamental duties of the bureaucracy. The state-centered modernization project was institutionalized in the 1920s. The Republican bureaucracy was designed not only to address the culturally pluralistic structure of Ottoman society but also to carry out the project of building a new nation. Major decisions were made in Ankara, while implementation was left to provincial and district administrators. Significant authority was delegated to local governors. The reforms were implemented more effectively in cities and towns, while in rural areas they were carried out only with the support of the local notables. Although an attempt was made to loosen the identification between the party and the bureaucracy at the party congress held in 1939 by separating governors from the party’s provincial chairmanship, the understanding of party-state unity continued (Eryılmaz, 2002: 139).

The early years of the Republic are described as the golden age of the bureaucracy in terms of its social position and powers. Although the structure and functions of the bureaucracy had not developed significantly in the early years of the Republic, the necessity of providing many basic services and works through public hands led to the rapid development of the bureaucracy (Şahin, 2007: 428).

In this period, Article 93 of the 1924 Constitution introduced the principle that the qualifications, rights, duties, salaries, allowances, appointments, dismissals and promotions of all civil servants would be regulated by a special law. In line with this, the Civil Servants Law No. 788 of 1926 was followed by the Salary Law of 1927, and later the “Equity Law” No. 1452 of 1929, which for the first time introduced the pay-scale (*barem*) system in Türkiye. Subsequently, the “Law on the Unification and Adjustment of Civil Servant Salaries” No. 3656 of 1939 determined the principles of civil servant salaries. Laws such as Salary Law No. 1108, Travel Allowance Law No. 6245, Law No. 2827 on State Railways Officials, Law No. 1453 on officers and military officials, and Law No. 3659 on personnel of state economic enterprises emerged as regulations governing various aspects of the regime. All these can be regarded as important improvement in terms of establishing the legal and financial status of public personnel on certain principles and ensuring unity in the methods applied, rights and responsibilities. During this period, efforts were made to establish a secure and stable working environment through the enactment of laws regulating the legal, financial, and social conditions of the bureaucracy, which undertook crucial responsibilities in creating and sustaining modern institutions. While these laws formed an institutional structure, they also aimed to improve working conditions and salary situations (Göküş, 2000: 32).

In this period, civil service ranked among the professions with the highest social status; since the private sector was not highly developed, public service was the most preferred occupation for individuals trained in modern educational institutions. The high social status of the bureaucracy ensured that bureaucrats constituted a privileged segment in income distribution. During World War II, significant powers and privileges were granted to civil servants regarding the distribution of food and basic necessities and the implementation of price policies. The powers and opportunities granted to officials increased their authority and pressure over society, while at the same time intensifying the long-standing antipathy of society toward officials (Eryılmaz, 2007: 244). The public’s reaction to the opportunities and privileges granted to bureaucrats by political power was strong and they began to take a stance against the bureaucrats. In the final years of the single-party period, there was no improvement in the financial and economic situation of the bureaucracy; on the contrary, it deteriorated further. As a result, the bureaucracy gradually began to turn against the government (Göküş, 2000: 29).

During the Democrat Party (Demokrat Parti-DP) period, radical changes occurred in the bureaucracy-political power relationship compared to the single-party era. In the developments between 1950 and

1960, a decline is observed in the bureaucracy's situation both in terms of material opportunities and social status. The most important change from the bureaucracy's perspective was undoubtedly the loss of political power (Şaylan, 1974: 181). In line with its program, the DP attempted to reduce the role of bureaucracy in society, while the bureaucracy showed strong resistance to this (Şahin, 2007: 430). The bureaucratic administrative tradition, which had revived and strengthened in the early years of the Republic, encountered significant obstacles with the transition to multi-party system. The seriousness of these difficulties stemmed from the fact that, for the first time in the evolution of the Ottoman-Turkish state, groups from outside the traditional ruling circles rose to prominence in political life and even came to power. In the Ottoman period, the needs of the state were adopted as the primary objective. In the first half of the First Republic period, essentially the same approach was adopted; however, because they viewed Westernization with tolerance, the economic interests of local notables, ayan, and business circles were taken into account for a period. In 1950, however, the rules of the game changed completely and an oligarchy composed of local notables, ayan, and businessmen seized political power (Heper, 1974: 121).

After coming to power, DP deputies regarded officials and bureaucrats as part of the CHP base and thus engaged in a power struggle with them. A conflict emerged almost within the state itself. Officials became the group that suffered the most from the DP's wrath after the opposition. In fact, from the very beginning of its rule, the Democrat Party exerted efforts to restrict the rights of officials. The reason for this distrust was that, although they had won political power in the elections, they were not confident in their control over the state—particularly the central and local bureaucracy, the armed forces, the judiciary, universities and the press (Ahmad, 1996: 48).

On June 6, 1950, Menderes carried out the largest change ever made in Türkiye's armed forces up to that point. The top-level administrators of the army, beginning with the Chief of the General Staff, were replaced. In addition, 15 generals and 150 colonels were suddenly dismissed (Kaçmazoğlu, 1997: 150). The DP government did not only deal with the military bureaucracy but also targeted other segments. According to them, laws, regulations and bylaws were all elements that served the interests of the CHP and aimed to overthrow the DP (Cerrahoğlu, 1996: 84).

Prior to 1950, civil servants could be retired after completing 30 years of service and had the right to appeal retirement decisions. The DP first abolished the right to object. Later, the retirement period was reduced to 25 years. However, until 1954, members of the Court of Cassation,

Council of State, Turkish Court of Accounts and professors were exempt from this provision. Under a law enacted on June 21, 1954, the provision allowing retirement after 25 years of service was extended to all civil servants, and thus members of key social security institutions were also subject to this provision. However, the DP did not stop there. With a new law, the requirement of a certain period of service for retirement was also removed. Accordingly, any official working in an official institution could be dismissed at any time regardless of length of service. With this law, the DP had placed the bureaucracy in a seriously difficult position (Eroğul, 2003: 166).

On May 3, 1956, by decision of the Ministry of Justice, 16 judges were retired. Three of these judges, two of whom were chamber presidents, were members of the Court of Cassation. On June 12, 1956, seven more judges were retired. Among them were the first and second chamber presidents of the Court of Cassation and the Chief Public Prosecutor (Eroğul, 2003: 193).

The DP, which held the majority in the Parliament, amended the Election Law to stipulate that a candidate rejected by one party could not become a candidate from another party in the next election. When state officials wished to become candidates, they were required to resign from their positions six months in advance. In addition, opposition parties would no longer be able to use state radio. The government imposed broadcasting bans on certain speeches of opposition leaders, attempted to restrict the freedom of travel of İsmet İnönü and leading CHP executives, banned their entry into certain provinces, or, as in the case of Kasım Gülek, had them arrested and sent to prison by force. One of the actions taken by the DP against the CHP while in power was the draft law prohibiting state university professors from actively serving in parties. The reason was that university circles felt close to the CHP and many professors held positions in the CHP. In order to deprive the opposition of this support, the government prepared a bill prohibiting university professors from engaging in politics and enacted it into law in 1953 (Kaçmazoğlu, 1997: 152). Another notable development during the DP period was the establishment of new public institutions (such as the General Directorate of Highways and the Ministry of Reconstruction and Resettlement), which increased the need for personnel with technical and professional knowledge. As a result, personnel outside the pay-scale system began to be employed. Thus, although these newly hired personnel were deprived of many social rights due to being outside the pay-scale, they had the opportunity to start with high salaries (Kaçmazoğlu, 1997: 244).

While developing a new political oligarchy in place of the previous one, the new political elite presented themselves to the public as defenders

of traditional values. The bureaucratic administrative tradition continued through the reaction of the traditional intellectual-bureaucratic elite against the new political elite. This traditional elite particularly opposed the new political elite's political approaches that contradicted the political attitudes and principles developed in the early period of the Republic (Heper, 1974: 121). With the transition to multi-party political system, the bureaucracy lost the dominant position it had enjoyed during its golden years in the single-party period. The decreases in its status, prestige, security and income pushed it into opposition against the DP government. The DP period has been viewed as the supremacy of civil elites over statist elites (Şahin, 2007: 431).

As mentioned above, difficulties were experienced in bureaucracy-political power relations between 1950 and 1960; with the increase in the power of party-centered politics instead of state-centered politics, the power and prestige of the bureaucracy weakened. For this reason, military and civil bureaucrats jointly opposed the DP government. In the 1950s, with the Democrat Party government, the unity between bureaucratic elites and political elites entered a process of weakening. With the emergence of a competitive political system, the political influence of the bureaucracy decreased and it was forced to share the power it had previously exercised alone with new social forces. In other words, the autonomous position of the bureaucracy began to be weakened in the face of the rising bourgeoisie (Şaylan, 1974: 86–87). The bureaucracy, which was losing both its power and prestige on the one hand and facing financial difficulties on the other, viewed the military coup of May 27, 1960, with a favorable attitude, longing for the days of yore (Eryılmaz, 2002: 147).

The 1961 Constitution, prepared by the “juristocracy” and military bureaucracy following the said coup, holds an important place in Turkish society and history. According to many experts and writers, it represents a turning point. It is either exalted or seen as the result of an attempt by the fallen state class to regain its former place in the political structure (Keyder, 1993: 195). When examined in the context of the subject of this study, the 1961 Constitution granted the bureaucracy a certain autonomy vis-à-vis political power in order to curb the power of party-centered politics. Arrangements were made to prevent the bureaucracy from losing power. With the new constitution, an attempt was made to prevent formations of the type possessed by the DP by sharing national sovereignty with new institutions. The 1961 Constitution strengthened the bureaucracy against political power. New groups, such as the technocrats within the State Planning Organization that emerged after the May 27 regime, strengthened the bureaucracy compared to previous periods by using their knowledge and expertise merit in bureaucracy and political power (Eryılmaz, 2002: 148).

Another area of application of the principle of the division and sharing of state power under the 1961 Constitution is the creation of public institutions that, while falling within the scope of executive and administrative functions, possess autonomous status. These were universities and the radio and television administration. According to Article 120 of the 1961 Constitution, universities are public legal entities with scientific and administrative freedom. Universities are governed and supervised by bodies composed of authorized faculty members elected by themselves. Granting these two types of public institutions autonomous status—that is, the authority to govern themselves—did not stem from a desire to make them privileged or untouchable within the public administration, but rather from the belief that their distinctive functions could be properly carried out within a pluralistic democratic framework only through a special status. Indeed, the function of universities is to freely research and teach scientific truth, while the function of the radio and television administration is to form public opinion in an impartial manner. It is very difficult for both functions to be carried out by general administrative bodies that are highly open to the influence of political powers in a manner consistent with the requirements of liberal and pluralistic democracy (Tunaya, 2001: 195). These new mechanisms were created to protect the academic and civil sphere against the risk of strengthening central authority.

Another development that emerged with the 1961 Constitution was the autonomization and strengthening of the military bureaucracy. The 1961 Constitution elevated the military bureaucracy to an effective and high position in state administration by establishing the National Security Council (MGK) and removing the Chief of the General Staff from subordination to the Ministry of National Defense (Eryılmaz, 2002: 148).

With the March 12, 1971 memorandum and the subsequent amendments to the constitution, a new period began in the bureaucracy-politics relationship. Through the changes made in this period, the autonomy of certain institutions that had been made autonomous was removed and the bureaucracy was strengthened against civil society organizations. With these changes, the exercise of freedoms was restricted, judicial independence was damaged, “State Security Courts” were established, the government was granted the authority to issue decree-laws, and significant changes were made in the formation and functions of the MGK. In the constitutional amendment of 1971, two important changes were made regarding the relationship of the MGK with the Council of Ministers. The phrase “to assist” in the last paragraph of Article 111 of the Constitution was removed; the phrase “informs the Council of Ministers” was replaced with “advises the Council of Ministers”. Although these

changes were justified as “arrangements in accordance with the purpose of the establishment of the National Security Council,” the removal of the phrase emphasizing that the MGK is an auxiliary organ to the Council of Ministers and the preference for the word “advises,” which carries the purpose of directing and influencing instead of the neutral action of “informing,” can be evaluated as a reflection of the military authority felt in all areas of society at that time, including basic legal rules such as the constitution, on the relationship between the MGK and the Council of Ministers (Sezen, 2000: 71).

Although the military bureaucracy, which frequently emphasized its neutral and supra-party stance, declared that it did not “command” the Council of Ministers through the National Security Council but only “advised” it, it was almost impossible to encounter a government that displayed an attitude contrary to MGK decisions in this period. Here, there is a strategy of the dominance of bureaucratic power over politics, in which the military wing of the statist elites, who hold the main functions of protecting the indivisible integrity of the state and Atatürk’s reforms, is involved. Again in this period, political governments make decisions on issues such as the Cyprus problem, war and peace, and sending troops to foreign countries not by consulting the army but by reaching compromises with the army (Şahin, 2007: 429).

Although legal arrangements were made in terms of the personnel regime to realize the merit system in this period, success could not be achieved in this field. Despite the 657 Civil Servants Law adopted in 1965 emphasizing classification, career and merit, this period was one in which the logic of “jobs for the relatives” through various favoritism methods predominated in public bureaucracy (Eryılmaz, 2002: 150). With the arrangements made during this period, the military and civil administration areas were separated from each other, and the integrity of the administration was partially damaged. Toward the end of this period, especially during coalition governments, ministries were seen as reserved areas for political parties, and as a result of the desire to capture the ministry, the bureaucratic structure within the ministry was completely changed from top to bottom. As a result, the civil bureaucracy became dependent on politics and politicians (Şahin, 2007: 433–436). In this period, the understanding of “party-affiliated officials” instead of competent officials became established (Eryılmaz, 2002: 151). In short, in the first part of the period between the two coups, both military and civil bureaucracy succeeded in strengthening itself. However, as the process approached September 12, while the military bureaucracy continued to strengthen, the civil bureaucracy began to lose its effectiveness as a victim of the political system and its structure.

The bureaucracy's reaction had been effective in the preparation of the 1961 Constitution, and political power had weakened. In the 1982 Constitution prepared after the military intervention of September 12, 1980, emphasis on the power of the bureaucracy continued; however, it is observed that political power was partially strengthened. The 1982 Constitution emphasized the superior and transcendent nature of the state and therefore gave weight to mechanisms that would strengthen the state politically against civil society. The emphasis placed on the political and ideological dimension of the state strengthened both the central loyalty of the public bureaucracy and its role over civil society. In this context, the 1982 Constitution increased the powers and duties of the presidential wing of the executive and the weight of the National Security Council within the political system (Eryilmaz, 2002: 152).

With the 1982 Constitution, some changes were made regarding the structure and functions of the MGK. Accordingly, deputy prime ministers and the Minister of Justice were also included among the members of the MGK; thus, the military-civil balance shifted in favor of civilians. Nevertheless, the military bureaucracy further strengthened its rigid and strong institutional ideology and tried to influence the civil bureaucracy as well (Eryilmaz, 2002: 152–153).

In this period, for the first time, a political party—ANAP—incorporated into its party program the struggle against the bureaucracy, which lagged behind economic and social developments, within the framework of the World Bank's policies centered on democratization, localization, and privatization. Factors such as Özal's good relations with international financial institutions and Western countries and his different interpretation of the understanding of the superior interests of the state led to the beginning of an ideological struggle with the bureaucracy. Özal struggled not only with the civil bureaucracy but also with the military-bureaucratic elite. Several events during the Özal period are interpreted as indicators of this. For example, in 1987, despite the military authorities' desire for Necdet Öztörün to become Chief of the General Staff, Özal appointed Necip Toruntay, whom he had chosen, instead (Zurcher, 2004: 416).

The second event showing Özal's struggle with the military was his open discussion of the General Staff budget both in Parliament and before the public in 1987. Another indicator of this struggle was Özal's attitude during the Gulf War. During the war process, Özal, who took almost all decision-making mechanisms into his own hands, caused the military bureaucracy to remain in the background in this period and led to Toruntay's resignation on the brink of war. Especially from the second half of the 1990s onward, the pressure of the military bureaucracy on politics

increased again in connection with issues such as the regime, religion, and secularism. In this period, every MGK meeting was perceived as a confidence vote for the political government and was seen as an alternative Council of Ministers. Especially during the Refah-Yol government and the 57th Ecevit government, MGK meetings took place in an atmosphere of crisis and occupied the top places on the country's agenda. The February 28 process was also a result of the Refah-Yol government period (Şahin, 2007: 438).

The new social arrangements expressed with slogans such as transition to a free-market economy, opening up to the outside, and downsizing the state after 1980 forced the emergence of a new type of bureaucrat. The basic characteristics sought in the new bureaucrats were to be entrepreneurial and productive rather than merely salaried employees at the state's door, and to make efficiency a priority objective (Ülker, 2001: 144–145). The new type of bureaucrat shaped by post-1980 developments tries to exist by fulfilling the services expected by capital. It can no longer sustain its function of being a transformative elite for society. In other words, bureaucracy in Türkiye is squeezed between the nation-state and global pressures and is in search of a new identity (Ülker, 2001: 152).

Concepts and practices that have gained importance in recent times—such as decentralization, flat organization, participation in management, transparency, the right to access information, ethical supervision, and the evaluation of bureaucrats' performance in terms of efficiency and effectiveness based on citizen satisfaction—are removing bureaucracy from being a closed structure; they are changing its sense of responsibility and increasing its accountability. The new understanding and techniques of management aim, on the one hand, to increase effectiveness and efficiency in public administration, and on the other hand, essentially to develop the social responsibility and accountability of bureaucracy. In this framework, the transformation experienced in the public sector beginning in the 1980s is not a one-dimensional phenomenon limited to efficiency, effectiveness, and savings; it is a multi-dimensional phenomenon in which principles and values such as participation in management, transparency, and accountability—fundamental areas of the social responsibility of public bureaucracy—have come to the fore (Eryılmaz, 2007: 69).

In this context, the period after the 1990s is one in which the civil bureaucracy strengthened itself against political power through independent regulatory boards. From this date onward, the bureaucracy of the regulatory boards established under the influence of the IMF and the World Bank emerged as power centers that narrowed the field of activity of political power thanks to the advantages provided by their administrative

and financial autonomy (Eryılmaz, 2002: 162). The worldwide prevalence achieved by regulatory institutions has reached astonishing dimensions. These institutions, which have become widespread in many countries in the same period in recent years, have now become a global phenomenon. Regulatory institutions, which have become a global phenomenon, have emerged with similar operating mechanisms in the same historical period (Bayramoğlu, 2005: 244).

In Türkiye, independent administrative authorities, which have a long history but attracted the interest of only a limited number of academics until the mid-1990s, have today become a subject of public debate with many aspects and characteristics. In essence, independent administrative authorities in Türkiye were established due to EU harmonization policies. Their emergence also occurred under the compulsion of the IMF and the EU (Özer, 2007: 162). There have been significant increases in the number of authorities established in recent years that substantially affect the current economic and administrative structure. Considerable powers have been granted and autonomy recognized to the independent administrative authorities established in the recent period.

EVALUATIONS

It can be said that Turkish bureaucracy has an ancient and deep-rooted tradition and that high-ranking state officials constitute the most elite social group in the country. In Turkish culture, which has a very old state-building tradition, administrators have always ranked high in social status. One of the most important problems that have emerged in Turkish public administration is the struggle between the senior administrative cadre (bureaucracy) and political powers (Şaylan, 1974: 54–56). It is not possible to say that the elected officials fully dominate the use of political power. In this respect, one of the major problems in Türkiye is that the elected-appointed relations have not been placed on a sound foundation. This situation stems not only from the bureaucracy's efforts to exert influence over political power but also from the failure of political institutions to develop a mature and adequate stance.

Furthermore, since the completion of the master's thesis on which this study is based (after 2008), there have been some significant changes in the Turkish bureaucracy. The AK Party, which came to power with the 2002 elections, set transforming the military-bureaucratic tutelage system that had been influential in Türkiye for many years as one of its main objectives. At the beginning of this period, the bureaucracy—particularly the high judiciary, the Turkish Armed Forces, and certain regulatory agencies/institutions—served as an actor shaping politics. Over time, with Erdoğan's charismatic leadership role and successful direction of social mobilization, politics, the private sector and civil society gained a stronger position against the bureaucracy.

In this period, the structure and function of the National Security Council (Milli Güvenlik Kurulu MGK) were changed; steps were taken toward civilianization. Democratization reforms were carried out within the framework of the European Union accession process. The balance of power between “appointed” and “elected” officials within the bureaucracy was redefined. The undersecretary positions in ministries were abolished and replaced with the politically appointed position of deputy minister positions. The 2010 constitutional referendum marked a significant turning point in the relationship between the bureaucracy and politics. Along with this change, the structure of the Council of Judges and Prosecutors (Hakimler ve Savcılar Kurulu-HSK, formerly HSYK) was altered.

The most critical breaking point of this era was the December 17–25, 2013 process. This process turned into an open conflict between the legitimate government and FETÖ (the organization also known as the Gülen Movement) and initiated a purge process within the bureaucracy.

This conflict reached its peak with the July 15, 2016 coup attempt of the organization. Following the coup attempt, a State of Emergency (OHAL) was declared and tens of thousands of public officials affiliated with FETÖ were dismissed. The issue of democratic political and civil oversight of the bureaucracy gained even greater importance after these breaking events.

With the 2017 constitutional referendum, Türkiye transitioned from the parliamentary system to the Presidential Government System. This systemic change has fundamentally transformed the bureaucracy-politics relationship. New structures such as policy councils/boards and Presidency offices were established. Traditional bureaucratic hierarchy has given way to a more flexible but more centralized administrative structure. In the new system, executive power is concentrated in a single hand—the President. Ministries have become directly subordinate to the President. Appointments of senior bureaucrats began to be made by presidential decrees. In this context, the powers of politics have increased significantly and direct political control over the bureaucracy has been institutionalized.

In the light of all these developments, it can readily be stated that Türkiye is one of the few countries in the world with centuries-old bureaucratic and political institutions, and with a long-standing tradition of efforts toward their institutionalization. Although the relationship between bureaucracy and politics (political power) has varied over time depending on the country's contemporary conditions, both actors essentially represent deeply rooted institutional structures that strive for the development of society and take action toward that end.. Since these two powerful institutions are indispensable cornerstones of democracy, their existence and efforts are important. In this context, Türkiye continues—and must continue—to embrace the spirit of the modern age through the interplay of democracy, politics, bureaucracy, and of course, diplomacy.

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